On September 11, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was a special guest on my weekly “Genron TV” internet television show, discussing what the pending security legislation will do for Japan’s national interests. His appearance came at a delicate time, as the government prepared to pass the pending legislation in the upper house of the Diet sometime next week. Understandably, Abe spoke cautiously, spending slightly over an hour to discuss the merits of the “peace” legislation aimed at expanding Japan’s international security role.

　　　　　Seeking early enactment of the law, the Abe administration is criticized for allegedly having not done enough to win the people’s understanding of the legislation, termed “war legislation” by the opposition camp. With lower house members of the Diet having spent a total of 116 hours—and their upper house counterparts nearly 100 hours so far—I asked why the majority of Japanese appear unable to understand what the legislation is designed to do for Japan’s security. Abe replied:

　　　　　“In normal countries, politicians engage in thorough discussions on how best to protect the people and the territorial air, land, and seas of the state. In Japan’s case, deliberations by Diet members have revolved around our constitution (which includes the war-renouncing Article 9), international law, and past debates in the public forum on these issues. Obviously, the people find these deliberations difficult to understand. While the government side has tried to answer questions by citing concrete examples as much as possible, the opposition camp terms the legislation “war legislation,” sounding the alarm that it will inevitably lead to conscription. Unfortunately, many people believe it.”

　　　　　Abe’s reply points to how peculiar Japan is as an independent democratic state. In other countries, politicians discuss concrete measures in order to protect their people’s lives and their territory. If a nation is uneasy about safeguarding its security on its own, the incumbent administration very naturally pushes ahead with military buildup or strengthens security cooperation with its allies. Otherwise, the administration’s responsibility for national governance will be seriously questioned.

　　　　　In Japan, however, there are people who have been nurtured to look away from the harsh realities of international geopolitics under a national constitution written by the American occupation authorities. There are many who naively believe that Article 9 has protected—and will forever continue to protect—Japan’s peace, banking on the goodwill of other nations and turning a blind eye to all threats.

　　　　　Of course, military might is not the only thing a nation should pursue. Abe and other world leaders maintain that conflicts and diplomatic issues must be resolved through peaceful talks. However, there actually are nations—such as China, Russia, and North Korea—to which peaceful negotiations seldom apply. Nations except for Japan resolve problems through negotiations as well as the use of force, if necessary, in dealing with adversaries that attempt to deprive them of their land or seas by force, or abduct their people. How would these people, who maintain that Article 9 has safeguarded the peace and security of Japan, explain the North Korean abductions of Japanese citizens, or the alarming realities of the East and South China Seas where China boisterously is endeavoring to change the existing order?

Clash between “Intellectualism and Anti-Intellectualism”

　　　　　Some opposition parties and liberal dailies, including the liberal Asahi Shimbun, shut their eyes to these issues, criticizing the pending legislation as “war legislation” that will lead to conscription. They say Japan should rely on peaceful negotiations with China, disregarding what Beijing has been attempting to accomplish in the East and South China Sea.

　　　　　The opposition camp never disseminates information pertaining to the harsh realities of international geopolitics—something that Japanese need very badly in judging the pending legislation. Members of opposition parties and the liberal press do not inform the people that almost all the nations in Asia, except for China and the two Koreas, greatly welcome the legislation and are looking forward to its early enactment, including the ten member nations of the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations). In point of fact, an overwhelming majority of nations around the world favor an early enactment of the legislation. While refusing to acknowledge this, the opposition camp plays up the view of certain scholars who continue to make groundless arguments against the pending legislation. This can hardly help to promote people’s understanding of the current debate.

　　　　　If what free-lance journalist Takashi Nakamiya wrote in the “Dateline iRONNA ” column of the September 11 issue of the Sankei Shimbun is true, I will be truly shocked. Nakamiya quoted Professor Jiro Yamaguchi (57) of Tokyo’s Hosei University as telling the crowd during a protest rally: “I wish to say this to Abe—‘You are less than a human being. I want to cut you to pieces!’”

　　　　　Nakamiya also wrote: “On August 26, Prof. Yamaguchi tweeted: ‘The battle in Japanese politics today is between civilization and barbarism, justice and might, and intellectualism and anti-intellectualism.’”

　　　　　It is difficult to immediately believe that those words, attributed to Prof. Yamaguchi,　were actually uttered by a scholar. Asked to comment on Yamaguchi’s remarks, Abe stated: “If he really means a clash between ‘intellectualism and anti-intellectualism’ is impairing Japanese politics, I would think he should not have said he wanted to ‘cut me to pieces.” I quite agree with the prime minister.

　　　　　Abe is constantly subjected to unfair attacks in the Diet and on the street. Belatedly, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), of which he is president, has begun to distribute leaflets and materials explaining that the pending legislation is not “war legislation,” that it is constitutional, and that there is no chance that the government will implement conscription following its enactment. Although the LDP’s counteroffensive is grossly overdue, it is still a positive step forward—no matter how modest—in dealing with the groundless charges against the legislation.

　　　　　Why has the government party been so passive? The strong impression is that it has been left to Abe alone to defend the legislation. There appear to be many ways to rebut the inconsistent arguments from the opposition parties, including the DPJ’s claim that “Japan does not require the right to collective self-defense. All Japan needs is the right to individual self-defense.” I asked the prime minister why the LDP—as a whole—has not refuted the opposition camp more aggressively. Abe had this to say:

　　　　　“We are proud that the LDP has not taken the high road in this debate. We have tried to explain the legislation logically and unemotionally, citing as many concrete and specific examples as possible.”

Appreciation of Postwar Regime

　　　　　Although the Asahi accused Abe of “looking down on the people” in its popular Vox Populli, Vox Dei column dated August 23, my impression is quite the contrary. Abe has maintained an amazingly low posture. For some reason, the LDP and the government have assumed a curiously restrained stance towards the opposition parties, whose inconsistent assertions could rather easily have been refuted.

　　　　　A question arose in my mind as I thought about Abe’s low profile. Isn’t he practicing “senshu bouei” (an exclusively defense-oriented posture) spiritually as he faces the opposition?

　　　　　Needless to say, the “defense-only” policy is the basic concept of Japan’s security framework. Isn’t this brake on the use of force also spiritually restricting the government, including the prime minister? As Abe pointed out, the government’s views on Japan’s right to collective self-defense date back some 40 years and must be rectified to reflect the sea changes in the international security environment. For instance, the number of US military personnel, aircraft, and warships has been cut by half. On the other hand, North Korea, which did not own missiles and other sophisticated weapons, is now equipped with a threatening number of missiles and other weapons, and China’s abnormal military buildup continues on. It is mandatory for Japan to grow out of its shell of naïve postwar pacifism in order to adapt to the rapid changes in the international security environment.

　　　　　I also queried Abe about his August 14 statement marking the 70th anniversary of the end of the last war in which he made a generally positive assessment of the political and social framework of postwar Japan. I wanted to know how this assessment jibes with his long-cherished desire of realizing a “departure from the postwar regime.” He replied:

　　　　　“Seventy years ago, we pledged to never repeat the horrors of war. We take pride in the steps we have since taken. It is also a fact that a variety of new systems were simultaneously introduced during the Occupation. It is very important to constantly reevaluate if these systems still match the needs of the modern age. The LDP holds up a revision of the postwar constitution as a major pillar of its policies.”

　　　　　“However, timing is an important element in politics,” explained Abe. “After the peace legislation is enacted, my first priority will be to make every effort to deliver positive results in strengthening the economy of the nation. I am also looking forward to grappling tenaciously with a constitutional revision—a long-cherished wish of our party since it was formed (in 1955).”

　　　　　As opinions hinting at the possibility of indefinitely putting off a revision of the constitution are beginning to be heard within the LDP, Abe’s reply gently but resolutely denying such a possibility made one feel the tenacity of a man well qualified to be in charge of postwar Japan at this crucial juncture of its evolution as a mature normal nation.

(Translated from “Renaissance Japan” column no. 672 in the September 24, 2015 issue of The Weekly Shincho)