With a scheduled address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe before a joint session of US Congress approaching, it is pertinent to ponder how Abe’s predecessors—such as Shigeru Yoshida, Ichiro Hatoyama, and Nobusuke Kishi—viewed world affairs and US-Japan relations in particular. Each of them desperately pursued Japanese national interests as a fierce battle unfolded between communist and anti-communist forces with Japan as the battleground immediately following the end of World War II.

　　　　　The American occupation of Japan evolved with two camps bitterly clashing—one headed by Major General Charles Willoughby, the staunch anti-communist chief of intelligence (G-2) for General Douglas MacArthur at his General Headquarters (GHQ), and the other by Brigadier General Courtney Whitney, an able, intensely liberal lawyer who served as head of GHQ’s Government Section (GS) with a host of communist staffers under him.

　　　　　The GS forces with Whitney at the helm were sympathetic to the former Soviet Union and China, determined to leave Japan so weak that it would never be able to rise to its feet again. Those with the Willoughby camp, however, regarded Japan as a respectable nation that must one day be allowed to become the full-fledged independent nation it had once been. They were convinced that an independent Japan was clearly in US national interests. The former group is called the “weak Japan” faction, and the latter the “strong Japan” faction.

　　　　　Japan’s misfortune was that, during the initial two to three years of American occupation, the GS group overwhelmed the other, leading to the formation of a strongly liberal and leftwing framework that shaped the fundamental policies of post-war Japan. In other words, a foundation was formed that would continue to place Japan under the patronage of the US while leaving it a fragile nation.

　　　　　The US drafted a constitution banning Japan from maintaining a military, only to be compelled to change course in light of the budding Cold War. American leaders began to favor Japan’s rearmament, convinced that it would not be in their national interests for Japan to remain a burden on the US interminably.

　　　　　The new turn of events meant that Japan was blessed with an opportunity to achieve independence—not only in terms of international law but also in how it actually managed its relationship with the US. However, this US overture was not necessarily welcomed by Japanese leaders or the general population. To the Japanese, may of whom had seen their homes burned down or their families lost in a losing war, rearmament may have evoked images of more war.

　　　　　Japanese businessmen and politicians, who had single-mindedly pursued economic recovery with minimum military outlay, may have thought that depending entirely on the US militarily would be ideal for Japan under the circumstances. Successive prime ministers may have avoided tackling a revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty or a constitutional revision because of the tremendous political capital that would be necessary in such an effort. While virtually every Japanese leader attempted to reject the US approach for Japan’s rearmament and reinforcement of military forces, Kishi was an exception.

An “Easier Way”

　　　　　John Foster Dulles, acting as a Special Representative to the President, visited Japan in March 1950 with a draft of the peace treaty that was to be signed the following year. Dulles, who was to become Secretary of State in 1953 as a member of the Eisenhower cabinet, urged Japan to rearm itself. However, Prime Minister Yoshida turned Dulles down flat, stubbornly declaring that he “would never give an inch,” according to Katsuo Okazaki, Foreign Minister in Yoshida’s cabinet. (Dulles and Shigeru Yoshida, edited by Ichiro Murakawa; Kokusho Kanko-kai, 1991)

　　　　　The book further quotes Yoshida as remarking: “I think (Dulles) was quite disappointed. In fact, it wasn’t just our posture toward rearmament. He wasn’t pleased with us in general.”

　　　　　Dulles must have viewed Yoshida, who resolutely refused to rearm Japan despite the start of the Cold War, as a politician incapable of coming to grips with world affairs.

　　　　　Upon signing the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1952, Japan also concluded the US-Japan Security Treaty. Japan thus regained an independence of sorts, while still agreeing to provide the US military bases in strategic regions across Japan. Although not committed to shouldering the responsibility to defend Japan, the US was allowed to dispatch its armed forces at will to control “large-scale riots and disturbances in Japan.” The bilateral treaty in effect relegated Japan to the status of a virtual US colony, and a revision of the Security Treaty was therefore a pressing necessity.

　　　　　In August 1955, Ichiro Hatoyama as prime minister sent his foreign minister, Mamoru Shigemitsu, to Washington in an attempt to discuss a revision of the Security Treaty. But Dulles “flatly brushed aside” his proposal, curtly asking: “Do you really think Japan could handle its defense on its own?” (Memoir of Nobusuke Kishi; Kosaido, Tokyo, 1983)

　　　　　Kishi was named prime minister two years later, following the resignation of the Hatoyama cabinet. The new leader paid his first visit to Washington in June 1957 for an historic meeting with President Dwight Eisenhower, who extended to his guest the rare hospitality of taking him back to the Japanese Embassy in his own car after a round of golf at Burning Tree Country Club in Maryland (the match was a draw). When Kishi proposed a revision of the Security Treaty in a summit meeting the following day, Dulles readily consented to it—an abrupt change of posture from two years before. Dulles proposed that a US-Japan Security Committee be set up to pursue the matter. The committee was established two months later in early August, subsequently leading to a revision of the Security Treaty in 1960.

　　　　　Why did the US find Kishi’s overture acceptable? Presumably, it was because Kishi demonstrated a resolve rooted in his commitment to Japan’s sovereign independence. Kishi had two options in mind: one aimed at fundamentally revising the treaty, the other designed to make the necessary changes by exchanging diplomatic notes without touching the treaty itself. The former must be ratified by the Diet and US Congress. The latter was an “easier way,” requiring no such ratification.

National Interests: Fundamental Principle

　　　　　Kishi, who passed away in 1987 at 90, was convinced the Security Treaty had to be revised—no matter how difficult that might be—in order that the Japanese people firmly establish a sense of themselves as an　independent country determined to defend themselves through their own efforts.

　　　　　Kishi’s vision for a “new era of bilateral relations” between Japan and the US presupposed an equal　relationship. In point of fact, he had formulated a national defense scheme under which Japan would have　self-defense capabilities commensurate with its national strength.

　　　　　Both Eisenhower and Dulles trusted Kishi because the Japan envisioned by him would serve America’s national interests as well.

　　　　　The fundamental principle dictating a nation’s action is its national interests. Kishi gave priority to Japanese national interests, which would serve those of the US because of the common values shared with Japan. That is why his proposal for a treaty revision was endorsed. The US side gave unstinted respect to Kishi, who dared to choose a more thorny path in his determination to realize the sovereign independence of his nation.

　　　　　What Japan must now aim at is striving with courage, like Kishi, to implement policies and strategies that will serve the national interests of both Japan and the US. In other words, Japan-US relations must be strengthened in all ways possible.

　　　　　In terms of the economy, agreement on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is the top priority. US Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter said recently: “(The TPP) is expected to increase US exports by $125 billion in the next decade…would deepen our alliances and partnerships abroad and underscore our lasting commitment to the Asia-Pacific…In terms of our rebalance in the broadest sense, passing the TPP is as important to me as another aircraft carrier.”

　　　　　The TPP will bring significant benefits to participating nations beyond just economic rewards. In his speech to the US Congress, Abe should keep in mind the examples of his grandfather Nobusuke Kishi as he urges the ratification of the TPP, pointing out the merits of yet another initiative founded on strong US-Japan cooperation. The TPP will stand in contrast to the new financial order that China—which cannot join the TPP although it badly wants to—is desperately trying to implement with the founding of the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank.

　　　　　The second most important message Abe must deliver to the US, and to the world for that matter, has to do with military affairs. He must demonstrate Japan’s readiness to step up and fill the security gap resulting from America’s tendency to look inward under the Obama administration. He must also state in no uncertain terms his willingness to grapple with the constitutional obstacles that stand in the way of Japan taking on such a larger role.

　　　　　That Japan has amply reflected on its wartime history has already been more than proven in its earnest endeavors as a peace-loving nation over the past 70 years. Looking to the future, Abe should pledge Japan’s continuing contribution to the peace of the world, moving beyond the tragic past.

(Translated from “Renaissance Japan” no. 652 in the April 23, 2015 issue of The Weekly Shincho)