There have been two largely differing views in Japan in analyzing China’s abrasive acts and interpreting the motives behind them as Japan endeavors to cope with the growing Chinese threat. One is the so-called pro-China view, focusing on China’s words and interpreting its acts in such a way as to conclude that it after all does have some legitimate reasons for its aggressive behavior. The opposite view, focusing strictly on China’s actions, sternly takes issue with the gap between what Beijing advocates and what it actually does.

　　　Whichever of these two views one may subscribe to, China, which is now the world’s second largest military and economic power, has undeniably become a leading trouble maker in the international community today. The world has entered a stage where the destiny of China’s neighbors will be determined by how accurately they manage to analyze Beijing’s true intent and prepare for the consequences.

　　　China, a nation marked by an endless inconsistency between words and deeds, may—to put it another way—also be said to be endlessly adaptable. Takeo Hiranuma, a senior member of the opposition Japan Restoration Party, has this to say about China based on his own experience:

　　　“In 2005, during the Koizumi Administration, I was invited to Beijing as chairman of an informal gathering of Japanese and Chinese parliamentarians. I decided to accept the invitation as the Taiwanese side strongly recommended that I do so because it was important for me to be well versed in the Chinese situation of that time. During a reception held at the Diaoyutai State Guest House, our host Tang Jiaxuan (State Councilor 2003-2008) delivered an address denouncing as unpardonable the visits by Japanese political leaders to Yasukuni Shrine, where the spirits of the so-called ‘Class A’ war criminals are enshrined.”

　　　Hiranuma’s own adoptive father, Kiichiro Hiranuma, was a former prime minister who died in 1952, shortly after being paroled from a life sentence as a “class A” criminal. Hiranuma says he fiercely refuted Tang’s comments, explaining the gist of his remarks as follows:

　　　“My adoptive father was opposed to the war against the US and was pushing ahead on a peace plan by working closely with US Ambassador Joseph Grew. Because of this initiative, my father was attacked in 1941 by rightwing terrorists obviously working under the army’s instruction. He took five bullets in the head but miraculously survived. Requested by Kantaro Suzuki, the last war-time prime minister, my father attended the council held at the Imperial Palace on August 14, 1945, in the presence of the Emperor, asking pointed questions of the military leadership present about how prepared they were to fight decisive battles on Japan’s home islands. The military men could neither convince nor refute my adoptive father and the opinions of the council were evenly split, with Prime Minister Suzuki finally asking the Emperor to make an ‘imperial decision.’ That was how Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration, which immediately led to the unconditional surrender the following day. The military was furious because they believed Japan’s surrender had been plotted by the prime minister and my adoptive father. Early on the morning of August 15, they dispatched two trucks loaded with machine guns to my father’s house, reducing it to rubble, although he himself escaped unscathed. So, that was how opposed my adoptive father was to the military and committed to peace. But the Allies treated him as a ‘class A’ war criminal.”

Anything Goes in Public Relations Wars

　　　Continues Hiranuma with a chuckle: “When I made my remarks, Tang, who until then had been so harshly critical of Japan, suddenly lightened up and changed the subject, proposing: ‘Gentlemen, dinner is ready now. Why don’t we move over to the dining hall?’ The Chinese change the subject when the situation turns unfavorable to them. They change their attitude brilliantly in accordance with the needs of the circumstances. They adroitly employ deceptive means to hide the real purposes of their actions. That is how the Chinese operate on all levels.”

　　　Masahisa Sato, an upper house lawmaker who belongs to the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, describes such adaptability as one of the notable characteristics of the information war waged by the Chinese. At the base of what in Japan is referred to as “China’s three wars”—the public opinion war, the legal war, and the psychological war—is a no-holds-barred public relations strategy, according to Sato. [Editor’s note: Sato has served as commander of the Japanese Iraq Reconstruction and Support Group in Iraq as an officer of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force.]

　　　Japanese have been made painfully aware of how successful China has been in its public relations war against Japan after witnessing what has come out of the “comfort women” dispute concocted in the US by Korean and Chinese activists. Chinese residents in the US have laid down a powerful support system to back anti-Japanese activities staged by Korean residents. Rather than supporting Korean activists directly, Chinese activists aggressively take advantage of all anti-Japanese campaigns waged by Koreans, utilizing them to the fullest extent possible for their own ends. The more we learn about the detail of their anti-Japanese denunciations, the more offended we become, almost unanimously asking: “How can they possibly tell such lies so nonchalantly?”

　　　As regards the “comfort women,” the Chinese have repeatedly told lies, such as: “Japan forced 200,000 women, including those in their teens, into war-time prostitution”; “Japan turned them into sex slaves”; and, “On top of all that, the Japanese army murdered all these women shortly before the end of the war in order to destroy evidence.” To most Japanese who since childhood have been taught to never lie, such Chinese fabrications are extremely hard to bear and forgive. However, the Chinese brazenly continue to come forth with ugly lies time and again. More examples of Chinese fabrications were in evidence during the May 30-June 1 Asian Security Conference in Singapore —this time in connection with the sovereignty of the South China Sea.

　　　Asked about the “nine-dash” demarcation line claimed by the Chinese, Lieutenant General Wang Guanzhong, Deputy Chief of the General Staff Department of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) declared that China’s sovereign power and jurisdiction over the South China Sea “have been taking shape since the Han Dynasty, some 2,000 years ago…The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (enacted only in 1994) can not be applied retroactively.”

　　　What a whopping lie. Different dynasties have successively risen and fallen in China since the Han Dynasty. The land we call China today has been ruled by forces and ethnic groups that have changed from dynasty to dynasty. There is no consistent definition of this country called “China.” In this vein, how can Beijing claim “China” has exercised “jurisdiction” over the South China Sea for over 2,000 years?

Japanese Once Avidly Studied Sun Tzu’s Teachings

　　　No one outside China believes the myths it promotes, but that doesn’t stop the Chinese from continuing to fabricate fantastic stories, repeating the same lies over and over year after year. This naturally makes Japanese ask again: “What for?”

　　　Fumio Ota, author of Japan’s Survival Depends on Sun Tzu (Chichi Shuppansha, Tokyo; 2014) provides a precise answer to this question, explaining that to the Chinese a manipulation of their adversaries with lies is the best way to wage war. In his The Art of War, China’s legendary strategist Sun Tzu (544-496 BC), preaches: “…when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we’re far away…” This forms the basis of contemporary China’s modus operandi, allowing it to claim it does not have the power to destroy its adversaries when it actually is more than capable of doing so; allowing it to deny it trained fire control radar on a Japanese naval vessel when it actually did; and allowing it to claim Chinese fighters were far away when they actually flew to within 30 meters of Japanese Air Self-Defense force aircraft.

　　　The Chinese Communist Party and PLA are said to attach primary importance to The Art of War today. Sun Tzu’s teachings not only form the core of education at China’s National Defense University, but were beginning to be taught in 2006 to all of PLA soldiers after having been limited to officers for years.

　　　As a theory on strategy that survived for many centuries, Sun Tzu’s teachings were once studied avidly in Japan—during its civil war (the end of the 15th century to the 16th century) and again in the twilight years of the shogun’s rule during the Edo period by such renowned strategists as Yoshida Shoin and Sakuma Shozan. At the age of 15, Yoshida is known to have made a presentation to his feudal lord Takachika Mori of Choshu Domain on “truth and falsehood” from Chapter 6 of The Art of War , which emphasized the importance of “managing oneself, knowing one’s adversary, and adapting to changing circumstances.”

　　　These teaching were passed on to the leaders of Meiji Restoration of 1868; Emperor Meiji, who is said to have poured over The Art of War, was quoted as linking Sun Tzu’s teachings to Japan’s widely acclaimed victories in the Sino-Japanese (1894-95) and Russo-Japanese (1904-05) Wars.

　　　What about Japan’s tactics in the Greater East Asian War? Emperor Showa listed insufficient studies conducted on Sun Tzu’s strategy as the primary reason for Japan’s defeat, writes Ota.

　　　Blurred by their nation’s phenomenal economic success following the end of the war, post-war Japanese have almost completely neglected the importance of safeguarding our national security. Isn’t it time for we Japanese to peruse—more earnestly than others—the teachings of Sun Tzu, which have been used by strategists in many countries for centuries as the cornerstone of their national defense?

(Translated from “Renaissance Japan” column no. 611 in the June 19, 2014 issue of The Weekly Shincho)