Reading press reports on the Japan-China-South Korea summit that took place in Seoul on November 1-2, I was freshly reminded of the vast differences in the national characteristics of the three Asian countries.

　　　　　South Korea obviously has yet to achieve the status of a mature nation, unable to even clearly identify its real national interests. As for China, despite facing increased pressure from its neighbors and the US, it still endeavors to move stubbornly towards its misguided objectives in the region, resorting to Sun Tzu’s tricks and sophistry as its means. Meanwhile, having managed to solidify its position internationally with the enactment of expanded security bills and agreement on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), Japan has boosted its self-confidence and national prestige. However, amid the fierce rivalry among the three leading Asian powers, one feels Japan must assume a more aggressive posture in pursuit of its own national interests.

　　　　　In view of the rapidly changing international situation, one cannot rule out a future scenario in which Japan and the US are allied against China—or against China and Russia. But before discussing any future scenarios in more detail, I would first like to touch on an amusing anecdote that demonstrates how the national characteristics of Japan and South Korea vastly differ.

　　　　　While President Park Guen-hye held a sumptuous state dinner to welcome Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, Ms. Park did not host even a simple luncheon for Abe. During preliminary negotiations, the South Korean side had allegedly requested—as a precondition for hosting an official luncheon—that Abe assume a low posture and announce his determination to resolve the “comfort women” issue “by the end of this year.”

　　　　　According to the November 3 edition of the Sankei Shinbun, Abe had rejected that request, saying with a laugh: “You can’t sacrifice national interests for just a luncheon.” The Yomiuri Shimbun reported that on the day of the summit itself, as the session was ending at around 11:45 a.m., Ms. Park asked Abe what his plans were for the rest of the day. Abe was quoted as replying: “I’m going to enjoy some Korean barbeque now.” Having nothing better to say, a surprised Park reportedly responded: “So you love Korean barbeque, Mr. Prime Minister?”

　　　　　It would be a complete loss of face for any head of state to propose a conditional luncheon—and have it turned down—in receiving a counterpart from anywhere on earth. Where in the whole world does one see a head of state ready to make an easy compromise over matters that seriously concern national honor? It seems highly unlikely that the South Korean secretariat would think the Japanese willing to sacrifice national interests over a luncheon, but it does at the very least seem to be an indication that the South Koreans are unable to view some vital matters objectively.

　　　　　Abe, who apparently didn’t mind the situation at all, happily went out to a well-known barbeque restaurant in Seoul, immensely enjoying his lunch. I dare commend Abe for keeping his composure and enjoying himself.

Chinese and Korean Concessions

　　　　　In its planning stage, China and South Korea tried to attach several preconditions to the summit.

　　　　　China had asked that Abe make clear his intention to not revisit Yasukuni Shrine; it had also called for Japan to recognize that a conflict exists between the two countries over the sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands. Meanwhile, the South Koreans had asserted that concessions from the Japanese were necessary in order to resolve the “comfort women” issue. But Japan stood firm on its principle that the trilateral summit must be held without any preconditions.

　　　　　Eventually, the Japanese position prevailed. In other words, China and South Korea were both compelled to make concessions to Japan.

　　　　　Would I be wrong to assume that, by adroitly hiding the fact from its people that it made concessions to Japan, China has succeeded in creating the strong impression on the part of Chinese citizens that its premier harshly criticized Japan at the summit?

　　　　　Li arrived in South Korea one day before the summit for an intimate talk with his South Korean counterpart. Images of the two leaders having a pleasant chat, excluding Abe, gave the clear sense that the two nations solidified a common front against Japan in connection with a number of pending issues, beginning with the so-called “history issues.”

　　　　　Japanese government officials likened Japan to being in “an away game facing two opponents at the same time,” preparing for a rough going. And yet, once the tripartite summit began, didn’t they realize that China and South Korea—especially the former—chose to seek realistic gains far more coolly than anticipated? Given that Li chose to attend the summit despite Abe’s refusal to agree to any preconditions, China must have clearly had concrete objectives in mind.

　　　　　Unless it succeeds in urging Japan to increase its investments in China, the Chinese economy will shrink further; China must also contain international criticism over issues pertaining to Southeast Asia; and it is also eager to drag Japan into the China-South Korea FTA (Free Trade Agreement) in order to prevent any further expansion of the TPP framework. At any rate, China was in a position in which it desperately needed to pursue these objectives.

　　　　　Didn’t China intend to hide these needs under the cloak of Li’s tough posture toward Abe? One example manifesting this Chinese posture, I believe, was reflected in Li’s remarks in Seoul implicitly criticizing Japan: “Collaboration (among our three nations) will contribute to coping properly with delicate matters, such as history. Some nation has yet to come to grips with this aspect.”

　　　　　It was natural that Abe refuted Li’s statement, pointing out: “It is not productive to spotlight a particular issue of the past.” Abe and Li reportedly traded barbs over history issues during their summit that followed, according to Chinese reports. Li allegedly told Abe that “the history issue has very much to do with the national sentiments of the 1.3 billion people of China,” urging his counterpart high-handedly to “cope with the issues responsibly.”

“All Warfare Is Based on Deception”

　　　　　The Japanese side has refrained from disclosing the content of the remarks by Li as well as Abe’s rebuttal, because Japan and China had agreed on the latter’s initial proposal that both sides withhold the details of the discussions.
　　　　　Obviously, the Chinese side has resorted to trickery in this case, as it broke the agreement. While the Chinese media has vigorously reported on Li’s remarks to Abe, the Japanese side has strictly kept its word as of this writing (November 3).

　　　　　“All warfare is based on deception” in China—as Sun Tze preached. To deceive the adversary is China’s basic policy not only in military affairs, but also in virtually all negotiations. Plainly speaking, Sun Tze gives priority to attaining an objective through deception.

　　　　　How should Japan deal with a nation like China? By managing to participate in the summit without departing from the administration’s fundamental principles, I believe Abe has succeeded in demonstrating that Japan is a mature nation.

　　　　　And yet I cannot help wondering if the Abe administration truly recognizes the threat of China’s long-term strategy toward Japan. Will it be possible to protect and secure our national honor and the lives, property, land and seas of our people by pursuing the same foreign policy over time? Judging from the strategy China is forging ahead with globally, Japan should be strictly on guard. Despite the tensions resulting from the USS Lassen cruising inside the 12-nautical mile territory claimed by China around one of its man-made islets in the South China Sea; despite the virtual denial by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague of China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea; and despite the objections by the international community to its disregard of international laws and norms, China has yet to give an inch in regard to its territorial claims. It also has yet to give up its strategy of fabricating history, or using the history card, in an effort to continue defaming Japan.

　　　　　Now that the Chinese side has broken the agreement not to disclose the detail of Li’s remarks to Abe at the summit, I believe Japan on its part should also make public what Abe told Li in an effort to prevent China from making the rules for future Japan-China relations.

(Translated from “Renaissance Japan” no. 679 in the November 12, 2015 issue of The Weekly Shincho)