The 12th Chinese National People’s Congress (NPC), China’s national legislature, ended its nine-day session on March 13th. Particularly noteworthy about the session was its further concentration of power in the hands President Xi Jinping, coupled with a continued marked movement toward an unprecedented and opaque military expansion.

　　　As a result of this overwhelming concentration of power, as well as a series of purges in connection with an on-going corruption investigation into former Minister of Public Security Zhou Yongkang, Xi has become one of the most feared leaders in China’s modern history-akin to Mao Zedong at the height of his powers.

　　　China during Mao’s days was in abject poverty. However, today’s China, recognized for now as the world’s second largest economic power, is many times stronger than it was then. Like it or not, the world inevitably will be significantly affected by China, depending on what foreign and security policies Xi may wish to pursue.

　　　Perhaps the surest key to understanding China now is to read Xi’s mind. Banished to the countryside during the Great Cultural Revolution, Xi survived hostility from many of those around him to reach the highest post in the Party, and is said to take nobody into his confidence. And yet, what is on his mind is self-evident—building an increasingly strong military clearly being his top priority.

　　　During the NPC session, China announced a plan to increase its 2014 economic growth rate by 7.5%–and its defense budget by a significant 12.2%– over last year. Although the Chinese authorities make their usual excuse that China’s military posture is wholly defensive, there is no question Xi is aiming at realizing a strong military force second to none. Katsuji Nakazawa, chief of the China General Bureau of the Nihon Keizai Shimbun reports that Xi referred to “a strong army” more than ten times during his remarks before the military leadership at the NPC.

　　　Xi’s second priority is keeping up a tenacious animosity against Japan. Amid China’s bearish economy and the disparity among its 1.35 billion population that cannot easily be rectified, the unprecedented military expansionism can easily stir up narrow-minded nationalism. If discontent grows on the part of the people, Xi’s strategy will be to set Japan up as the villain, making an incessant onslaught on Japan by fabricating history. China will without doubt position Japan as the target of its greatest animosity, ready to bring catastrophe to Japan at every opportunity.

China’s Import of Russian Submarines Made the Difference

　　　China is the very source of trouble for Japan, the “Senkaku Islands” situation constituting an impending crisis. This crisis can hardly be overcome without a determination on the part of Japan to be on an equal standing with China. It is generally noted that, against China’s military power, the most efficient method of Japan safeguarding the security of the Senkakus is to improve its submarine capabilities. Submarines can remain submerged deep in the sea, keeping a watch on—and restricting—the moves of Chinese submarines. The excellence of Japanese capabilities in this field far exceeds that of China.

　　　And yet, in view of the rapid pace of China’s military expansion, as well as its insatiable desire for military supremacy, it will not be easy to continue defying the Chinese threat. What, then, can we possibly learn from the speed and scope of China’s past military expansion?

　　　Shigaku Aoi, head of the Defense Strategy Education Laboratory at the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Staff College, believes it was between 2002 and 2003 that the US first began viewing Chinese submarines as a threat. At the time, the US shifted all of its five surveillance submarines in the Atlantic to the Pacific. Then over the next five years, the total number of US submarines deployed in the Pacific eventually exceeded that of those in the Atlantic. That is to say, a US national defense strategy that had long viewed the Soviet Union as its primary threat, started to regard China as its new threat, according to Aoi. (“The threat of Chinese submarines and the US Navy” in Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Staff College Review.)

　　　Following the end of the Cold War, the US decommissioned nearly half of its 97 submarines. It now reportedly has 22 in the Atlantic and another 31 in the Pacific. Meanwhile, Japan has a fleet of 16 submarines.

　　　On the other hand, China’s submarine fleet is reportedly 71 strong. Until the mid-1990s, Chinese submarines were noisy, making for easy pursuit. In that sense, they could hardly be considered a threat then.

　　　But a change occurred in 1995, according to Aoi, when China purchased from Russia four “quiet” kilo-class submarines. Over the next decade, the Chinese increased to 12 the number of its submarines, with Russia exporting high performance submarines with domestic specifications, contributing to a dramatic rise in China’s submarine capabilities. Approximately 70% of Chinese submarines had thus been modernized by 2012.

　　　It was in April 2010 that China’s kilo-class submarines made their first brazen appearance before the Japanese—about the time when Yukio Hatoyama, our former prime minister, thoughtlessly proposed to then Chinese President Hu Jintao that China and Japan jointly make the East China Sea a “sea of fraternity” while telling President Obama to “trust me.” Two Chinese kilo-class submarines surfaced side by side out of the blue, cruising between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island as part of a formation of ten Chinese warships.

　　　Six years prior to that, in 2004, a Han-class Chinese nuclear-powered attack submarine had cruised submerged in Japanese territorial waters off the Sakishima Islands. A year before, a Min-class Chinese submarine had cruised through the Osumi Strait off the Osumi Peninsula in Kagoshima Prefecture—a passage between the East China Sea and the Pacific Ocean.

　　　Incidentally, when Lee Ten-hui ran for President of Taiwan in March 1993, the Chinese fired missiles into the Taiwan Strait to pressure Lee. When an alarmed US dispatched two aircraft carriers to the strait, China allegedly deployed three submarines in the area.

Threshold for Manageable Defense

　　　This incident apparently reminded China of the urgency of building up military power to cope with the US. Simultaneously, however, it must have alerted the US to the importance of redoubling precautions against Chinese submarines.

　　　One must pay particular attention to submarines as their formidable power is obvious from past conflicts. The US and Britain combined were believed to have had to deploy as many as 25 warships and 100 military planes to cope with just one German U-boat.

　　　Submarines lie submerged deep in the sea, silently approaching and launching deadly attacks on their targets. To locate and pursue a submarine deeply submerged in the wide expanse of the ocean is a tough proposition. During the Greater East Asian War, the Japanese Navy had 201, or one third, of its warships sent to the bottom by US Navy submarines. The power of submarines should never be underestimated.

　　　During the Cold War, the ratio of submarines deployed by the US and the Soviet Union was 1 to 3 in favor of the latter. But the US managed to make up for the imbalance by utilizing the Navy’s anti-submarine patrol planes and anti-submarine ships, an integrated wide-area surveillance system, and their overall technological superiority. At the time, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force safeguarded the security of Japan’s peripheral sea areas, contributing to the maintenance of the order in the Asia-Pacific region. Experts say a nation can theoretically defend itself successfully against a seemingly stronger adversary, so long as the ratio of military force remains within 1 to 2.8.

　　　Now, the US is believed to deploy one submarine per every 2.6 submarines deployed by the Pacific fleets of the Chinese and Russian navies respectively—a ratio within the theoretical threshold of a capable defense. But this is only as things stand now. Furthermore, as I have repeatedly mentioned in this column, there really is no guarantee that the US will defend Japan without fail when push comes to shove.

　　　China now has a fleet of more than 71 submarines, their number growing and their performance improving rapidly even at this electric moment. In an outline of the National Defense Program last December, Prime Minister Abe decided to add six new vessels to Japan’s submarine fleet, increasing to 22 the total number of submarines in Japan’s possession. In view of budgetary constraints, however, realizing the coveted fleet will take a decade. Under such circumstances, we must implement everything that the situation calls for, including a swift decision to exercise our right to collective self-defense. That, I wish to stress once again, is mandatory.

(Translated from “Renaissance Japan” column no. 600 in the March 27, 2014 issue of The Weekly Shincho)