The high approval rating enjoyed by the administration of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe – over 70% in the latest polls – reflects the eagerness of the Japanese to see their nation become a normal country boasting sovereign independence.
　　　This year, Abe’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) added Taiwan to the list of nations formally invited to a state-hosted March 11 ceremony in Tokyo in which representatives from nations and international organizations were called to the center stage to dedicate flowers to the victims of the earthquake and subsequent tsunami that two years ago devastated the coastal regions of Japan’s Pacific northeast, leaving nearly 20,000 people dead or missing.
　　　Had the previous Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) government extended similar courtesy to Taiwan at last year’s first anniversary, Japan could have properly conveyed its profound thanks for the enormous outpouring of aid from the Taiwanese people – more than US$20 billion, by far the largest aid by a single nation.
　　　During last year’s anniversary ceremony, the DPJ, bending over backward to China, failed to call the Taiwanese representative to the stage to dedicate flowers, seating him alongside ordinary guests instead. Many Japanese felt personally ashamed of this show of grave discourtesy, immensely indignant about the DPJ administration for putting Japan and its people in a shamefully thankless position concerning Taiwan. This year’s ceremony at long last dissipated the people’s indignation and the widespread anguish that Japan could not accomplish anything significant that would run counter to China’s wishes. This, I believe, is one powerful factor contributing to the high degree of public trust the Abe administration has managed to win.
　　　The Chinese government objected strongly and skipped the ceremony at the last minute, issuing a statement complaining that the Japanese government “dared place Taiwanese officials in the same area as diplomatic envoys” and expressing “strong displeasure and protest” with Tokyo. But, of course, the Chinese reaction had been amply anticipated. There is absolutely no need for Japan to accommodate Chinese values, which are simply too dogmatic.
　　　On March 14, Abe told visiting Sri Lankan president, Mahinda Rajapaksa:
“The rapid increase in China’s maritime activities is a matter of common concern for the entire region. Japan is committed to responding in a coolheaded and resolute manner to any attempt to change the status quo in this region through military power.”
　　　Sri Lanka recently completed new multi-million dollar port facilities at Hambantota largely financed by China. Abe’s remarks are significant in that they reflect Japan’s resolve to pursue a strategy as a sovereign nation vis-à-vis the maintenance of stability in the entire region, including the Indian Ocean. China has been developing a “net” in the Indian Ocean aimed at encircling India; Hambantota is one of the key military ports in that strategy.

China Building a Strong Army Capable of “Winning Wars”

　　　Meanwhile, Xi Jinping delivered his first address as the newly elected president of China on March 17 during the closing session of the 12th National People’s Congress (NPC), using words that were highly disquieting.
　　　For example, Xi declared that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) “must be developed into a strong military that can win wars and resolutely safeguard Chinese sovereignty, security, and the benefits won in its national development.” Although Xi did not neglect to mention that China’s path is based on “peaceful development,” one cannot help being wary about his true intentions as he referred immediately to “wars” in his first official address as the newly elected Chinese president. The vocabulary used throughout Xi’s address revealed the extent to which the Communist Party of China (CPC) has obviously been pressured to implement changes and, to counter such pressure, what tough new policies it will likely be compelled to implement.
　　　Repeatedly, Xi used such nationalism-inspiring words and expressions as “China’s dream,” “patriotism,” “the great Chinese spirit,” “a great renaissance (of the Chinese nation),” “the vigor and vitality of a strong nation,” and “the Chinese way.” Interpreting such rhetoric along with Xi’s call for “a strong military that can win wars,” one can easily foresee China implementing tough external policies, especially towards Japan in its bitter dispute over the Senkaku Islands and the resource-rich East China Sea.
　　　On March 8, China’s National Administration of Surveying, Mapping and Geoinformation announced its intent to carry out a geographical survey of the Senkakus. A geographical survey of sovereign Japanese territory by Chinese government employees? This should only be interpreted as blatant advance notice by China of a planned infringement of Japanese sovereignty.
　　　To forge ahead with such a hard-line policy, China has over the years endeavored to strengthen its naval war potential beyond just significantly increasing its military expenditure. For instance, by 2020 the State Oceanic Administration plans to expand its fleet of surveillance ships from 280 to 560, and the staff of its maritime patrol units from 9,000 to 16,000 – almost a doubling of its ships and personnel.
　　　The Abe administration implemented its first countermeasure against such Chinese actions by announcing that Japan will seek a close alliance with the US. The announcement that Japan will participate in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free-trade negotiations was a case in point. On March 17, Akira Amari, newly appointed minister in charge of the TPP, remarked: “The TPP will undoubtedly constitute a great stabilizing force for the entire Asia-Pacific region. I also believe it will further play a significant security role, contributing to the making of new rules that will help combat destabilizing forces affecting East Asia.”
　　　It appears apparent that the TPP will transcend economic matters to represent a framework for common rules regulating the behavior of democracies in the region, effectively providing deterrence against China. The US and Japan account for a third of the world’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). It is only natural to expect an economic bloc, constituting roughly 40 % of the world’s GDP – if the GDP figures of all the participating nations are put together – to eventually demonstrate immense strength to safeguard regional security. It is because a majority of the people of Japan have correctly interpreted the merits of Japan joining the TPP that the approval rating for the Abe administration has reached 72% — the highest since its inauguration last December – in the latest survey conducted by the mass-circulation daily Yomiuri Shimbun. Some 60% of the respondents supported the government’s decision to participate in the TPP negotiations. Therefore, I believe it is fair to deduce that the TPP has the public’s support in Japan not only as a strategy for economic growth, but also as a credible strategy against China.
　　　Keeping China in mind, it is mandatory for Japan to seek a closer alliance with the US under the terms of the US-Japan Security Treaty. Equally essential will be the formation of an expanded national defense framework, symbolized by the building of cooperative relations with India and Asia-Pacific nations through the activities of the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) and the Japan Martine Self-Defense Force (JMSDF). The most crucial thing for Japan, however, will be to make every effort to become a nation genuinely boasting sovereign independence.

Devastating Loss of Post-War State Intelligence Service

　　　Among the state functions lost as a result of its defeat in World War II was Japan’s national defense capability, as it renounced war under its new “peace” constitution. What is required of Japan today is an all-out effort to strengthen its national defense capability, with the rejuvenation of a full-fledged national military force in mind. Moving towards exercising the right to collective self-defense is certainly a step in the right direction. However, attempting to exercise that right with the JSDF still tightly bound by the 1948 Police Official Duties Execution Act would only serve to further complicate the code of behavior of JSDF personnel. In other words, it would only lead to an expanded list of permissible actions (the so-called “positive list”). To avoid a further complication of the rules, the government should shatter the seemingly impenetrable wall dividing the right to self-defense into two categories – “individual” and “collective.” It is also mandatory to start discussing a constitutional revision in as concrete terms as possible.
　　　Another of the state functions lost with the defeat in World War II was Japan’s intelligence-gathering capability, as its state-run intelligence service was eliminated. The term “intelligence service” makes more than a few people cringe. However, all normal nations maintain state-run intelligence services, sparing no effort daily to strengthen their intelligence-gathering capability. If we probe seriously into why Megumi Yokota and Rumiko Masumoto and others were abducted by North Korean agents back in the 1970s, I am certain we will inevitably come to grips with the seriousness of the damage sustained by the loss of the government’s intelligence gathering capability. If only we had a legitimate intelligence service capable of accurately grasping the movements of North Korean operatives in Japan, the abduction of so large a number of Japanese citizens would not have occurred in such rapid succession.
　　　Abductions or not, Japan cannot afford to lose the “intelligence war,” as our fate rests on its outcome. The rejuvenation of a full-fledged state-run intelligence service may not materialize easily, but we must definitely take the first step forward now, determined to build a nation with an outstanding intelligence-gathering capability no matter how much time is required. This is what the people of Japan are asking of the Abe administration – an unflinching resolve to develop Japan as a democracy built on a basic foundation of capabilities that any country would expect.

(Translated from “Renaissance Japan” column no. 551 in the March 28, 2013 issue of The Weekly Shincho)