Will the Second Obama Administration Switch to a Pro-China Foreign Policy?
On April 15 a monthly seminar was held at the Sabo Kaikan convention hall in central Tokyo, sponsored by the Japan Institute for National Fundamentals (JINF), a privately-financed Tokyo-headquartered think tank I head. The hall was packed. The seminar featured a special panel discussion in which four speakers participated – Professor Tadae Takubo of Kyorin University in Tokyo (JINF’s deputy director); Hiroshi Yuasa, a correspondent with the conservative mass circulation newspaper Sankei Shimbun (a member of JINF’s planning committee); Keiro Kitagami, former Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) member of parliament well versed in matters pertaining to the US, where he has worked in many years; and myself. The topic of the discussion: “Will the US Change Course and How Will Japan Respond?”
On the same day as the seminar, US Secretary of State John Kerry visited Tokyo after earlier stops in London, the Middle East, China and South Korea. Below I would like to present an overview of US foreign policy while analyzing press reviews of Kerry’s remarks following his meetings with representatives of the Japanese government.
The seminar began with Prof. Takubo making observations about President Obama’s domestic and foreign policies, which can be summarized as follows:
“The policies of the second Obama administration, I believe, are characterized by an obvious tendency to prioritize domestic issues, washing its hands of conflicts in the international community as much as possible. Until recently, a host of nations, including Japan, have been able to focus on vial domestic programs for social welfare, health care, and education, while benefiting from a world order maintained primarily by the overwhelming military power of the US. But now, the Obama administration is obviously changing course to enhance its domestic policies, significantly slashing military spending. In other words, the US – like many other nations of the world – is en route to becoming a welfare state. Consequently, I would expect the US to naturally become more passive and inward-looking in terms of its foreign policy.”
In sum, Prof. Takubo predicts that, as a result of modifying its foreign policy of the past three years or so – committing itself to safeguarding the order and security of the Asia-Pacific under its “pivot” policy and maintaining an intense check on China – to attaching primary importance to domestic problems, the US would likely lean towards adopting a more accommodating policy towards China.
Meanwhile, Kitagami stated that he has come to regard the US as a nation very concerned with its status as “a morally righteous nation,” spelling out respect of democracy, freedom, and international law as the basic values for every member of the international community. Kitagami characterized the Republican Party as a political party which traditionally advocated a strong US, having continued to oppose reduction of military spending. However, he noted that the party has since undergone a change, now going along with the military spending reduction proposed by the Democratic administration.
Overrating China’s Influence
Yuasa noted that the government and private sector in the US have always joined hands remarkably well in an all-out effort to overcome challenges to the country’s status as a super-power. This can be seen in such cases as space exploration – where the US put together the “Apollo” project to overcome an initial lead by the Soviet Union and its Sputnik satellite – or in the computer field, where the US successfully countered Japan in a fierce “economic war” across the Pacific.
Among other things, Yuasa pointed out that the on-going shale gas revolution in the US will be one key in its economic competition with China. He also noted that attempts to reduce the defense budget also naturally come from the Republican Party because of its connection with the Tea Party, a grassroots conservative movement, explaining that no small number of Republicans reply on support from such conservatives and, therefore, tend to automatically favor “the small government” advocated by them.
At this stage, there are plans within the US government to reduce expenditures by some US$580 billion in the next ten years. The military budget is the largest target of reduction, some 60% of the total expected to be squeezed from it. Today, the US is compelled to conduct a fundamental reassessment not only of its policy toward China, but all of its overall foreign and defense policies as well.
US policy towards China has shifted back and forth between “engagement” and “hedging,” depending on the international circumstances at the time. The purpose of engagement is to get China to accommodate values such as democracy and the rule of law by promoting interchange between Washington and Beijing.
Taking office in 2009, President Obama pursued an engagement policy with China in the first year of his administration. From the second year on, however, the administration switched to hedging, following the thinking of then Secretary of State, Mrs. Hillary Clinton. While emphasizing dialogue, Washington created a framework aimed at stopping China from acting recklessly. This framework involved primarily building sufficient military power, but it also included a ploy to check China by forming a new international order in which China would be forced to participate as seen in the Trans-Pacific Economic Partnership (TPP) free trade agreement that is currently under negotiation.
Now that a pronounced advocate of engagement has assumed the post of US Secretary of State, a concern is steadily spreading not only in Japan but across Southeast Asian nations and India that the US might lean toward a policy toward China that is more accommodating than necessary.
As if to brush aside such concern, Secretary Kerry said during an address at the Tokyo Institute of Technology: “My commitment to you is that as a Pacific nation that takes our Pacific partnership seriously, we will continue to build on our active and enduring presence.”
One of Kerry’s most important agenda items during his visit was to explore mutually agreeable ways to deal with North Korea during consultations with Asian leaders, including Xi Jinping of China, Park Geun-hye of South Korea, and Shinzo Abe of Japan. As a positive outcome of his trip, Kerry referred to “the sternest ever posture” which China assumed towards North Korea regarding denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and an “unprecedented joint statement” Beijing agreed to release committing its effort to stop North Korean’s nuclear program. (Sankei Shimbun).
And yet China, heading the six-nation talks aimed at reining in Pyongyang, has never once managed to prevent North Korea from launching missiles or detonating nuclear bombs. In point of fact, North Korea has conducted three nuclear tests since 2006 despite continuous objections from various members of the international community, including China – a reminder that it would seem very dangerous to overrate Beijing’s influence over Pyongyang.
Reasons Behind Kerry’s High Elation
Why, then, is it that against such a backdrop, Kerry rated so highly China’s decision to present a common front with the US as regards Pyongyang? The answer appears obvious from a news conference he gave on the last day of his stay in Beijing.
Arriving behind schedule, Kerry started his remarks to the press abruptly with the following statement:
“Let me try to give you a summary of what has been, I think, an extremely constructive and positive day…frankly, more agreement than disagreement in many – in most, in all respects – I think beyond what I anticipated in many regards. And I thank our host in China for the privilege to…be able to meet with President Xi, with Premier Li (Keqiang), as well as with my counterpart, Foreign Minister Wang (Yi)…It is absolutely clear to everybody that when you have two of the most powerful – the two most powerful economies in the world and two of the most significant energy users in the world, as well as two members of the permanent Security Council of the United Nations, with interests that extend around the world, you have the possibility of being able to create synergy (between our two nations.)”
It was a news conference that conspicuously exuded an obvious sense of high elation on the part of Kerry, who commented on how virtually every problem on earth could be resolved as long as the world’s two strongest and biggest nations cooperate with each other closely. These remarks were identical with those he made three months ago at a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing in Washington, where he talked at length about China without once referring to Japan.
What one discerned from his posture at the time was a marked advocacy of a policy of engagement. From this, one cannot but conclude that the US will look further inward from now on, eventually implementing a full-fledged policy of accommodating China.
Presumably, both Prime Minister Abe and Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida ought to have gone over in detail with Kerry the truth about China’s foreign policy as seen from the Japanese side. From now on, Japan must carefully watch the US to see to what degree it will understand China’s propensity to disregard the rule of law and threaten the integrity and sovereignty of other nations. What is important for Japan under the circumstances, after all, is to spare no effort to strengthen itself so that it will never be compelled to be tossed about helplessly between the two giants.
(Translated from “Renaissance Japan” column no. 555 in the April 25, 2013 issue of The Weekly Shincho)