NEEDED: PRECISE RECOGNITION OF DECEPTION AS ESSENSE OF CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY
A former editorial writer of the People’s Daily, official organ of the Chinese Communist Party (CPC), recently contributed an article to the liberal Chuo Koron entitled Peace and Quiet in Asia Will Not Be Achieved without Reconciliation between Japan and China. Ma Licheng, who has previously questioned Beijing’s animosity toward Japan, calls on Tokyo and Beijing to sincerely tackle three pertinent elements to improve their strained relations:—(1) genuine efforts to maintain peace, (2) reflection on their wartime history, and (3) mutual tolerance.
Ma appears to be directing his remarks to China as he discusses the first element, i.e., efforts to maintain peace: “Some countries get ready to use force while chanting sweet slogans of peace…Such a method never commands respect, as it uses peace as a deceptive ploy.”
Regarding reflection on the past, the author’s remarks are directly aimed at Japan as he declares: “Japan was the assailant during the war and must humbly reconsider its conduct. In a survey by the Asahi Shimbun, 74 percent of Japanese regard the ‘Murayama Statement’ (a formal government apology issued on August 15, 1995 by then Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama) as having been the right and appropriate thing for Japan to do.” Quoting popular author Haruki Murakami, who wants Japan to “apologize as often as necessary” for its wartime conduct, Ma stresses it is all the more important for Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to reflect on the statement by Murayama and make a fresh apology in a formal statement expected for the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II next month.
The third element, pointing out that tolerance is the mother of reconciliation, is obviously geared to China.
While making stringent demands on both Japan and China, Ma makes a point of introducing only good aspects of the bilateral relationship. Noting that Japan has apologized 25 times to China (in point of fact, Japan has apologized more than 60 times) and that Chinese government representatives have indeed accepted Japanese apologies—as Prime Minister Wen Jiabao did in 2007—Ma brings up laudatory remarks about Japan by former leaders Mao Zedong, Chou Enlai, and Deng Xiaoping. Ma denies Japan is a militaristic nation today—a statement one could not readily make in a nation that is fanatically anti-Japanese without the approval of the higher-ups.
In fact, so disarming is Ma’s proposal to Japan that it may entice the reader to hope that, if Japan apologizes again and seeks forgiveness, China will respond according, leading to a historic reconciliation between Tokyo and Beijing.
The reader should be reminded that that is just wishful thinking. In 2002, Ma contributed a controversial essay entitled New Thinking on Relations with Japan to the then two most popular monthly magazines in Japan, introducing this stunning view: “Speaking on the basis of concrete facts, (Japan) actually is Asia’s pride.” The Bungei Shunju and the Chuo Koron carried Ma’s essay simultaneously after it had originally appeared in China’s influential Zhanlue yu Guanli (Strategy and Management) magazine. Touched by the author’s courageous assertions made amid a fierce storm of anti-Japanism in China then, I interviewed Ma. Harshly criticized for what he had written, he had by then been relieved of his People’s Daily post, but I was convinced that he had written “New Thinking” with the tacit understanding of Chairman Jiang Zemin.
Beijing’s Conspiracy to Build a Chinese Empire
Although China’s top leader himself presumably granted Ma permission to publish the essay, Japan-China relations continued to deteriorate, with China’s invented version of Japan’s World War II conduct becoming fixed in the mind of the international community. How have the ties between Tokyo and Beijing evolved over the years? It is true that the Communist Party, for the most part pursuing a tough line against Japan, has tossed an occasional pro-Japanese bouquet our way. But whenever we Japanese have found a ray of hope and made concessions, hasn’t China driven us further into a corner, taking advantage of our amicable compromises? As this tedious process has kept repeating itself over the years, hasn’t China stepped up its fabrication of Japan’s wartime record, building major historical museums in China and the US based on its own invented interpretation of events with no consultation with Japan?
Ma’s article was released just before Abe is slated to issue a statement as head of state to mark the 70th anniversary of the last war. Seemingly designed to show a deep understanding of Japan and win the sympathy of the Japanese people, Ma’s article is clearly aimed at demanding Abe’s apology by adroitly turning to Japanese and international public opinion. How should we treat Ma’s commentary?
While I do recognize Ma as a fair-minded journalist, I suspect that the Communist Party views him as a convenient chess piece. One becomes more convinced of this after reading The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower (Henry Holt and Company, 2015) by Michael Pillsbury, a leading American expert on China who admits to having once been among the most pro-Chinese experts in the Western world.
As director of the Hudson Institute’s Center on China Strategy, Pillsbury has made annual visits to China over more than four decades, building his network of contacts with China’s centers of power, including the People’s Liberation Army. He has arguably had access to more Chinese government internal documents than any Westerner. Committed to helping promote Washington’s conciliatory policy toward Beijing, he was even derisively called a “panda hugger”—a term he says he gladly wore “as a badge of honor for decades.”
The Hundred-Year Marathon is the author’s candid admission that he has been deceived by China over his four decades of China-watching. By marathon, Pillsbury means Beijing’s conspiracy to build a Chinese empire, replacing the US as the world’s leading power by 2049—a century after the establishment of the Communist government.
In the introduction of his book, Pillsbury describes five false assumptions the US has made about China. In False Assumption #1,—“Engagement Brings Complete Cooperation,”—he explains: “For four decades now, my colleagues and I believed that ‘engagement’ with the Chinese would induce China to cooperate with the West on a wide range of policy problems. It hasn’t…In short, China has failed to meet nearly all of our rosy expectations.”
Pillsbury explains False Assumption #2,—“China Is on the Road to Democracy,”—
by predicting that rule by the Communist Party will prevail for decades, with a system termed “authoritarian capitalism” emerging in the communist state.
False Assumption #3,—“China, the Fragile Nation,”—is presented together with a bitter confession from the author: When he visited China in 1996, distinguished Chinese scholars “offered us what appeared to be an unprecedented look at their country’s inner workings and problems…We were told that China was in serious economic and political peril—and that the potential for collapse looked large.
“Considering the well-known secretiveness of the Chinese Politburo,” Pillsbury recalls, “I was astonished by these scholars’ candor, which only underscored my support for efforts to provide U.S. aid to a supposedly fragile China.”
Revenge against the US
Pillsbury later learned that “an identical message about China’s coming decline” was delivered simultaneously to other groups of American academics, business leaders, and policy experts on those purportedly “exclusive visits.” Back in the US, many of them repeated these “revelations” in various forms—articles, books, and commentaries.” As a result, even the influential RAND Corporation asserted that the US must support China. “Many expressed the worrisome view that if the United States pressed China too hard to have elections, to free dissidents, to extend the rule of law, and to treat ethnic minorities fairly, then this pressure would lead to the collapse of the Chinese state—causing chaos throughout Asia…
“Yet the hard fact is that China’s already robust GDP is predicted to continue to grow by at least 7 or 8 percent, thereby surpassing that of the United States by 2018 at the earliest…Unfortunately, China policy experts like me were so wedded to the idea of the ‘coming collapse of China’ that few of us believed these forecasts. While we worried about China’s woes (and extended to China all the aid we could give), its economy more than doubled.”
Americans have generally assumed Chinese would want to be like them. Under False Assumption #4,—“China Wants To Be, and Is, Like Us,” —Pillsbury sorely laments Americans’ failure to come to grips with the Chinese mindset. In his discussion of the last of the five false assumptions,—“China’s Hawks Are Weak,” — he introduces the following anecdote: During the Clinton administration, the Department of Defense and the CIA assigned him specifically to examine “China’s capacity to deceive the U.S. and its actions to date along those lines…Over time, I discovered proposals by Chinese hawks…to the Chinese leadership to mislead and manipulate American policy makers to obtain intelligence and military, technological, and economic assistance. I learned that these hawks had been advising Chinese leaders, beginning with Mao Zedong, to avenge a century of humiliation and aspired to replace the U.S. as the economic, military, and political leader of the world by the year 2049.” Pillsbury says he has finally come to realize that the most effective way for China to attain its objective of achieving hegemony is to get everything it needs from the US while continuing to resort to deception in order to hide its true objectives. He points out that then CIA Director George Tenet was the only US government official who believed his findings.
The assumption of hegemony China aspires to, Pillsbury stresses, would mean changes in the existing international norms and values—tantamount to gaining revenge against the US, as it were. If one compares Ma’s article, based predominantly on wishful thinking, with Pillsbury’s assertions substantiated by extremely detailed materials, then realizes the realities of the Xi Jinping administration’s accelerating offensive against Japan, the impact of Ma’s article rather quickly fades away.
Abe must conduct his China diplomacy by coming to grips with the true character of China as a nation. Despite this imperative, however, the Foreign Ministry has kept secret China’s aggressive development of gas fields in the East China Sea over the years, desperately trying to improve bilateral relations. It is for this reason, among many others, that I have strong reservations about the government’s conduct of its China policy in line with the guidance of the Foreign Ministry.
(Translated from “Renaissance Japan” column no. 665 in the July 30, 2015 issue of The Weekly Shincho)