Representatives from the Japan Institute for National Fundamentals (JINF) of Tokyo and India’s Vivekananda International Foundation (VIF) met in Tokyo June 3-4 to exchange views in a joint seminar entitled “Japan and India: Two Democracies Tied together for the Security and Stability of the Asia-Pacific Region.” The second day of the session, co-hosted by these two think tanks, was opened to the general audience with an admission fee, but the conference hall was so packed that additional chairs had to be brought in.

　　　The high interest the audience took in the possibility of bilateral cooperation obviously reflected their sense of urgency in terms of the need to implement effective measures to cope with China. The focal point of the seminar: how India and Japan, regarding the communist dictatorship as a major threat to the peace and security of the region, can work in closer cooperation to develop specific measures to deter China.

　　　The VIF, headquartered in New Delhi, is a leading Indian think tank
which has amassed a long list of outstanding accomplishments, especially in the research of such fields as peace and security, intelligence, and international relations. It is named after an Indian man of religion who once admired Japan, Swami Vevekananda (1863-1902), whose name I believe adds deep meaning and significance to the joint study pursued by the Indian and Japanese think tanks. Vivekananda, who was 30 years old when he visited Japan in 1893 en route to the US, is credited with having contributed significantly to religious reform in India, as well as having introduced Hinduism to the Western world.

　　　Arriving in Nagasaki, he sailed on to Kobe, from where he traveled to Yokohama by land. After visiting Osaka, Kyoto, and Tokyo, he was immensely touched by the scenic beauty of Japan and the frugality and neatness of the Japanese. Calling the Japanese “one of the cleanest peoples on earth,” he described as “picturesque” the neatness of the streets and dwellings as well as the “elegant and beautiful” deportment, etiquette, and matter of speech of the people.

　　　In 1893 when Vivekananda came, Japan was marking the 26th year after the Meiji Reform; it was four years after the promulgation of the Meiji Constitution, and just a year before the outbreak of the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-95). Realizing that Japan must defend the Korean Peninsula at all costs in order to thwart control by the big powers, Japan was going full blast making preparations for any contingencies under the slogan “Rich Nation, Strong Military.” Everywhere across Japan, Vevekananda sensed the determination and vigor of the nation, noting that “the Japanese have fully awakened to the need to develop the power that the new times now call for.” Seeing what Japan was going through then -€ as it strove to withstand overwhelming pressure from the great powers, with the whole population dead set on preserving their nation’s autonomy and independence -€ must have been dazzlingly invigorating to Vivekananda who, like his millions of fellow countrymen, must have felt the humiliation of his country being under British colonial rule. That, I believe, is why he also wrote he wished to “have many (Indian) youths visit Japan and China every year and come to their senses.”

Ridiculous Standard

　　　Vivekananda, who extensively studied the Hindu religion which constitutes the foundation of the pride and values of the Indian people, died nine years later at 39. The VIF was founded with his name in order to honor his lofty spirit. Its director is Ajit Kamar Doval, former Director of India’s Intelligence Bureau, with Prabhat Shulka who for ten years served as Ambassador to Russia assisting him as Joint Director. Raman Puri, who took part in the seminar as a panelist, is former Flag Officer Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Eastern Naval Command, having previously commanded his nation’s first aircraft carrier.

　　　Although the VIF is a group of outstanding diplomatic, intelligence, and peace and security experts, the India-Japan cooperation scheme it proposes covers all fields, including the economy. Clearly, its proposals are based on the recognition that India and Japan are natural strategic partners logically situated to complement each other.

　　　The natural bond that brings the two nations together is a shared historical perspective. India has positively and correctly valued Japan’s basic stance regarding the Greater East Asia War (the Pacific War) -€ a world of difference from China’s historical view of Japan. Also, as two of the most important Asian democracies, India and Japan face China as a common threat. They complement each other especially in terms of industry and population, with Japan embracing technology and India an abundant young work force. With 60 percent of its total population still under 30 years of age, India is an ideal recipient of Japanese technology, capable of taking that know-how and turning it into new and innovative products. Further, India’s young population represents a remarkable think tank, as many young Indians who have migrated to the US have already shown by playing a major role in the US computer industry.

　　　It is of the utmost importance for both India and Japan to make conscientious efforts together to make the most of their strong points in boosting their respective economic strength in terms of national infrastructure. For that purpose, the government will be held responsible for developing the necessary legal and institutional environment. Unfortunately, however, cooperation between India and Japan has not been progressing as smoothly as desired primarily because the Japanese government is devoid of a grand strategy to achieve its goals.

　　　A case in point is Japan’s three principles on arms exports maintained since the days of the Liberal Democratic Cabinet of the late Prime Minister Takeo Miki (1907-1988). Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda belatedly reviewed the three principles last December 27, allowing exports and transfer of arms, equipment, and technology to any nations with which Japan maintains cooperative security relations, provided that joint development and manufacture with those countries is deemed favorable to Japan. At this stage, however, it is highly difficult to determine whether or not India would be construed as one such nation.

　　　Professor Yoichi Shimada, a security expert at Fukui Prefectural University, is concerned the last of the three conditions -€ that the government will not permit the export of weapons to “nations involved in, or likely to be involved in international armed conflict” -€ will likely stand in the way.

　　　It certainly is a bizarre standard, I must say. In point of fact, Chinese armed forces infiltrate into Indian territory almost daily, triggering skirmishes. The Indian side claims up to several hundred such incidents are caused by the Chinese every year. Given these circumstances, it is quite possible to regard India as a nation involved in international armed conflict. One could even conjecture that China has intentionally been creating such incidents in order to prevent Japanese arms, equipment, and technology from being delivered to India. If such a view prevails, then there is a good possibility that the relaxed arms export principles will not be applicable to India.

Under Constitutional Constraints

　　　What the Japanese government should do is to refrain from standing on ceremony to uniformly treat the so-called “nations involved in, or likely to be involved in, armed conflict” and resolutely draw a line, based on national interest, between those nations that are considered “threats,” and those who are considered “friends.” Japan should be ready to assist friendly nations even if they are involved in armed conflict. What is being assessed most stringently by the international community today is whether Japan is willing to assume a new stance as a reliable ally, committing itself to helping friendly nations far more positively than in the past.

　　　Safeguarding maritime security in the seas around Japan through multilateral cooperation is what Japan must seek most urgently. Japan has jurisdiction over some 4.5 million square kilometers of territorial waters and exclusive economic zone (EEZ), while India has about 40 percent of what Japan has. And yet, the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) has only 12,500 personnel available to keep the seas safe, and its ships are in extremely short supply.

　　　Even as of this writing, I am certain that several hundred Chinese fishing boats are in operation within the Japanese EEZ in the seas around the Senkaku Islands. This fact in itself is unpardonable, but Japan should be on constant alert lest the Chinese should violate Japanese territorial waters and land on any of the islands of the Senkakus. However, Professor Yoshihiko Yamada of Tokai University points out that the JCG maintains only four patrol boats to guard the seas around the Senkakus against several hundred Chinese fishing boats.

　　　Alongside the acute shortage of ships and manpower, there are serious legal problems, according to Professor Yamada. The JCG law allows its personnel to evacuate ships approaching the EEZ only after its personnel inspect them. It is plainly impossible for JCG agents aboard only four patrol boats to inspect all of the several hundred boats. Should one of the Chinese boats manage to slip past them and its crew members succeed in landing on one of the islands, JCG agents will be unable to arrest or evacuate them because they are not endowed with police authority on land.

　　　Last February 28, a set of bills was approved by the cabinet of Prime Minister Noda to beef up the JCG Law, but they have yet to be implemented as the government has largely stopped functioning. The two-day seminar discussed these and many other pertinent matters. Evident from any one of these issues was the realization that Japan is virtually incapable of implementing any workable measures to benefit its relations with India primarily because of constitutional constraints, including problems faced by the JCG, possible cooperation between the Maritime Self Defense Force and the Indian Navy, as well as prevention of, and joint operations pertaining to, cyber warfare.

　　　Obviously, the “peace” constitution is an insurmountable obstacle that must by all means be grappled with before we even dare discuss matters concerning future India-Japan cooperation. The recent exchange of views with Indian policy experts has once again brought home to me the conviction that this thick wall can only be demolished by revising the constitution.

(Translated from “Renaissance Japan” column no. 513 in the June 14, 2012 issue of The Weekly Shincho.)