The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) has vowed to submit a non-confidence motion against the cabinet of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe if the government adopts the pending security legislation designed to expand the international security role of the Japanese Self Defense Forces (JSDF). How does the top opposition party—leaving aside splinter opposition parties like the Democratic Socialist and Japan Communist Parties—intend to safeguard the lives of our people and the peace and order of the state by so single-mindedly opposing the security legislation, which it terms “war legislation”? After having thoroughly reverted to the irresponsible opposition party it always was, how does the DPJ, which took charge of the government from 2009 to 2012, expect to win back the trust of the people?

　　　　　At the military parade in Beijing on September 3 marking the 70th anniversary of China’s victory in its war with Japan, China proudly flexed its powerful military muscle, demonstrating an assortment of ballistic missiles with varying ranges, obviously with the US very much on its mind. Donning a dark Mao suit and speaking from a podium in Tiananmen Square, President Xi Jinping boasted: “(This great triumph) crushed the plot of the Japanese militarists to colonize and enslave China.” Throughout his address, Xi made a point of persistently portraying Japan as the villain in Asian history.

　　　　　No matter how hard China tries to set Japan up as the villain, however, it is China with its rapid military expansion that a majority of Asian nations are now terrified of. Doesn’t the DPJ realize that as many as 44 nations, many in Asia, highly value Japan’s readiness to play a bigger international security role and welcome an early enactment of the “peace” legislation? Despite this, the DJP insists it will block its enactment no matter what.

　　　　　The DPJ must realize what Japan has been unable to accomplish under the existing security framework severely restricting its international security role and what serious national security threats Japan has often been exposed to as a result. The pending legislation will rectify the situation as it enables Japan to exercise its right to collective self-defense—albeit restrictively.

　　　　　Points out Tetsuya Nishimoto, former chairman of the JSDF Joint Staff Council:

　　　　　“One of the major flaws in our existing security law is the ambiguity about how the JSDF can and should deal with ‘gray zone’ situations. A ‘gray zone’ is, as its name suggests, is a situation in which Japan may be threatened but a state of conflict may not clearly exist. Currently the latitude given the JSDF to react to such contingencies is too narrow. The ‘Shimokoshiki-Jima incident’ of February 3, 1997 in Kagoshima Prefecture, is a typical case in point.”

　　　　　In that incident, 20 Chinese stowaways landed on the 66 square-kilometer (25 square-mile) island some 45 kilometers (28 miles) from the southern Kagoshima city of Sendai. Alerted by residents, the police organized a search party comprising members of a young men’s association and firefighters to hunt for the Chinese. The next morning, 30 members of the JSDF sub-base in the island joined the search but were not allowed to carry firearms as the law only allowed them to participate in a search in the name of “field training.” Explains Nishimoto:

Gaps in “Gray Zones”

　　　　　“An order from the prime minister, or a request from the prefectural governor, is required when JSDF troops engage in public security operations (as stipulated under Article 81 of the JSDF Law). Mobilization of JSDF troops is permitted only when ‘a situation seriously affecting public security’ develops, or when there are other ‘compelling reasons’ for such an operation, but determining such a situation precisely is naturally difficult. In the Shimokoshiki-Jima case, JSDF personnel were mobilized under the guise of field training as a desperate measure, managing to catch all of the stowaways. However, this JSDF action was criticized immediately afterwards as lacking legal grounds. If, however, the stowaways happened to be armed, coping with them would have been too dangerous for the police and the firefighters. Also, would JSDF troops be safe unarmed under such circumstances, even though they may be well-trained for such operations. This gap in dealing with ‘gray zone’ situations must be filled as swiftly as possible.

　　　　　Another serious incident occurred on March 24, 1999, when two North Korean spy ships showed up in the Japan Sea off the eastern coast of the Noto Peninsula in Ishikawa Prefecture. As the spy ships fled at high speed in an attempt to elude Japan Coast Guard patrol ships, the Japanese government issued an order to add a JSDF destroyer and a P3C reconnaissance plane to the chase. It was the first time for such an order to be issued under Article 82 of the JSDF law. Because the destroyer and the reconnaissance plane were banned from resorting to arms “unless attacked first,” the only choice they had was simply to track the North Korean ships. As a result, the spy ships made good their escape into the North Korean port of Chongjin.

　　　　　Many Japanese have been abducted by North Korean ships since the early 1970s. There was a possibility that some Japanese abductees might have been aboard. However, under the existing law, it has been practically impossible to stop the North Koreans from engaging in further such acts of aggression.

　　　　　Chinese patrol boats started violating Japanese territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea during the DPJ administration. In point of fact, Chinese submarines had begun to violate the territorial waters around the Japanese archipelago a long time before. On November 10, 2004, a Han class Chinese submarine cruised our territorial waters between Ishigaki and Tarama Islands in Okinawa Prefecture. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi employed Article 82 for the second time, issuing an order to add JSSD air and naval forces to give chase. The submarine was ordered to surface, as ultrasonic transmitters were dropped to locate the intruder, but in this case, too, the Chinese submarine managed to easily get away, reaching the port of Qingdao in Shandong Province without once coming to the surface.

　　　　These are all cases in which the armed forces of other nations would very naturally have resorted to arms in order to capture the intruders, but the current law allows the JSDF to only chase them. Having obviously scrutinized the gaps in the Japanese constitution as well as the JSDF law, China and North Korea continue to violate Japanese territorial waters fully aware that the JSDF, bound hand and foot, cannot resort to arms. They know that, even when they are cornered, they will be able to attack JSDF forces first before being attacked.

　　　　　Members of the JSDF are not able to perform their duties in protecting our people or our territorial waters without first being exposed to danger themselves. There are political parties that charge that the peace legislation is bound to increase the risks for JSDF personnel, but that is contrary to the truth. The existing law which forces JSDF personnel to expose themselves to danger in the face of China’s aggressive intent is absurd. The DPJ, which was in charge of this country not long ago, ought to be aware of this sorry aspect of our existing security law.

　　　　　Japan’s military might alone cannot sufficiently cope with the Chinese threat. This makes it mandatory for us to take every possible step to allow the US-Japan Security Treaty to function efficiently and properly. Nishimoto tells of a bitter experience he once had concerning this point:

　　　　　“In March 1994, a US-Japan military seminar was held in Tokyo to discuss emergency measures necessary should a conflict occur on the Korean Peninsula. The US side comprised representatives from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Pacific Command, and US-Forces Japan, while our side was made up of representatives from internal bureaus of the Defense Agency and the JSDF Joint Staff Council.

Matter of Japan’s Own Defense

　　　　　“The main theme of the discussions was how to deal with the rapidly deteriorating situation on the Korean Peninsula, with North Korea under Kim Jong-il having recently pulled out of the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), provoking South Korea and the US with a warning that he would ‘reduce Seoul to a sea of flames.’ Requesting logistical support from the JSDF, Washington submitted a detailed deployment plan for US forces on the Korean Peninsula.”

　　　　　The plan revealed by the US side was thorough to the extreme, according to Nishimoto, detailing when and from which bases specific troops were scheduled to depart, which specific ports or airfields in Japan or the Korean Peninsula they were slated to arrive, and by what means they would travel. Nishimoto quoted the US representatives as vigorously explaining that, with efficient logistical support provided by Japan, US combat troops could be committed ahead of these troops, making it possible to deal with—and possibly resolve—the impending crisis that much quicker. But the Japanese side had to turn down the US request in the absence of a law presupposing a situation calling for such support.

　　　　　“The US side pressed hard on us, demanding to know why we could not comply when ‘Japan’s own national security was endangered,’” recalls Nishimoto. “I was gravely concerned that the US-Japan alliance would not be sustainable unless Japan rectified its stance.”

　　　　　Refusing to face up to the threat from China, the DPJ and other opposition parties charge that exercising the right to collective self-defense, even if restrictively, or providing logistical support will definitely lead to conscription, violating our constitution. They make assertions relying heavily on the opinions of the nation’s constitutional experts. It is, however, noteworthy that Setsu Kobayashi, a prominent constitutional scholar at Tokyo’s Keio University whose views are highly valued by the opposition camp, remarked at the Lower House Committee on Constitution on June 22:

　　　　　“Frankly speaking, we scholars are given an enviable environment at universities in which we are entitled to freely develop our ideas, completely oblivious of the advantages or disadvantages of our theories in the real world. We are in a position to disseminate to society the results of our academic arguments about the objective meaning of each of the clauses of our constitution. It is our business to adhere strictly to what each word and phrase printed in our constitution is supposed to mean. If our interpretations clash with the political needs of this nation in the real world, we hope our politicians will hammer out the differences. I certainly do not believe we scholars have the last word.”

　　　　　In other words, politicians must earnestly face up to the realities of international geopolitics and render judgments needed to protect people’s lives and the security of the state. They do not have the luxury of solely relying on the often impractical interpretations that emanate from the ivory tower of constitutional scholars.

(Translated from “Renaissance Japan” co　lumn no. 671 in the September 17, 2015 issue of The Weekly Shincho)