On the heels of the worst snowfall in central Japan in 45 years last weekend, a few regional specialists got together in Tokyo to discuss matters pertaining to Japan-China relations. Remarks by a Chinese scholar, seriously concerned about the on-going tensions between Tokyo and Beijing, left a strong impression on me.

　　According to him, China is unlikely to relax its policy toward Japan within the foreseeable future—vis-à-vis the over-all bilateral diplomatic relations or specific issues such as the disputed Senkaku Islands. The reason: China at this juncture is in the process of modifying its 21st century national strategy, viewing the “Senkaku” problem as an indispensable lever required for the projected strategic shift.

　　　Here is how the scholar, who will remain unnamed, accounted for China’s insistence on its sovereignty over the Senkakus: it is geopolitically mandatory for Beijing to put under its jurisdiction the small cluster of uninhabited islets in the East China Sea in order to annex Taiwan, as controlling the latter would enable China to easily turn the South China Sea into an inland sea of its own.

　　　The professor further explained that the strategic objective of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is to first control the so-called “first island chain” stretching from Japan proper to the Philippines via the Okinawa islands and Taiwan as the first step toward securing the “second island chain,” which virtually divides the Pacific Ocean, thereby excluding US forces from the Western Pacific.

　　　Some Chinese consider laughable this ambition, which has long possessed the PLA. However, the number of people who take this view is not large. The Communist Party of China (CPC), as well as the PLA, are prone to present only China’s side of the story. As a result, the vast majority of Chinese hold a negative view of both the US and Japan.

　　　A case in point is the appalling anti-Japanese campaign China has waged over the past 18 months since the latter half of the DPA (Democratic Party of Japan) administration of Yoshihiko Noda. As part of this campaign, Chinese television stations have aired an endless assortment of movies, blatantly exaggerating Japanese militarism through excessively graphic images.

　　　Amidst a series of bloody anti-Japanese riots that swept across China in the fall of 2012, a Chinese citizen driving a Japanese-made car was roughed up by rioters, suffering a skull fracture. The International New York Times quoted the culprit’s mother as defending her son, saying: “Chinese television shows anti-Japanese war movies day in day out. How can we Chinese not hate the Japanese?”

Chinese Claims Draw Laughter

　　　In addition to the continuing push against Japan, there is an intensifying trend against the West as well, while Beijing shows no signs of putting a brake on ever-deepening anti-Japanese sentiments in China.

　　　Both the CPC and the PLA have, since the time of Deng Xiaoping endeavored to overtake the US while at the same time being fearful of its power. A documentary film demonstrating Chinese wariness and animosity towards the US, produced in 2013, was released on Chinese websites last October.

　　　Although Silent Contest was taken down a few days later, it has since been confirmed that its co-producers included China’s National Defense University, the General Staff Department of the PLA, and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Its theme constituted a warning about America’s alleged attempts to subvert the Communist regime.

　　　The Chinese call the “peaceful infiltration” of China “a plot designed to topple the Chinese regime through superficially peaceful—but actually nefarious—measures and purposes.”

　　　As proof of American subversion of China, Silent Contest depicts the actions the US took in support of students during the Tiananmen Square Incident of 1989, as well as American support of Chinese author and human rights activist Liu Xiaobo, winner of Nobel Peace Prize.

　　　Another important point noted in last week’s Tokyo meeting of regional specialists is that hard liners within the PLA have an increasingly stronger voice. The Chinese scholar warned that, if this tendency continues, China will not only forge ahead with a foreign policy that takes a hard line but also may turn to fascism in implementing its domestic policy. His concern left a strong impression on us all.

　　　It was noteworthy because a Chinese national—not a Japanese—referred to “militarism” and “fascism” when talking about China today. His remarks were in sharp contrast to a statement by the Chairman of the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China during last month’s Davos Annual Meeting, which Prime Minister Shinzo Abe also attended. Jiang Jianqing remarked: “During World War II, Japan was the Nazi of Asia. China has been a peace-loving country. We have never invaded or bullied others…So when you asked whether things could develop into a real conflict, I think it is up to Japan.”

　　　Jiang’s remarks drew a ripple of laughter from the audience. The international community sees the truth behind the words and deeds of Chinese leaders.

　　　Intriguing remarks have also recently been heard coming from the US government. A case in point is the February 5th testimony by Daniel R. Russell, Assistant Secretary of East Asia and Pacific Affairs, before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific.

　　　In charge of the State Department’s East Asian policy, Russell was the official who confirmed the announcement of “disappointment” issued by the US Embassy in Tokyo following Abe’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine in late December. Here, in a nutshell, is what Russell—long considered to be pro-Chinese in Japan—had to say about China:

　　　*The establishment of the air defense identification zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea is provocative and seriously mistaken;

　　　*Japan has administrative rights over the Senkaku Islands: any move by China to arbitrarily change the status quo will add to tensions in that area without strengthening Beijing’s claim for the islands under international law; and,

　　　*The US does not recognize China’s new ADIZ. It will have no effect whatsoever on US activities in the area.

　　　In point of fact, there is nothing new in Russell’s statement explaining the US position vis-à-vis the new Chinese ADIZ. Even so, one is stunned by the sea change in his posture, considering that he did indeed cast a cold eye on Japan after Abe’s controversial Yasukuni visit. Russell also stated as follows:

Sense of Wariness towards the US

　　　“(It is) imperative that we be clear about what we mean when the US says we take no position on competing claims to sovereignty…First of all, we do take a strong position with regard to behavior in connection with any claims: we firmly oppose the use of intimidation, coercion or force to assert  territorial claims. Second…maritime claims must be derived from land features…claims (in the South China Sea that are) not derived from land features are fundamentally flawed…”

　　　Clearly, Russell made these remarks bearing in mind the maritime rights China has started to claim in the East and South China Seas without any legal foundation. He also brushed aside China’s assertion of the “nine dash line” as marking the boundaries of its territorial waters in the South China Sea, dismissing such claims as counter to international maritime law.

　　　Russell also chastised China over Scarborough Reef—which it is in the process of trying to wrestle from the Philippines—as well as the administrative and military districts it is endeavoring to establish across the South China Sea.

　　　Viewed from Tokyo, these are all fair and reasonable assertions by the US. And yet, one wonders what has really prompted the State Department to make such an about-face when, until just recently, the Obama administration had assumed an indifferent attitude clearly marked by a lack of readiness to understand Japan’s position.

　　　Behind this change, I believe, is the “‘global’ diplomacy” and “active pacifism” aggressively pursued by Abe. I believe the change in the US posture toward Japan has resulted from Abe’s efforts to solidify the foundation of Japan as an industrial democracy by aggressively striving to expand cooperative ties with foreign nations around the pillar of stronger relations with Washington. I also believe the change has come about significantly because the US Embassy’s statement of “disappointment” has awakened many of us to the realization that it is mandatory for Japan to state its case after it sadly dawned on us Japanese that the US does not necessarily understand Japan.

　　　Would it be too much to conjecture that a certain sense of growing wariness towards the US in Japanese public opinion—especially among those seen as pro-American conservatives—may have had a bearing on the State Department’s Asian policy?

(Translated from “Renaissance Japan” column no. 595 in the February 20, 2014 issue of The Weekly Shincho)