Quite a few people among us Japanese keep chanting slogans opposing the new security legislation under deliberation in the Diet, calling it “war legislation.” I utterly fail to understand their mindset because this legislation—designed to prevent wars by expanding the international security role of the Japan Self Defense Forces (JSDF)—should rightly be termed “peace legislation” instead.

　　　　　Opposition parties, including the Social Democratic Party and the Communist Party, as well as some members of the Japanese mass media, have previously carried out vigorous campaigns against government policies and legislation involving the JSDF, citing reasons that were far from the truth. Twenty-three years ago, when the government enacted legislation pertaining to United Nations peace-keeping operations, the opposition camp charged that the law would make Japan an aggressor nation. But what the JSDF has accomplished during past international peace keeping operations has been highly evaluated globally, proving that the criticism by the opposition was totally unfounded. The pending “peace legislation” will be sure to create the same results.

　　　　　Alarmed by the irresponsible assertions by the opposition camp, I have recently formed a national people’s forum with the purpose of enabling the nation to scrutinize the details of the bills under discussion, come to grips with the drastic changes in the international situation, and appeal for the early enactment of this legislation. The forum consists of a total of 318 scholars, intellectuals, and business leaders who firmly believe early enactment is the key to protecting the people of Japan and deterring war. On August 13, approximately 90 of the founding members congregated in Tokyo to hold a news conference.

　　　　　My homepage was inundated with emails expressing opinions on the pros and cons of the legislation, including one written by a man who identified himself only as “the father of a son who joined the JSDF last year.” In a nutshell, he said:

　　　　　“My son joined the JSDF, attracted by what he saw as its primary mission of protecting people and saving lives in times of natural disasters—such as after the Chuetsu Earthquake in Niigata Prefecture in July 2007. However, it is obvious that the security legislation would drastically expand the scope of the operations of the JSDF, undoubtedly causing their men and women to face a growing risk to their lives. I don’t want my son to be with the JSDF anymore. As a father, I am seriously worried about his well-being every single day.”

　　　　　I truly feel for this loving father who is worried about his son. And I suppose this sentiment is of course shared by virtually all parents with sons and daughters serving stints in the JSDF, and perhaps young parents as well with little children. In considering this father’s email, I think it is pertinent to review two elements—the security of the people and the nation itself, and that of JSDF personnel.

Legislation to Prevent War

　　　　　In connection with the security of Japan and its people, Tetsuya Nishimoto, former Chairman of the JSDF Joint Staff Office, points out that four relevant points must be considered: (A) so-called “gray zone” situations; (B) situation that gravely and seriously affects the security of Japan; (C) international peace keeping operations; and (D) the right to collective self-defense.

　　　　　The “gray zone” (point A), as it name indicates, is a situation where Japan’s interests may be threatened but a state of conflict may not clearly exist. Currently the latitude given the JSDF to react to such contingencies is too narrow. Legally speaking, the Japanese government is prohibited from mobilizing the JSDF to act unless an adversary attacks Japan deliberately and systemically. For instance, if a large fleet of Chinese fishing boats should rush towards the shores of the Senkaku Islands, with unarmed Chinese fishermen going ashore quietly and orderly, there would be nothing the JSDF could do to stop them. It could not even help the Japan Coast Guard to stop the fishermen from landing on the Senkakus.

　　　　　The JSDF could only cope with such intruders if the Chinese launched an assault on the Senkakus, having obviously organized and premeditated the landing, and armed the infiltrators. If, on the other hand, the Chinese fishing boats were found to have simply “happened to” rush for the Senkaku shores to, say, seek shelter from a typhoon, the JSDF would have to sit idly by, as the law bans it from taking action under such circumstances. Because such a framework makes it essentially impossible to defend Japan, the government has recently set up a system under which it will, if necessary, convene a telephone cabinet meeting in order to swiftly order the JSDF to patrol the seas around the Senkakus on behalf of the Coast Guard.

　　　　　As matters stand today, there are numerous other security gaps that need to be filled; the pending security legislation is designed to rectify this awkward situation in which there is often no effective means of coping with aggressors.

　　　　　Point (B)—a situation that directly and gravely affects the peace and security of Japan—can be understood by pondering what could happen on the Korean Peninsula. If an armed conflict developed there and the ensuing situation could not be resolved, Japan would face a serious national security crisis. In order to stave off any danger to Japan, the legislation seeks to enable the JSDF to provide supplies to US forces more efficiently. At present, supplying goods and services to US forces is allowed only within Japanese territorial space, requiring US forces to come back to Japan every time they need supplies. The legislation will enable delivery to US forces on the spot, leading to smoother coordination between US and Japanese forces—although the JSDF will continue to be restricted from providing arms directly to US forces.

　　　　　As regards point (C)—international peace-keeping operations—there have also been a number of complications with this aspect of our broader self-defense. The JSDF, its use of arms stringently restricted, has had to turn to foreign forces for its own protection since it began peace-keeping operations in 1992. The JSDF was protected by the French army in Cambodia. In Iraq, it was protected initially by the British army, then by the Dutch army, and finally once again by the British army. Domestic law prohibits the JSDF from fighting back when the armed forces of other nations protecting it are attacked. Simply put, there is nothing for the JSDF but to run. This is cowardice by any stretch of imagination. So under the new law, the JSDF would be allowed to counterattack if foreign forces protecting it were assaulted.

　　　　　A few words on the final point (D)—Japan’s right to collective self-defense. This right, which virtually all nations around the world except Japan exercise, enables allies to join hands in implementing joint self-defense initiatives. Japan’s readiness to exercise its right to collective self-defense, even restrictively, teamed up with the US and other allies, would have a dramatic effect against countries like China and North Korea. Beijing has its eyes on the Senkaku Islands and other Japanese territory, while Pyongyang presents a threat with its nuclear weapons. The new law would be an important curb on the power of these two countries. Let me stress once again that the purpose of a restrictive exercise of the right to collective self-defense is to deter a war, not start one.

　　　　　As can be well understood from the above explanations, Japan is seeking to enact security legislation for the sole purpose of protecting its land and people—far from provoking or invading other nations.

Risking Lives for the Common Good

　　　　　Now let us get back to the father of the member of the JSDF who emailed me to express his concern about a heightened risk for his son. I wish to first point out that, regardless of the security-related legislation, all JSDF personnel are subject to risks of all kinds—just like our firemen and policemen. Even now some lives of JSDF personnel are lost in the daily pursuit of their duties or in training accidents.

　　　　　Recognizing such risks, men and women with a strong sense of mission to commit themselves to the nation’s peace and security have joined the JSDF. That is why they pledge that in the worst case they are prepared to risk their lives in performing their duties.

　　　　　Despite risks inherent in serving in the JSDF, our nation has for years been almost totally devoid of a sense of thanks and respect for these people. In point of fact, many people have looked down on JSDF personnel.

　　　　　However, the persistent efforts made by these men and women have caused people to take a fresh look at them. Their accomplishments have begun to melt the people’s hearts. A surprisingly high percentage of the population—92.2 percent—view the JSDF as trustable. This is proof that an overwhelming percentage of the population has finally begun to realize that they owe much to JSDF personnel. I feel that the JSDF is belatedly beginning to evoke a genuine feeling of thankfulness and respect in the minds of our people.

　　　　　I am convinced that JSDF personnel, who make it their mission to commit themselves to protecting our land and its people, constitute the central axis of the sense of oneness between the state and people. All the more reason for me to strongly hope that the closer one is to JSDF personnel—such as the father of the member of the JSDF who emailed me—the better he or she will understand the real nature of the peace legislation, realizing that it never is “war legislation”— as those in the opposition camp groundlessly and persistently claim.

(Translated from “Renaissance Japan” column no. 669 in the September 3, 2015 issue of The Weekly Shincho)