The recent visit to India by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, I believe, has significantly contributed to the stability not only of Japan-India relations but also of the Asia-Pacific region.

　　　　　During his visit December 11-13, Abe managed to sign agreements on the construction of a “bullet train” high-speed railway system as well as the transfer of defense technology, classified intelligence, and arms and equipment between the two nations. A combination of a strong Japan and a strong India will constitute a powerful force, contributing to and protecting the stability of the Asian region against the aggressive rise of China.

　　　　　That Japan and India also reached a basic agreement on bilateral nuclear cooperation is a significant achievement for Abe. There are those in Japan who oppose providing India nuclear technology, asserting that India, despite being a nuclear nation, has yet to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) or the Comprehensible Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). However, such criticism will automatically dissipate if one realizes how India has viewed, and dealt with, nuclear power over the years, reminding one that Japan in reality has much to learn from her partner in this area.

　　　　　In point of fact, India had begun studying peaceful uses of nuclear power prior to the end of the Greater East Asian War (1941-1945) at least ten years earlier than Japan.. Professor Kumao Kaneko, who heads the private Society for Strategic Energy Studies, points out the surprising fact that scientists from India—which at the time was still a British colony—conducted nuclear research in the UK and were even involved in the Manhattan Project. (See Japan Must Wake Up from Nuclear Fallacy, in India-Japan Joint Studies, vol. 2: The Japan Institute for National Fundamentals, Tokyo; 2012.)

　　　　　Professor Homi K. Bhabha of Harvard University, known as the “Father of Nuclear Power in India,” served as chairman of the first International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, sponsored by the United Nations in Geneva in 1955. A young politician named Yasuhiro Nakasone who attended the conference was awakened to the need for the development of nuclear power in Japan. He began vigorously arguing for the merits of nuclear power soon after his return to Tokyo, prompting the Japanese government to engage in the study of nuclear power despite the “nuclear allergy” resulting from the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the US.

　　　　　India later placed an emphasis on nuclear tests, reflecting a desperate strategy to defend itself against the threat of attack from its two hostile neighbors—China and Pakistan.

Privileges of Nuclear Power

　　　　　India, which had been pursuing a policy of peaceful non-alignment, was thunderstruck by China’s massive invasion of its territory on October 20, 1962. India took heavy losses in a series of defeats in the wake of the sudden Chinese assault, with nearly 3,300 of its soldiers killed in battle. Amid this resounding success, however, China abruptly declared a cease-fire.

　　　　　Why did this sudden invasion and cease-fire happen at this time? It was all part of a grand plan concocted by Mao Zedong, asserts Brahma Chellaney, one of India’s leading strategists who serves as a professor at the New Delhi-based Center for Policy Research.

　　　　　Mao viewed the Cuban Crisis of October 1962 as a golden opportunity to invade India. With the Soviet Union having secretly deployed nuclear warheads and medium-range ballistic missiles in Cuba, President Kennedy established a naval blockade around China and sternly demanded that the Soviet offensive weapons be immediately dismantled and returned to the USSR. The beginning and the end of China’s aggression against India coincided perfectly with the start of the Cuban Crisis and the official end of the US blockade.

　　　　　Mao had obviously thought the Chinese invasion would not attract the world’s attention under the tense situation that threatened a nuclear war between the US and the USSR. Unquestionably, he sought to take full advantage of the crisis in Cuba to resolve the China-India border dispute in his own favor.

　　　　　Two years later, in 1964, China suddenly conducted a nuclear test, joining the ranks of the nuclear power. Then in 1967, it succeeded in its first hydrogen bomb test.

　　　　　Meanwhile, in 1970, the international community enacted the NPT. It was an agreement which granted only the five nuclear powers—the US, the USSR, Great Britain, France, and China—the right to possess nuclear weapons, permanently differentiating between nuclear powers and non-nuclear powers. The five “have” nations can manufacture any number of nuclear weapons without reproach—and without even being inspected by IAEA (the International Atomic Energy Agency). India, on the other hand, even though it faces the threat of a nuclear China, is banned from owning nuclear weapons as a means of safeguarding its domestic security.

　　　　　India conducted its first nuclear test in 1974 clearly as a response to China’s aggressive nuclear program. Twenty-four years later, in May 1998, India again conducted a nuclear test, followed by one by its neighbor Pakistan two weeks later.

　　　　　President Bill Clinton sternly criticized India at the time. Prime Minister Atal Behari Vagpayee replied in writing, stating: that India shares its border with nuclear power China; that China invaded India in 1962; and that China has further practically helped another neighbor, Pakistan, become a nuclear power.

　　　　　In fact, Deng Xiaoping started supporting Pakistan’s nuclear development in 1982, and conducted—on Pakistan’s behalf—a nuclear test at Lop Nur in the Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region on May 26, 1990.

　　　　　Japan has placed itself under the US nuclear umbrella, but under its policy of nonalignment, India has no one to turn to. It is, therefore, only natural that its leaders want to defend their nation from the nuclear threats from China and Pakistan by possessing their own nuclear weapons. Were Japan in India’s position, would it be able to develop nuclear weapons for its national defense? Do today’s Japanese, inclined to constantly turn to the US for protection, have the mettle to satisfactorily defend their nation on their own? Doesn’t India’s experience force us to grapple with this difficult question?

World’s Biggest Democracy

　　　　　When George W. Bush became President, the US took steps towards improvement of the relationship between “the world’ oldest democracy” and “the world’s largest democracy,” signing in 2008 a nuclear cooperation agreement with India, which had yet to join the NPT.

　　　　　The US turned down Pakistan’s request for the same treatment, because the nation was plainly responsible for proliferating nuclear weapons, as demonstrated by its delivery of Chinese-given nuclear technology to North Korea in exchange for its Nodong missiles. Although not a signatory to the NPT, the Bush administration recognized that India had discreetly endeavored to prevent nuclear proliferation.

　　　　　While China has benefitted from every transfer of technology, including nuclear, India has refrained from seeking such benefits. Considering China’s outrageous acts of nuclear proliferation over the years, this gap in the treatment of these two nations is simply unacceptable. First and foremost, China is a nation ruled under a one-party dictatorship devoid of the freedom of speech. Since its founding in 1949, the People’s Republic has frequently launched attacks on the 14 nations it shares its borders with. And today, it is the cause of the disputes in the South China Sea.

　　　　　Meanwhile, India is the world’s largest democracy, as Bush has put it, far from a one-party dictatorship. It has never caused conflicts with or launched attacks on its neighbors, although it has responded to attacks for self-defense. That understandably was why former Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada of the Japan Democratic Party administration headed by then Prime Minister Naoto Kan started negotiations on a nuclear power cooperation agreement with India. The negotiations got off to a good start, but no agreement was reached, as Okada was prominently reported in India as remarking that “Japan would have to stop cooperating with India if nuclear testing is resumed by India.” The 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster also adversely affected the outcome of the negotiations.

　　　　　After India declared its moratorium on further nuclear testing in September 2008, however, nations including the US, France, Russia, Canada, and South Korea, have viewed India as trustworthy and signed bilateral agreements for peaceful nuclear cooperation. Also putting full trust in India on the basis of its years of efforts for nuclear non-proliferation, Japan must sign a full agreement as soon as possible. Signing such an agreement, I firmly believe, will strengthen the combined capabilities of both nations and significantly contribute to the stability and prosperity of Asia.

(Translated from “Renaissance Japan” column no. 685 in the December 24, 2015 issue of The Weekly Shincho)