A fierce struggle for national supremacy – actually a cutthroat survival war among nations facing the Pacific and Indian Oceans – is tacitly underway, involving China, India, Japan, Russia, and the United States along with the ASEAN nations, Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan and varied terrorist forces – each  constituting a key player. As different nations and religious forces engage in this  intense struggle for survival, some possessing weapons of mass destruction with their fingers dangerously close to the launch button – nations lacking mettle and a clear strategy will inevitably lose ground and end up being the real losers in this equation.

　　　Economic strength alone cannot sufficiently ensure a nation’s survival. Although one of Asia’s leading economic powers, Japan will not be able to sail through the stormy seas without a firm resolution to prepare military strength adequately – together with a grand strategy reflecting a close scrutiny of the situations particularly in the Eurasian continent and the Indian Ocean.

　　　Last month, I headed a delegation of the Japan Institute of National Fundamentals (JINF), a 100 percent privately-funded think tank headquartered in Tokyo, on a visit to India. We exchanged views and opinions with Indian experts on a wide range of pertinent international issues, keenly mindful of what strategy Japan as a responsible sovereign state should pursue to cope with the rapidly changing situation surrounding the two big oceans.

　　　Shiv Shankar Menon, National Security Advisor to the Indian prime minister, spoke up almost as soon as we called on him:

　　　“The framework of international politics, as you know, is undergoing a drastic change – and so are the world’s economic and military frameworks. Why don’t we talk strategy to find out how Japan and India can join hands in grappling with the current international situation, which actually represents a great opportunity for both our nations?”

　　　Menon emphasized that Indians from all walks of life – not just government officials – generally regard Japan as an ideal partner, judging from the historical circumstances involving both nations, as well as the national characteristics having much in common with each other.

　　　We agreed that assessing China’s intentions and capabilities as precisely as possible is the vital common task for the international community – not just for Japan and India. On this, Menon had this to say:

　　　“Japan and India are faced with the same dilemma over our neighbor (China), which is very free to override on borders and poses a direct threat to us. As their national power has grown, Chinese diplomacy and behavior have increasingly been carried through with self assertiveness. While Japan is faced with its own China problem involving the seas as well as the islands and islets around the Japanese archipelago, India by the same token is confronted with its China problem involving the crucial land border issues. And yet, we still have to come to terms with this fast-growing geopolitical giant, and I believe both Japan and India have managed to work out similar countermeasures which have been implemented under the principle of competition and dialogue.”

　　　One might say the Indian government is often inclined to take a half step backward in its diplomacy with China – in somewhat the same way as Japan’s  DPJ (Democratic Party of Japan) administration led by Prime Minister Naoto Kan and Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshito Sengoku (who just left his post), continues to assume a low profile, which allows Japan’s intractable neighbor to continue throwing its weight around. One theory for such behavior on the part of India is that its devastating and humiliating defeat in its 1962 border war with China still has lingering effects on the Indian state of mind nearly a half century later. In addition, Indians generally are viewed as being inclined to feel that their nation has yet to be on a par with China economically and militarily at this stage.

　　　However, India demonstrated great mettle during the state visit of Premier Wen Jiabao to New Delhi last month. Judging from the way India handled China then, it appears fair to conclude that, during the three days of the Wen visit, India pursued diplomacy with China far more astutely than Japan, which is sadly incapable of bringing itself to say what Beijing must hear – despite the fact that Japan is a technological superpower far more resourceful than China; an economic power on a par with China in terms of GDP; and has military strength not inferior to China’s.

　　　Refusing to budge an inch over matters pertaining to its border dispute with China, India this time got one back at its archenemy. India and China have long fought over the territorial rights in some areas in the northeastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh and the northern state of Jammu Kashmir, where China has begun to resort to drastic measures to claim its rights to the territories in question, particularly in the past year or two.

　　　India has rigidly protested against China’s dispatch of troops to Aksai Chin, a region representing one fifth of Jammu Kashmir, calling it a blatant act of aggression designed to compel India to accept – by force of arms – another fait accompli of the region being a Chinese territory. However, China has refused to respond throughout. In retaliation, India – which in previous summits with China had steadily declared there was only one China including Tibet and Taiwan – simply refused to follow suit last month. Short of recognizing Taiwan’s independence, India incontrovertibly is more than just resisting China where and when it should.

　　　China’s strategy of overpowering India is meticulous. After investing ten-odd years, China is nearing completion of a number of military strongholds aimed at encircling India. Some Indian experts believe China has also provided Pakistan, India’s archrival, nuclear weapons, in order to deprive India of resources with which to counter the Chinese offensive. These experts point out China has provided North Korea nuclear weapons in order to put Japan in the same situation as India vis-à-vis China.

　　　Experts have pointed out that in 1982 – when Deng Xiaoping was in office – China decided to adopt a policy of proliferating nuclear weapons in the third world, making North Korea and Pakistan key strongholds. It goes without saying that China is the indisputable source of nuclear proliferation in the third world, with North Korea and Pakistan as primary examples.

　　　The Indian government officials we conferred with during our December visit expressed hope that the Japanese government and its people will come to grips with the circumstances surrounding the reality of the world’s nuclear weapons. Such remarks are a subtle reminder that Japan is having second thoughts about signing a nuclear power agreement with India on grounds that India has yet to participate in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime and that there is a possibility that India may conduct nuclear tests in the future.

　　　“That is not going to be the case,” asserts a high-ranking Indian government official. “In fact, India has not transferred its nuclear technologies overseas – not even once. India maintains nuclear weapons for the single  reason that we require them purely for self-defense because Pakistan has them.”

　　　As irony would have it, China, a full-fledged NPT member, and North Korea, which once was a member, both constitute sources of nuclear proliferation; meanwhile, India – a non-NPT signatory – has steadfastly refrained from nuclear proliferation. A grand strategy for Japan’s future should be formulated in tandem with partners selected on the sheer merit of their nuclear policies – not just because they are NPT signatories by name only. Realistically, Japan needs to work closely not only with the United States but also with India. In order for Japan to face up to China properly, a close alliance and cooperation with the U.S. and India is indispensable. For that purpose, I firmly believe Japan should resolutely take steps towards signing a nuclear agreement with India at an early stage.

　　　From a strategic point of view, I also support the Japan-South Korea alliance proposed by Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara, as well as the three new principles involving weapons export advanced by Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa.

　　　However, Premier Kan sorely lacks the capacity to take action on such opportunities. Kitazawa’s proposal for a review of the three principles must surely have won popular support in Japan had Kan responded proactively in the first place. But he just sat on it, and Kitazawa’s proposal went down the drain. Formation of the proposed Japan-South Korea alliance would have been an even heavier burden to shoulder for this premier incapable of perceiving the demands of the changing times.

　　　As mentioned at the top of this article, Menon, India’s top government security specialist, has proposed that Indians and Japanese start to “talk strategy.” However, “strategy” appears too lofty a notion for our premier’s deplorably limited framework of thinking.

(Translated from the January 13, 2011 issue of The Sankei Shimbun daily)