The June 20th government report reviewing the 1993 “Kono Statement”—Japan’s official apology to South Korea concerning the so-called “comfort women”—was a step in the right direction. However, the report fails to go far enough, neglecting to touch on the most fundamental aspects of this controversial issue.
　　　　　Why the five-member panel picked by the government could only provide a superficial review was made clear from the remarks by the panelists during a news conference following the release of the report. Apparently, Foreign Ministry sources put a check on the panel throughout the reviewing process to make the review as “amicable and sensible” as possible. The panel, headed by former Prosecutor General Keiichi Tadaki, also included Professor Ikuhiko Hata, a leading expert on the history of the war period.
　　　　　As Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has vowed, the government’s intent has never been to revise the statement, although he did make clear it must be reviewed for the accuracy of its content. I believe Abe hopes to bring to light what is contrary to historical fact in the statement made on August 4th, 1993, by then Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono. This, I believe, is a necessary process in order to present the other side of the argument, safeguarding Japan’s national interests as concerns the “comfort women” issue. Nevertheless, Foreign Ministry officials interfered, attempting to avoid diplomatic friction with Seoul, typically pursuing a policy of protecting their own positions, rather than the interests of the nation. What the panel’s report actually points to is a dire need to fundamentally revamp Japan’s spineless posture toward its foreign policy.
　　　　　Let us first review the positive aspects of the report, which said the government panel found confidential records showing Tokyo and Seoul coordinated closely on the wording of the Kono Statement. The report revealed for the first time that the South Korean government had pressured Tokyo to specify—at the cost of twisting the facts—that Korean women had been physically taken away by force to Japanese military brothels, demanding the Japanese side “investigate the truth about the ‘comfort women’ in a way that would satisfy various organizations in South Korea (involved in protecting their rights and seeking redress for them.)”
　　　　　The only way for Tokyo to satisfy all of the anti-Japanese bodies active in South Korea at the time would have been to completely capitulate to their demands. In point of fact, the Korean government urged Japan to acknowledge the military’s involvement in the recruitment of “comfort women” and the use of coercion—and apologize for having thrown these women into the depths of misery. This despite a serious lack of evidence of the Japanese government or military having ever ordered or directed the establishment of brothels or compelled Korean women to work in these establishments. Without such an admission on Japan’s part, however, the South Korean government insisted it would be absolutely unable ”to straighten out the difficult situation and pacify the general populace.” To put it differently, the Korean government threatened that it would be incapable of doing anything to control a fierce backlash against Japan if Tokyo didn’t comply with its demands.
　　　　　When Seoul demanded, in order to satisfy Koreans, that Tokyo acknowledge the Japanese military having “ordered” that brothels be set up, Tokyo counter-proposed a description—that the military had “asked” that such establishments be set up for Japanese soldiers. Seoul then demanded that Tokyo acknowledge having also issued “orders” for the coercive recruitment of Korean women. Both sides subsequently agreed to tone it down to “instructions.” Eventually, Tokyo compromised and agreed to state that brothels were set up “at the request of the military,” according to the report.

Wrongly Equating One Thing with Another

　　　　　Japanese established brothels in Korea, but so did Koreans. As for the recruitment of women for these establishments, the Japanese government in reality issued frequent warnings about brothels tricking women into prostitution by falsely announcing they represented the military. In reality, it is an utterly false accusation that the Japanese government and military “ordered” or “instructed” coercive recruitment of women.
　　　　　However, the Korean side absolutely refused to accept this reality, informing Tokyo that South Koreans would not accept the explanation that some Korean women had become military prostitutes of their own volition—even if they might have represented a small portion of their nation’s female population. In effect, Seoul demanded that the Koreans be portrayed as absolutely clean and righteous and the Japanese as absolutely evil, stressing anything contrary would be totally unacceptable.
　　　　　Such was the nature of the exchange behind closed doors between Tokyo and Seoul, notes the report, concluding that the Japanese government stood firm on its “recognition that no use of coercion by Japan has been confirmed,” while making up its mind to accommodate as many wishes of the Korean government as possible in the best interest of more amicable relations with Seoul.
　　　　　The panel’s review deserves credit for having revealed the appalling reality about the fundamental Korean diplomatic posture towards Japan, insisting that Tokyo twist historical facts to concoct a story favorable to Seoul to appease the public. And yet, the report is gravely defective in that it fails to mention that the Korean perception of the “comfort women” issue reflects grossly misconceived premises. Comments Tsutomu Nishioka, professor of Tokyo Christian University and an expert on Korea:
　　　　　“On January 16th of 1992, when then Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa visited Seoul, he apologized altogether eight times over the ‘comfort women’ issue. Referring to a January 1992 announcement South Korea made soon after his visit, the report notes ‘the South Korean government discussed its policy towards matters relating to the ‘Women’s Volunteer Corps.’ The South Korean government viewed—and still does—‘comfort women’ and members of ‘Women’s Volunteer Corps’ as the same thing. In point of fact, these are two entirely different matters.”
　　　　　The Women’s Volunteer Corps refers to groups of female volunteer workers organized across Japan and the Korean Peninsula during the war, assigned predominantly to strategic industries. Takashi Uemura, then a reporter for the mass-circulation liberal daily Asahi Shimbun, is held accountable for linking volunteer female workers and comfort women, treating them as no different from each other in his reports. Later, on January 14th, 1992, Kim Yong-su of Seoul’s Hapdong News Agency reported that “a 12-year-old Korean elementary school girl had forcibly been taken by the Women’s Volunteer Corps during the war, leading to the wide-spread interpretation that a 12-year-old was made a military prostitute.
　　　　　Prof. Nishioka, who says he was stunned to read an editorial in the Dong-A Ilbo based on Kim’s report the following day, recalls the editorial was fiercely critical of Japan, referring to “this barbaric act that infuriates Heaven as well as mankind,” “Japanese as beasts with human faces,” and these “inhuman Japanese acts of cruelty.”
　　　　　Under no circumstances did Japan force members of the Women’s Volunteer Corps into military prostitution. And yet, the South Korean government, by describing its policy toward “comfort women” as one toward members of the Women’s Volunteer Corps, lays bare its fundamental misconceptions about these two entirely different groups of women. Unfortunately, the review by the government panel makes no mention of this, although this type of basic misconception is omnipresent in the overall Korean perception of “comfort women.”
　　　　　Under the premise that the Kono Statement would not be revised, Professor Hata admits, the panel refrained from judging whether or not the facts contained in the statement are true. What is a review of so important a statement worth if it is barred from pointing out any errors, misconceptions, or misinterpretations? Working on the review must have been quite frustrating for Prof. Hata and his colleagues, discouraged by the inner circle of the Foreign Ministry from criticizing the Kono Statement right at the outset. That is why I propose that we regard this review as a first step, with the government following up with further verification of the facts, ready to provide South Korea and the rest of the world pertinent information regarding the “comfort woman” issue.

Elimination of Friction Shouldn’t Always Be Japan’s Diplomatic Priority

　　　　　Despite the outrageous demand that Japan twist the facts and admit having resorted to the use of force in the recruitment of the “comfort women,” the report notes, Tokyo stood firm on its assertion that “no use of coercive measures has been confirmed.” It also quotes Nobuo Ishihara, then Kono’s deputy, as recently asserting before the Diet: “It is absolutely impossible to say Japan employed coercive measures (in recruiting “comfort women”). True to the government’s position, the Kono Statement does not refer to coercion by the military. And yet, Kono’s remarks spread across the world as the official admission that coercive measures had been resorted to by the government and the military to recruit young Koreans as “comfort women.” The report holds Kono responsible for the widespread misconception, noting what he had to say during a press conference following the release of the statement.
　　　　　Asked if the government “recognizes that the ‘comfort women’ had indeed been forcibly taken into military brothels,” the review notes that Kono replied: “Yes, (the government recognizes) there actually were such acts…I would say (that such an interpretation) would be correct.” In other words, the report states that the then Chief Cabinet Secretary arbitrarily acknowledged the use of coercion on the part of the Japanese government and military, overstepping his role as the chief government spokesman. There is no question that Kono was extremely anxious to admit the evidence of coerciveness. In addition to Kono, then Prime Minister Miyazawa and Chief of the Cabinet Councilors’ Office of External Affairs Sakutaro Tanino were instrumental in paving the way for the Kono Statement. Tanino and the Foreign Ministry are as responsible as Kono himself for how the world today views the “comfort women” issue.
　　　　　In point of fact, Tanino is known to have invited leading media figures to his office prior to the Kono Statement, pointed to a pile of materials on his desk, and warned: “We have this much evidence (to support what Kono would have to say regarding “comfort women”). Therefore, I would urge you to refrain from criticizing the government for its apology to Seoul over this matter.” As is well known, however, none of Tanino’s materials contained evidence of coercion on the part of Japan—government or military—and the interviews with the 16 former “comfort women” conducted by the South Korean government were perfunctory. I suspect both the Foreign Ministry and Tanino were eager to eliminate any predictable diplomatic friction with Seoul by simply accommodating Korean assertions and demands regarding the “comfort women”—rather than categorically refusing to acknowledge coercion because it was contrary to the truth.
　　　　　In order to clarify the still unresolved uncertainty regarding the Kono Statement, I strongly urge the Diet to summon both its author and Tanino as witnesses to thoroughly explain how it was crafted. Beyond that, I believe the government should aim for a more solid statement superseding the existing statement.

(Translated from “Renaissance Japan” column no. 613 in the July 3, 2014 issue of The Weekly Shincho)