The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has become almost intolerably overbearing in both its words and deeds in the past year under the regime of Chinese President Xi Jinping. However, an analysis of the PLA’s heavy-handed violations of international law also reveals how meaningless its assertions and actions have been.

　　　Let us first review some of the indeed shocking things the PLA and its leaders have recently said or done.

　　　On January 26th, the government-run New China News Agency (NCNA) reported that three ships from China’s South Sea Fleet were patrolling the James Shoal—a small bank in the South China Sea—to engage in activities aimed at “proclaiming Chinese sovereignty” over the area.

　　　NCNA quoted fleet commander Jiang Weilie as urging soldiers and　officers to “always be prepared to fight, improve combat capabilities, and safeguard China’s maritime interests.” In point of fact, Malaysia also claims sovereignty over the reef. China has thus created new territorial friction in addition to a confrontation with another of its neighbors, the Philippines, over the Scarborough Reef, also in the South China Sea.

　　　China had announced it would implement tighter control over foreign fishing boats operating in the South China Sea effective January 1st, 2014, adding seven more frigates to its fleet.

　　　Last December 5th, a PLA Navy vessel and a US aircraft carrier almost collided with each other in the South China Sea when the former blocked the USS Cowpens in international waters. In the near collision, the distance between the two vessels reportedly narrowed to just 90 meters (approximately 100 yards), forcing Cowpens to maneuver in order to avoid hitting the PLA vessel.

　　　This is just one example of how the PLA has stepped up its activities in the South China Sea, taking an evermore uncompromising approach.

　　　The same thing can be said of the East China Sea. Last November 23rd, China announced a unilateral air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in an area that includes Japan’s airspace over the Senkaku Islands. Just a day before, on January 22nd, former general Luo Yuan, known for his often derogatory language, remarked that Japan would turn into a sea of flames from Chinese missiles if China and Japan opened hostilities. Luo, who also serves as Deputy Secretary of the China Society of Military Science, also boasted that China “could defeat Japan with ease.”

　　　Then on January 24th, NCNA reported a PLA Air Force plane issued verbal warnings to a foreign military plane flying within the new ADIZ.

Reflection of Domestic Anxieties

　　　What explains the tough lines the PLA is pursuing in both of the South China and East China Seas? If one analyzes the PLA’s behavior in tandem with the on-going progress of the concentration of power in Xi, an underlying internal vulnerability facing China is brought into sharp relief.

　　　At the end of last year, it was decided that Xi would chair the newest of the “leading small groups” of the Chinese Communist Party (CPC). Named the Central Leading Group for Overall Reform, the group is charged with tackling domestic problems pertaining to finance, the judiciary, and other matters requiring reform. The group was first convened on January 22nd. Two days later, on January 24th, Xi was named Chairman of the National Security Commission. There reportedly is also a move afoot to remove the 1.2 million strong People’s Armed Police from the jurisdiction of the Ministry of State Security, restructuring it as an organization under the direct control of the CPC.

　　　On January 24th, I invited an expert on East Asian security to my Internet TV show “Your Small Step Will Change Tomorrow’s Japan.” Professor Tomohide Murai of the Japan Defense College declared that the series of militaristic moves under the Xi regime reflects an underlying domestic anxieties haunting the Chinese leadership.

　　　“The reason why the Chinese so frantically turn to The Analects of
Confucius as a means of emphasizing the importance of morality is that there is actually a total absence of it in today’s China,” asserts Prof. Murai. “The truth of the matter is that the Chinese leadership is tightening domestic control because they desperately need to cope with anxieties over internal issues.”

　　　While Xi’s newly inaugurated reform group grapples with domestic issues, the primary task of the Armed Police is the maintenance of domestic and border security, with control of different ethnic groups—such as the Tibetans, the Uyghurs, and the Mongolians—heading the list of its priorities.

　　　In addition, the National Security Commission is charged with safeguarding domestic security as opposed to external strategy.

　　　“The Chinese leadership believes that a series of organizational reforms is mandatory in China in order to maintain domestic stability,” continues Prof. Murai. “That the head of state has been appointed to chair such bodies shows that the level of domestic crisis has risen that much higher. A sense of impending crisis calling for urgent measures to be implemented has, I believe, led to this series of organizational reforms.”

　　　Pay closer attention to the outlandish remarks by Gen. Luo made under such circumstances, and one can detect China’s true intentions.

　　　The threat that Japan would be ablaze from Chinese missiles may be real, if Gen. Luo meant to say that missiles Japan fails to intercept could land on our soil, causing widespread fires. However, this simply does not make sense, because potential Chinese missile attacks will least affect the on-going military and strategic relations between the US and Japan, notes Prof. Murai. He explains:

　　　“Of course, Japan is completely devoid of missiles with which to attack, or counterattack, China. But we would have the US-Japan alliance to resort to if Japan and China opened hostilities. American missiles would definitely be fired on China in retaliation. So, if a war broke out, surely our cities could be ablaze from Chinese missiles but do not forget that, simultaneously, Chinese cities would also turn into a sea of flames from American missiles.”

　　　However, Prof. Murai says a war in which China would beat Japan “with ease,” as Gen. Luo claims, would not be unthinkable.

　　　“The Chinese could easily defeat Japan if they used the type of weaponry that Japan does not own—for instance, atomic weapons. In reality, however, China cannot hope to instigate a nuclear war against Japan because it is absolutely unthinkable that the US would not retaliate should Japan be attacked in that fashion.”

Equation of Military Power

　　　China’s intention in making loud declarations about what, realistically, are events likely to never happen can be surmised from the example of Taiwan. Stationing an overwhelming number of missiles on its shores across the Taiwan Strait, China has threatened to turn Taiwan into a sea of flames, proclaiming that it can easily defeat Taiwan. This has successfully contributed to an increase in the number of Taiwanese who take China seriously, and as a result, Taiwan has gradually been brought under Chinese control. I suspect the Chinese may be trying to apply a similar pressure to Japan.

　　　“Rest assured that the Chinese can absolutely not expect to see the same results in Japan,” emphasizes Prof. Murai, explaining that the capabilities of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces rival those of the PLA. He further notes:

　　　“In comparing the military power of one nation with another, one must first determine whether the difference in capabilities with the adversary is more than three times one’s own. Capabilities must be measured both in terms of the quality and particular circumstances of the quality. It will be difficult to win any conflict where the capabilities of the adversary are greater than three times. Bearing this in mind, we must come to grips with the fact that, should the existing gap of military power widen in China’s favor, there will likely be more areas in which the gap in capabilities would widen beyond the 3 (China)-to-1(Japan) ratio. This would certainly be a most dangerous situation for both the US and Japan.”

　　　Obviously aware of this equation as concerns its military strategy, China is currently laying stress on increasing the number of its arms and equipment. This constitutes the biggest threat for Japan for the moment, as we have stringently been controlling the number of weapons in our armories under the terms of our “peace” constitution over the years.

　　　At this juncture, China’s State Oceanic Administration—called the nation’s “second navy” by the Chinese media—is believed to own twenty-some patrol boats larger than 1,000 tons. In mid-January, a decision was made at a national maritime work conference to build 20 more patrol boats within the next year—a measure implemented obviously with the Senkakus and the South China Sea in mind.

　　　By contrast, the Japan Coast Guard is said to own and operate seven patrol boats larger than 1,000 tons in the seas around the Senkakus. In order to safeguard the security of the Senkakus, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe hopes to form a special-purpose coast guard unit with 12 large patrol boats and 600 full-time staff. Due to budgetary constrictions, however, the unit is expected to take approximately two years to realize.

　　　But I seriously wonder if that would be enough to cope satisfactorily with the impending crisis in our southwestern seas. The Japanese government is eagerly called on to bring the men, arms, and equipment of both the Self-Defense Forces and Coast Guard up to the mark—on the clear understanding that the moment of truth has come for decisive action.

(Translated from “Renaissance Japan” column no. 593 in the February 6, 2014 issue of The Shincho Weekly)