During a session of the House of Representatives Budgetary Committee on February 2, an opposition member confronted Foreign Minister Koichiro Genba with a question regarding what can rightly be described as a shocking aspect of Japan’s relations with China. The questioner was Itsunori Onodera, a member of the Foreign Affairs Section of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). In sum, Onodera stated as follows:
　　　With the building of its new embassy completed in Beijing last July, the Japanese government requested the Chinese authorities to ascertain that construction had been carried out in accordance with local building regulations.
　　　However, approval was denied, as the Chinese side claimed that the new building included construction which had not been approved beforehand. It is said that, when the Foreign Ministry queried how the problem could be solved, the Chinese government replied with a verbal note that it would consider the matter favorably if Japan would give ‘due consideration’ to China’s plans to purchase two prime pieces of property to construct new consulates-general in Japan -€ one in Niigata City and the other in Nagoya City.
　　　The Foreign Ministry is said to have subsequently delivered a verbal note dated January 19, promising to deal with the request according to international and domestic laws pending approval from the foreign minister; in other words, Japan would in turn give the Chinese request “due consideration.” Two days later, on January 21, the Chinese government allegedly gave its blessing to the new embassy building in Beijing as is.
　　　If there really was illegitimacy in the floor plan or carelessness in the implementation of the building scheme, as the Chinese authorities claim there was, all that could have been done was simply ask the Japanese side to modify the specific portion of the new building immediately. It was absurd of China to request that special consideration be provided as regards planned acquisitions of land for its diplomatic missions in Japan -€ a matter totally unrelated to the issue of the new embassy building. When a government receives a request such as in this case, all it should do is reject it with an explicit explanation as to why the request is irrelevant and unacceptable. This is what diplomacy is all about. Did Ambassador Uichiro Niwa, posted to Beijing in June 2010 by the ruling Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), make any efforts to dissuade China from making such a preposterous request, or did he simply pass it on to his superiors at the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo, hoping it would be accommodated?
　　　Onodera asked Genba:
　　　“Mr. Foreign Minister, would you mind telling us whether China in fact insisted on such a note, and if that was the case, what really was the nature of the Chinese demand?”
　　　Replied Genba: “From the outset, we have made our position quite clear to the Chinese government that the scheduled move of our embassy offices in Beijing (into the new building) and the desired construction of additional Chinese diplomatic missions in Japan are two entirely separate matters. Further, we have indicated that we will cooperate with any requests according to pertinent international laws and within the realm of Chinese laws and ordinances. In this process, I admit there was the specific request from the Chinese government -€ which you have just referred to -€ that we inform them of our position in writing. We sent a verbal note accordingly.”
　　　So, a diplomatic memorandum promising cooperation over the land issue was indeed sent.

Bilateral Relations Far From Reciprocal

　　　Foreign Minister Genba added:
　　　“As you know, (Japan as) a host nation finds itself in a position to support (China, or any other nations for that matter) in accordance with the provisions of pertinent laws, including the Vienna Convention governing establishment of foreign diplomatic offices.”
　　　True, the Vienna Convention calls on governments to provide support and assistance as concerns preparations for foreign diplomatic offices in their domain. This clearly means that Japan in turn has the right to request necessary support in meeting the needs of its diplomatic missions in China. On February 2, the conservative mass-circulation daily Sankei Shimbun reported that the “added construction (of a section of the new embassy building) not listed in the original application” referred to a stairwell.
　　　Building a stairwell without formal prior approval may not have been such a good idea. Even so, how could China blow this matter out of proportion and stall on the Japanese request for speedy approval of the new building for as long as six months following its completion? Japan should have exercised its right to call on China to expedite the approval process based on the spirit of reciprocity under the Vienna Convention. Also, with the Chinese side having stubbornly continued to refuse cooperation, Japan should simply have decided to do away with the stairwell, such as by walling it off. And yet, those in Japanese diplomatic circles -€ the ambassador in Beijing and the foreign minister included -€ failed miserably to show mettle, and, ended up delivering an oral note, committing Japan to accommodating China’s demand instead.
　　　Foreign Minister Genba emphasized that Japan did not strike a “barter deal” with China, noting that the trouble over the stairwell had nothing to do with the stalemate over property purchases for Chinese missions in Niigata and Nagoya. However, Genba admitted in the Diet that matters involving China’s interest in real estate in both cities had actually been discussed during preliminary consultations, and that China did indeed “make a specific request” concerning this matter. Explained Onodera:
　　　“Following extensive research by the LDP Foreign Affairs Section, it was ascertained that the Chinese government, plainly linking the Niigata and Nagoya property issues to the protracted approval of the new embassy building in Beijing, had strongly urged the Foreign Ministry to meet its request. Also, the ministry explained that China had indeed made an offer for the barter deal in question. As a matter of fact, China recognized the new building as completed just two days after Japan delivered the oral note. No matter from whatever angle one may look at it, it is an undeniable barter deal -€ even if it may not have blatantly referred to ‘cooperation’ with China’s purchases of real estate in Japan. ”
　　　In exchange for Chinese approval of just one stairwell within the new embassy premises, the Foreign Ministry effectively has intended to exercise influence over the sale of prime plots of land in Niigata and Nagoya to China. The Japanese Embassy in Beijing will hereafter be viewed as a lasting symbol of disgrace to Japanese diplomacy.
　　　How, then, has this situation come about? Foreign Minister Genba refers to the “spirit of reciprocity” -€ a slogan that his ministry loves to chant. But relations between Japan and China obviously are far from reciprocal, at least when it comes to diplomatic missions. China has a policy of not selling land to foreign governments and enterprises -€ not even one square inch. As a result, the Japanese Embassy in Beijing has been paying rent -€ over 20 million (US$260,000) a month today -€ to the Chinese government for the past 37 years (since 1975) after normalization of diplomatic relations between Tokyo and Beijing in 1972. Even after the Japanese embassy completes its move at the end of February into the new building -€ constructed at a cost of 8.7 billion (US$679 million) of tax money -€ a significant land rent will still have to be paid into the future.
　　　In China, none of the seven Japanese diplomatic offices -€ the embassy in Beijing as well as the six consulates-general in Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenyang, Chongquin, Quingdao, and Hong Kong -€ is built on owned land. Meanwhile, all of China’s diplomatic missions in Japan are built on land China owns, with its embassy standing on a 200,000 square-foot piece of property in central Tokyo and most of its consulates-general occupying between 36,000 and 53,000 square feet of select land in Sapporo, Osaka, Fukuoka, and Nagasaki. And now, the Chinese are after two pieces of choice property stipulated in the afore-mentioned barter deal -€ one in Niigata (178,000 square feet) and the other in Nagoya (85,000 square feet), with the fabled Nagoya Castle nearby.
　　　What, then, is becoming of this land now? According to a Foreign Ministry report sent to the LDP, sales activities for the Nagoya property have since been halted, as Nagoya Mayor Takashi Kawamura and Aichi Prefecture Governor Hideaki Omura, among others, adamantly appealed to the government for discretion in helping consummate the transaction, with local residents also voicing strong objections. On the other hand, in Niigata City, a contract is reported to have been closed last December for the sale of the 178,000 square-foot piece of privately-owned property in the center of the city.

Never Forget Japan Is a Sovereign State

　　　From the very beginning, Niigata Governor Hirohiko Izumida and Mayor Akira Shinoda have avidly been advocating promotion of the prefecture’s economic interchange with China, vigorously applying themselves to the sale of the property in Niigata City. It is a cold fact of life that once sold, property will never be returned to Japan. While it is highly questionable what gains in Japanese-Chinese relations would result from the sale of precious parcels of property in Japan, nowadays a cross section of politicians -€ not only top leaders of the government party but also heads of local governments, and even LDP President Sadakazu Tanigaki -€ are prone to making comments that appear to be encouraging sale of Japanese property to China.
　　　Should the relationship with China continue to be one in which, while China keeps buying up Japanese land, Japan single-mindedly goes on assuming a low posture to woo Beijing’s generosity in allowing Japanese diplomatic missions and corporations to rent real state in China? Does the “reciprocal” relationship warrant the sale of a prized piece of property as the price for just one stairwell within the Japanese embassy premises -€ as in the recent case? Is this how a reciprocal relationship should evolve? In point of fact, a reciprocal relationship calls for a party to give back to the other the same treatment and convenience received. Based on this principle, the US government has made it a rule to not sell -€ or approve the sale of -€ land to Chinese diplomatic missions in the US. Bearing in mind that it is a sovereign state in its own right, Japan should immediately suspend land sales to China, and attempt to reestablish a bona-fide reciprocal relationship by charging China’s future diplomatic missions appropriate land rent.
　　　Last month, it became plain that China has been independently drilling for natural gas in the Kashi (known as Tianwaitian in China) Gas Field in the East China Sea, near what Japan claims as the median line between the exclusive economic zones (EEZ) of both nations. On February 3, four frigates belonging to the Chinese Navy cruised through the Japanese territorial waters between Okinawa Island and Miyakojima Island, demonstrating anew a Chinese military presence in Japan’s home waters and the Pacific Ocean.
　　　In a front page scoop on January 30, the Sankei Shinbun prominently reported that the People’s Daily, an organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, now calls the Senkaku Islands, also in the East China Sea, part of China’s “core interests.”
　　　By this China means that the Senkaku Islands and the seas surrounding them are its sovereign territory and can never be allowed to secede or declare independence from China; that any such moves will be prevented by readily resorting to military strength; and that it will under no circumstances condone intervention by a third party. As this expression clearly indicates, the independent drilling in the underwater gas field in the East China Sea, as well as the frequent cruises in Japanese waters made by Chinese warships, reflect China’s contention that the waters around Japan are its own.
　　　At such a time when China has started claiming ownership of Japanese territorial land and seas, to sell our land to China -€ be it an island or a piece of property in a township, no matter how small it may be -€ is another step towards literally transforming Japan into a Chinese territory.

(Translated from “Renaissance Japan” column no. 497 in the February 16, 2012 issue of The Weekly Shincho.)