Top US and Chinese officials met in Beijing on June 6 for the eighth annual US-Chinese Strategic and Economic Dialogue to discuss a wide range of matters of mutual concern. At the opening session, Chairman Xi Jinping emphasized, as expected, the need for Beijing and Washington to work steadily toward “a new model of major country relations.”

　　　　　Xi stressed the importance of the two sides recognizing each other’s “core interests,” honoring the principles of “non-confrontation, mutual respect, and win-win cooperation…”—principles Beijing never fails to bring up in the two-nation dialogue over the past few years. This time, Xi remarked:

　　　　　“China and the US need to properly manage differences on the sensitive issues…in a pragmatic and constructive fashion…”

　　　　　Despite Xi’s words, it is China who has continuously disrupted the existing order and norms, whether in the South China Sea or elsewhere. Beijing sets specific goals, then seeks to achieve those goals by adroitly biding its time until the opportunity is there to strike.

　　　　　This has long been China’s approach. In point of fact, Beijing used the same tactics in 1978 in deceiving Japan into “reaching” an agreement on the Senkaku Islands when then Chinese Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping visited Japan. Deng had earlier stated in Beijing that, if the Senkaku question could not be resolved “by our generation, it does not matter if it is shelved for some time, say, 10 years. Our generation is not wise enough to find common language on this question. Our next generation will be wiser. They will certainly find a solution acceptable to all.”

　　　　　In Tokyo, Deng told the press that an agreement had been reached to shelve the Senkaku question. In point of fact, no such agreement had been reached, but Tokyo did not immediately refute Deng’s claim—“out of consideration” for the Chinese. This was a very Japanese diplomatic gesture which ultimately proved detrimental to Japan’s national interests. Japan’s position—then and now—is that no territorial question exists as regards Senkakus which Japan has administered since 1895．Despite the difference over the “agreement,” Japan began extending huge grants to China under an ODA (Official Development Aid) program. Fourteen years later, China took Japan by surprise by abruptly enacting a new domestic law, declaring the Senkaku Islands as well as the entire East China Sea to be its own territory.

　　　　　What Xi said in Beijing this time overlapped with Deng’s remarks in Tokyo nearly four decades ago. These statements by Chinese leaders are proof that China will never give up its territorial claim over the Senkakus—in the same way as they will not give up the South China Sea.

China’s Growing Isolation

　　　　　Right up to the start of the Strategic Dialogue in Beijing, the US and China skirmished over the South China Sea, sharply criticizing each other during the Summit held in Singapore the week before. Also known as the Shangri-La Dialogue, the Singapore summit is held annually and attended by defense ministers, military chiefs, and defense experts from some 30 nations. With China not expected to make compromises readily, the biggest focal point at the summit was to what extent the US would succeed in constraining China’s blatant acts of aggression in the South China Sea.

　　　　　In his address on June 4, Defense Secretary Ashton Carter emphasized the importance of freedom of navigation and overflight in the region, urging participating nations to continue honoring the principles of territorial sovereignty based on international law. Referring to “principle” 36 times—as in “a principled security network (in Asia)” and “a principled and prosperous future (for Asia)”—Carter criticized China’s construction of military facilities on reclaimed islets in the South China Sea, warning: “China could end up erecting a Great Wall of self-isolation.”

　　　　　Carter stressed that peace and order in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean is ensured through close partnerships, referring specifically to US-Japan-Korea, US-Japan-Australia, and US-Japan-India trilateral military relationships. He further pointed out that the US is proactively pursuing bilateral relationships with Vietnam, the Philippines, and Singapore, noting that even Thailand, Indonesia, and Laos are cooperating with the US. Carter thus attempted to highlight China’s growing isolation in the region.

　　　　　As regards the appeal filed by the Philippines with the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague in 2013 over China’s acts of aggression in the South China Sea, Carter urged Beijing to accept the court’s upcoming ruling as “an opportunity for China and the rest of the region to recommit to a principled future, renew diplomacy, and lowering tensions, rather than raising them.”

　　　　　The Chinese reaction to the Carter address was surprisingly emotional. Admiral Sun Jianquo, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of China’s PLA (People’s Liberation Army), left the conference hall immediately after Carter finished speaking, brusquely retorting in a bass voice before the press:

　　　　　“Secretary Carter is completely wrong. We were not isolated in the past, we are not isolated now, we will not be isolated in the future.”

　　　　　Sun delivered an address the following day, rigidly repeating, as expected: “We don’t make trouble but have no fear of trouble.” He emphasized:

　　　　　“China will not bear the consequences, nor will it allow any infringement on its sovereignty and security interests, or stay indifferent to some countries creating chaos in the South China Sea.”

　　　　　Statements made by Chinese representatives at the security summit have become markedly more belligerent over the past three years. Typical was the sharp language used to denounce the key note address Prime Minister Shinzo Abe made in 2014, in which he noted the importance of safeguarding the open seas, freedom of navigation and overflight, peaceful settlement of disputes, and the rule of international law—all for the good of the international community. Hearing Abe’s unexpectedly direct remarks, the audience reacted quite positively, giving him a number of standing ovations.

　　　　　Any praise for Japan, however, without fail provokes anger from China. Putting aside a prepared statement, the leader of the Chinese delegation—Lieutenant General Wang Guanzhong of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)—attacked Abe, accusing him of “trying to stir up disputes and trouble,” which he claimed ran counter to “the spirit of the (Shangri-La) Dialogue.”

　　　　　Why did the Chinese react so bitterly in 2014?

Nation Capable of Coping with Crisis

　　　　　With China forging ahead with land reclamation in the South China Sea at a frenzied pace at the time, Lt. Gen. Wang’s remarks might possibly have been intended to camouflage the sense of guilt on the part of the Chinese leadership.

　　　　　At the same summit last year, Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong made a proposal in line with the Chinese position that disputes over the South China Sea should be settled through consultations only between the parties involved (without the US or Japan intervening). Clearly, Lee must have been under pressure from China.

　　　　　And then this year, too, China reacted sharply, as demonstrated by Admiral Sun’s remarks. Regarding the upcoming ruling by the court in The Hague, Sun declared that China’s policy toward the South China Sea remains unchanged, noting: “China will not recognize the court’s ruling, nor will it allow any infringement on its sovereignty.”

　　　　　The Global Times, the overseas edition of The People’s Daily, commended Sun’s statement as a clear response to foreign provocations over the South China Sea. The English daily confidently stated that China is prepared to cope economically and militarily with any provocation.

　　　　　Japanese Defense Minister Gen Nakatani stated that “Japan will respond appropriately” if China ignores the ruling by the court, which will be based on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Vietnam’s Deputy Defense Minister Nguyen Chi Vinh warned: “If not addressed timely and successfully, it is likely to entail an arms race, and a strategic rivalry of the regional powers with disastrous and unpredictable consequences.”

　　　　　The security summit was marked by a hostile mood, to which Xi responded with proposals that the US and China “properly manage differences on the sensitive issues” and “manage them in a pragmatic and a constructive fashion.” However, the problem for the US and Asian nations is that time is not necessarily on their side, as the Obama administration will end in the next six months, with considerable opacity as to who the next president will be and what direction US diplomatic and security policies will take.

　　　　　In the US, there is significant dissatisfaction with Japan and NATO members, whom it is felt are not making sufficient efforts to defend themselves. This discontent may drive America further toward looking inward. When that happens, how will Japan and the rest of Asia face up to the threat from the Chinese?

　　　　　The very question Japan is faced with today is if it can become a nation capable of sufficiently coping with such a crisis—whether it is capable of making up its mind to be a reliable and responsible democracy. How Japan acts now will determine the nature of its future relationship with the US and, beyond that, its future ties with China.

　　　　　Against the backdrop of China’s expansion and the unclear direction of the foreign policy the US will adopt under its next president, we Japanese must take a hard look at the very foundation of our national defense.

(Translated from “Renaissance Japan” column no. 708 in the June 16, 2016 issue of The Weekly Shincho)