Since the devastating ruling against Beijing’s South China Sea territorial claims by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague on July 12, China has adopted an increasingly hard-line policy towards Japan. Starting on August 3, an unprecedented number of Chinese coast guard vessels escorting a large fleet of fishing boats have daily entered not only the waters near the Senkaku Islands but the territorial waters themselves. On August 8, the number of the Chinese coast guard vessels reached 15, seven of which were reportedly equipped with guns. As of this writing, August 17, nine Chinese coast guard vessels have violated Japanese territorial waters.

　　　　　Of the estimated 230 Chinese fishing boats in the area, a total of 43 have violated the territorial waters. That Chinese patrol vessels and fishing boats, brazenly flying their five-star red flags, have dared start cruising in a wide swath of Japan’s territorial waters as if they belong to China clearly indicates that the situation is approaching a new crisis point.

　　　　　Fresh in one’s memory is the first-ever entry of Chinese warships into the contiguous area around the Senkakus on June 9. Six days later, on June 15, Chinese warships also entered the territorial waters around the Kuchino-erabu Islands of Kagoshima Prefecture, southern Japan, also for the first time. Then, between July 31 and August 4, China designated a vast area of the East China Sea as a “no fishing zone,” carrying out massive military exercises that included live firing drills, deploying more than 100 warships and several dozen fighter-planes.

　　　　　China’s aggression against Japan has not been limited to the seas. Since late May, Chinese jets have approached Japanese air space over the Senkakus more than a few times, some of them flying to within some 30 miles. Two Chinese jets that rapidly approached the air space were accused of taking “aggressive actions” against the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force jets that scrambled to meet them, filling the skies over the Senkakus with a hitherto unseen sense of tension. Clearly, an entirely new security crisis for Japan—and the rest of the democracies in Asia, for that matter—has evolved in the East China Sea.

　　　　　How has the Japanese government responded to this situation? On August 9, Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida summoned Chinese Ambassador to Japan Cheng Yonghua to protest against the Chinese actions, but Cheng’s posture was apparently evasive, for instance noting nonchalantly that the Chinese fishing fleet had had a good catch in the waters off the Senkakus. While the Foreign Ministry called the Chinese envoy at a nearly two-hour interval, there reportedly were times when the Chinese ambassador would not even come on the line.

　　　　　What is the Chinese motive behind this series of aggressive actions against Japan in recent weeks? One must watch the evolving situation carefully to understand that, at this point, the Chinese incursion into the Japanese territorial waters around the Senkakus is not necessarily synchronized with the moves of the PLA (People’s Liberation Army).

“Salami Tactics”

　　　　　China’s past actions in the South China Sea indicate that the next crisis Japan will face in the East China Sea is when China attempts to land militiamen disguised as fishermen on the Senkakus. The Japan Coast Guard (CG) is charged with coping with such cases. If the situation cannot be handled by the CG, the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) will be called in under the maritime safety or public safety provision of the Self-Defense Forces Law. But the important thing is to resolve the situation before turning to the MSDF.

　　　　　Obviously, China wants to create a situation which forces Japan to dispatch MSDF forces first, so it can accuse Japan of aggression and claim it had to react militarily. Masahisa Sato, an upper house lawmaker who in 2004 served as the commander of the Japanese Iraq reconstruction and support group, says he reads two intentions in the Chinese actions.

　　　　　The first is a warning to Japan to stay quiet during the upcoming (Sept. 4-5) G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors summit. Notes Sato: “The summit is going be held in Hangzhou, which is not very far from the Senkakus. Chairman Xi, who has to make the summit a success, is extremely concerned about Japan bringing up the South China Sea issue and embarrassing China during the conference. The recent incursions into the waters around the Senkakus, I believe, are a demonstration of a Chinese intention to put a check on Japan.”

　　　　　China’s second intent, Sato feels, is to strengthen the foundation of the Xi leadership, noting that Beijing hopes to distract the Chinese people from the rapidly deteriorating economy as well as the recent decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. In that decision, the Court ruled against China on almost all counts in its territorial dispute with the Philippines in the South China Sea.

　　　　　It is China’s usual practice to attack Japan in order to divert the public’s attention away from the government’s failures, but if China should in fact go further in its aggressive actions in the Senkakus, it will have to deal with not only Japan but the US as well.

　　　　　That said, America under the Obama administration has assumed a passive posture toward the tensions in the East and South China Seas, preferring to resolve the problems through talks first. Further, that the US is in the middle of the presidential election year makes it that much more difficult to cope with the Chinese moves. If so, could this situation entice China to take the bold step of landing disguised fishermen on the Senkakus?

　　　　　Sato takes a negative view, noting: “China knows that once a landing takes place, things could not be readily resolved. Japan would do everything to avoid any military action, but would absolutely never allow the Chinese to seize the islands. Depending on the circumstances, however, a fierce battle for the islands could evolve, forcing China to deal with Japanese and American forces at the same time. The Chinese could not easily take that step, as it would call for them to be resolutely prepared for what would follow. I don’t think the Chinese military is that powerful yet.”

　　　　　However, China has steadily made big strides, both conspicuously and inconspicuously. For instance, China has built a total of 12 oil and gas exploration platforms along the Japan-China Median Line in the East China Sea in the past three years. Platform no. 12, of which only the basic foundation had been built as of June last year, has recently been completed, with radar equipment and a night vision device installed.

　　　　　Explains Fumio Ota, former Head of the Defense Intelligence Headquarters of the Defense Ministry: “These are typical Chinese ‘salami tactics.’ Their plan is to first install small and obscure water-surface radar-equipment, reassuring adversaries that they have nothing to worry about, and later come up with more powerful radar systems such as air-search and sea-floor radar. By installing a variety of radar systems along the median line, they hope to be able to block the movements of US forces.”

Advanced Base against Japan

　　　　　If there were a conflict with China, US submarines based in Guam would probably attempt to lay mines at the mouth of the bay of Shanghai as part of a naval blockade. As a means of blocking such a US attempt, China will likely build an anti-submarine barrier. The radar systems China is now quietly installing will prove useful then. The platforms China has built will automatically be converted to military use, constituting an advance base against Japan as well. It was a diplomatic mistake for Japan to have allowed such a situation to evolve.

　　　　　Ohta explains the reality of China’s military expansion as follows: In just three years, China has managed to build 300 new fighter planes equivalent to ten regiments of the fourth-generation of the latest fighters developed by Japan. As of last year, the number for China had increased to 730, against 293 for Japan. China’s number has further increased by 80 to a total of 810 over the past year. By 2020, when the Olympic Games will be staged in Japan, China will own between 270 and 280 battleships, catching up with the US Navy, which currently has the largest number—280. As for submarines, Japan plans to increase its current fleet from 16 subs to 22 by 2020. Meanwhile, China has announced plans to increase its current fleet of 71 subs to 100 by 2020.

　　　　　Of course, merely comparing military numbers between Japan and China would be meaningless because of Japan’s close alliance with the US. But we must take into consideration the fact that, for instance, Kadena in Okinawa is the only base Japan and the US share for the defense of Taiwan, which is also closely linked with the defense of the Senkakus. Meanwhile, China has already secured 39 bases to dispatch Taiwan-bound troops; 16 of them have been built in the last five years.

　　　　　It would be a gross mistake to underestimate China’s military capabilities. We Japanese must recognize that we are clearly faced with a critical situation in the East and South China Seas, and must take effective measures as soon as possible to enhance our military defense. This must include, without question, the revision of our current constitution.
(Translated from “Renaissance Japan” column no. 717 in the August 25, 2016 issue of The Weekly Shincho)