The recent G20 (Group of Twenty) summit held September 4-5 in the Chinese city of Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province, and the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) summit that followed in Vientiane, Laos, September 6-7 brutally laid bare the Obama administration’s failed foreign and international security policies.

　　　　　While endeavoring to contain criticism against its actions in the South China Sea, Beijing during the summits made clear its determination to continue to follow its own path of greed and aggression, steadfastly challenging the values of the Western world. Meanwhile, Obama sadly failed to check China—a super power clearly driven by incompatible values—from calling the shots.

　　　　　In just four months, Obama will walk off the center stage of domestic and international politics. His persistent reluctance to be a world leader may very possibly blunt America’s future global leadership, leading to a tumultuous and dramatic change in the world order in the next few years. History can change in a split second, and we in Japan must be ready for anything.

　　　　　Since joining the World Trade Organization in 2001, China has benefited more than any other nation from the principle of a free and open market economy. The Western world expected China to develop into a more open nation as it accumulated experience in the capitalist economy, hoping the world’s most populous nation would learn to honor the principles of fair competition.

　　　　　But China has fallen far short of our expectations. This year’s major theme for the G20, founded in the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008, was to cooperate closely to boost economic growth, eliminating factors that might have a negative effect on the world economy. China’s overproduction of steel is a case in point.

　　　　　Operating under a framework revolving around state-owned corporations far removed from the market economy, the Chinese in 2015 produced 800 million tons of steel, half the world’s production, spreading excess stock across the globe at grossly reduced prices. Through these actions, they have in fact exported recession and unemployment to the market economy nations of the world, including Japan.

　　　　　This time the G20 nations agreed to create a system designed to check such overproduction, but there is no guarantee that the proposed system will function as expected. It is unrealistic to expect the Chinese to restrict their exports as they will naturally expect competing nations to readily make up the balance.

Fate of South China Sea

　　　　　Another Chinese-led framework that both the US and Japan watch warily is the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Earlier, the Obama administration tried hard to talk America’s allies and other nations out of joining it because of its overt political inclination and the opacity of its proposed management. However, EC nations joined the AIIB in unison; even Canada, America’s immediate neighbor and one of its closest allies, decided to join just before the G20 summit got underway. Obama’s influence—and that of America—has faltered to this extent.

　　　　　The summit between Obama and Xi Jinping was held for four hours on the night of September 3 preceding the G20 summit. Obama strongly urged China to respect the South China Sea ruling handed down by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague. Meanwhile, in his meeting with Xi, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe stressed “in no uncertain terms” the Japanese position as regards China’s attempts to expand its presence in the East and South China Seas. In diplomatic language, these were strong expressions of displeasure.

　　　　　But the reality on the high seas has proven to be much harsher. On September 2, Filipino President Rodrigo Duterte revealed that China had dispatched eight ships to Scarborough Shoal—an open challenge to the order of the South China Sea.

　　　　　The Chinese fleet comprised four China Coast Guard ships, two barges, and two ships suspected of being military vessels used to transport soldiers. Filipino Secretary of Defense Delfine Lorenzana demanded that the Chinese side explain why these ships had congregated in the waters around Scarborough Shoal, because the “deployment of the barges can easily be linked to dredging, reclamation, and construction” (of military facilities).

　　　　　Scarborough Shoal, close to Taiwan and barely 120 miles from Subic Bay where the US once maintained a huge naval base, is a point of strategic importance in the South China Sea. By putting the shoal under its control and linking it with the Paracel and Spratly Islands, China can be sure to secure mastery of the air and seas in the area.

　　　　　The US has maintained that, if China laid a hand on Scarborough Shoal, it would not let it pass. With the eight-ship Chinese fleet already dispatched to the shoal, can Obama take the bold course of deploying US forces to counter the Chinese?

　　　　　One suspects that Beijing, which presumably has stopped taking Obama seriously, may have possibly timed the fleet’s deployment to coincide with the US-China summit.

　　　　　America’s decisions will determine the fate of the South China Sea. Against this backdrop, there is the danger that Duterte may act as a wild card in giving some advantage to Beijing in the regional competition. A planned meeting between Obama and Duterte was canceled at the last minute because of the latter’s foul-mouthed outburst. The faltering of US-Philippines relations can at least in some way be attributable to Obama’s inaction and indecisiveness.

　　　　　Obama is faced with serious problems: he has failed to put a check on China and America’s relationship with the Philippines has become shaky. Also, it still is unclear whether he can manage to get Congress to ratify the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement—the new free trade agreement he is seeking to establish with Japan, America’s major Pacific ally.

　　　　　In the shadow of America’s declining global influence, Japan, which for over 70 years since the end of the last war has fundamentally relied on the US for its national defense and foreign policy, must now take an entirely new approach.

Needed: Well-Concerted National Effort

　　　　　Chinese Coast Guard vessels have violated Japanese territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands repeatedly since the beginning of this month, their number increasing to four from three in recent days.

　　　　　The Chinese are changing their strategy against the US presence in the region—from first just targeting the Senkakus to controlling what they refer to as the “First Island Chain” (stretching from the Kamchatka Peninsula to the Malay Peninsula) and then the seas to the west of the “Second Island Chain” (the next chain of archipelagos beyond the First Island Chain, primarily comprising the Bonin Islands, Marianas Islands, and Caroline Islands). If the Chinese were to launch an offensive, Japan has long expected the US to promptly counter by deploying aircraft from their carriers in the region to attack the Chinese mainland. That is at least how America’s Air Sea Battle (ASB) strategy has been construed in Japan.

　　　　　Under the ASB concept, it is assumed that America’s nuclear deterrence will remain effective, and that in a prolonged conventional conflict the US will be able to wear out the Chinese. However, US forces are pulling back today, their strategy having undergone a significant change. The US forces are now ready to retreat to areas east of the Second Island Chain at the first signs of China launching missiles, leaving Japan to face the Chinese.

　　　　　Clearly, a fundamental review of Japan’s defense policies is mandatory. The Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) are precariously short of equipment and manpower. The Japanese constitution and the JSDF Act are deeply committed to the principle of an exclusively defense-oriented policy, with the JSDF’s actions and offensive capabilities stringently constrained. This makes the defense of Japan almost impossible.

　　　　　Having procrastinated over the years, the Obama administration and the Japanese government have ended up allowing China to achieve supremacy in a host of fields, most importantly military. By 2020, when the Olympics will be held in Tokyo, the gap in military strength between Japan and China is expected to widen to 1-5, with China getting the absolute upper hand.

　　　　　It is the government’s responsibility to relate to the people candidly that Japan is truly faced with a precarious situation. If the government can share with the general populace a recognition of the fierceness of China’s offensive capabilities, as well as its persistent zeal for expansion, I am certain that the people will inevitably render a correct judgment.

　　　　　Government leaders must first endeavor to create an environment in which they can involve the people in a candid discussion of Japan’s security needs. They must then pay attention to what the professional military men in the JSDF—those with the strongest desire to avoid war—have to say. The government must implement a major reform in our defense structure, including a doubling of our defense budget and arranging for the level of equipment and number of personnel that these officers deem mandatory. Only in this way can we ensure the peace and prosperity of our country.

(Translated from “Renaissance Japan” column no. 720 in the September 15, 2016 issue of The Weekly Shincho)