IS TOKYO UNIVERSITY FULFILLING ITS RESPONSIBILITY AS JAPAN’S TOP EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTE?
Professor Yasuo Hasebe, a renowned constitutional scholar requested by the government to serve as an expert witness at a recent session of the Lower House Constitution Commission, threw the Diet into confusion and caused a public sensation by abruptly declaring as unconstitutional Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s plans to expand Japan’s international security role. Two other experts, recommended by the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) and Japan Innovation Party, expressed similar views, adding to the confusion. Under Diet deliberations at present is a package of security bills aimed, among other things, at enhancing Japan’s position in its military alliance with the US by restrictively exercising the right to collective self-defense.
A week later, I discussed this unexpected turn of events on my weekly Internet “Genron TV” show with two guests—Itsunori Onodera, defense minister (2012-2014) in the second Abe cabinet, and Akihisa Nagashima, who briefly served as deputy defense minister in late 2012 in the second DPJ cabinet of Yoshihiko Noda. Before exploring what brings a scholar like Prof. Hasebe to testify as he did against the government-introduced legislation, allow me to introduce Onodera’s convincing case for why Japan must lift the self-imposed ban on the exercise of the right to collective self-defense.
Onodera recalls that as defense minister he kept contemplating, day in and day out, how the state could sufficiently protect the people of Japan should a major security crisis develop. With normal nations, emergency countermeasures are thoroughly legislated, enabling the government to simply concentrate its efforts on how to implement the existing laws as swiftly and appropriately as possible. Because Japan’s security system has various gaps, however, Onodera admits he had to spend much time exploring how they could be plugged up, explaining:
“If North Korea fires a ballistic missile and Japan shoots it down before ascertaining which country it is aimed at—the US or Japan—there is a high possibility that Japan’s action will be interpreted under international law as an exercise of its right to ‘collective,’ not ‘individual,’ self-defense. But can Japan sit idly by under such circumstances claiming that its constitution doesn’t recognize such a right? It simply doesn’t make sense, does it?”
If the missile hits Guam because of the failure on Japan’s part to make a decision to shoot it down, continues Onodera, Japan will suffer serious consequences, as Guam attracts many Japanese and also hosts a major American base that supports the US-Japan military alliance. If the missile is shot down before reaching Guam, and even if the international community interprets the Japanese action as exercising its right to collective self-defense, Onodera admits, a Japanese defense minister could view the Japanese action as justifiable because safeguarding the lives of Japanese in Guam becomes the primary objective in this case.
Onoda further notes: “If the government makes sincere efforts to explain to the nation by citing concrete examples such as this, I have a feeling that a majority of Japanese will inevitably become convinced that they would want the missile shot down by all means. In fact, the government party is hoping to make allowances for such popular sentiment and exercise restrictively, as a means of safeguarding Japan’s security, what international law would surely regard as Japan exercising its right to collective self-defense.”
Sweeping Purge of Top Japanese Brains under American Occupation
While basically agreeing with his counterpart, Nagashima questioned whether military operations of the Japan Self Defense Forces (JSDF), such as mine-sweeping in the Strait of Hormuz as envisioned by Abe, would expand without limits once the current legislation is enacted. Onodera responded as follows:
“Sea lanes are Japan’s vital lifelines. Once mines were laid, whether in the Strait of Hormuz or international waters around Japan, tankers fully loaded with oil or other ships carrying foodstuffs or industrial products would be unable to reach Japan. If JSDF troops removed these mines, it would constitute Japan’s use of military force. Viewed from Japan, it represents an exercise of our right to ‘individual’ self-defense. Under international law, however, it would be construed as our exercising the right to ‘collective’ self-defense as we would be taking a military step to remove the mines in international waters before either we or our allies were attacked. This is a natural course of action any normal nation would take. Japan cannot afford not to. The government’s position is that, if that is the case, we should judge that Japan too can exercise its right to collective self-defense.”
If the government manages to build up specific examples like this one by one, then the nation will find it easier to understand why our right to collective self-defense can be exercised. And yet, in Diet deliberations, this turns into a constitutional issue, with opponents demanding that the government exercise the right to collective self-defense only after grappling squarely with a reform of the constitution. But those in the opposition camp are also adamantly against constitutional reform under all circumstances.
Supporting this inconsistency with scholastic authority are the afore-mentioned scholars like Prof. Hasebe, whose roots trace back to the nation’s highest educational institutions with Tokyo University at the top. One wonders if some of Japan’s misfortunes may not be attributable to its academic circles, which refuse to recognize the changes in the realities of international geopolitics. Laments Onodera:
“The sad fact about post-war Japan is that (academic circles) have become a gathering of a weird bunch of individuals who are either far removed from the realities of today’s world or can hardly make themselves understood, although they may be extremely intelligent.”
One conspicuous characteristic of those in academic circles is an out-and-out aversion to military matters. Until relatively recently, for instance, Tokyo University had stringently banned all research on military matters. In 1959, President Seiji Kaya declared at the Education and Research Council, the university’s highest organ of decision-making: “Our university will not undertake any research on military affairs, or any project suspected of having to do with military research.” Then in 1967, President Kazuo Ookochi announced: “We will not accept subsidies for any research from military-related institutions, including those abroad.”
But have these top Japanese intellectuals who reject all things military not benefited from the amenities of modern military technology? It is hardly necessary to note that a wide range of military technology has been diverted to commercial use. For instance, location information, obtainable through military satellites in order to implement a pin-point missile attack on targets, has been utilized in car navigation systems that are commercially widely available. It is worth pointing out that, if Tokyo University professors are actually taking advantage of highly developed car navigation systems based on military technology, that itself is an ironic contradiction.
Onodera adds:
“Following the end of the war, more than 200,000 public officials, including politicians and bureaucrats, were purged by the Americans. Because not a few of those purged were members of academic societies as well, it was said that the Americans had gone ahead with a sweeping purge of ‘the brains’ of Japanese society. Stepping into their shoes were left-leaning scholars.”
Steadfast Refusal of Research Requests
Regardless of whether these scholars had originally been left-wingers or turned to the left as a result of pressure from certain elements within the American Occupation, most of the post-war professorships at Tokyo University were assumed by left-leaning scholars. Their disciples followed in their footsteps in unison. Prof. Hasebe is among those who belong to this category of constitutional scholars. Meanwhile, military research has continued to be severely restricted at Tokyo University and other top universities across Japan. Onodera observes:
“Top universities around the world never fail to have chairs dedicated to the study of that specific country’s security strategy. However, Japanese universities are not supposed to engage in security or military research, creating a preposterous situation. For instance, while the Japan Defense Academy always wishes to send its elite graduates to the research institute of the nation’s highest institution of learning in an attempt to enable them to study more and develop into human resources who can be entrusted with the future of this nation, this institution simply rejects them, although gladly accepting researchers from, say, China. What has become of the professoriate of that university? I just cannot overlook the real cause at the root of this problem—in other words, the origin under the Occupation of post-war professorships at this and other universities in Japan.”
Needless to say, by the “nation’s highest institution of learning” Onodera means Tokyo University.
In December 2013, the Abe administration reached a cabinet decision to pursue a national security strategy aimed at utilizing military research conducted at the nation’s universities. A year later, the Graduate School of Information Science and Technology of Tokyo University lifted a ban on military research. Little progress has since been made, however. During this period, there have been more than a few instances of “brain drain” to foreign countries. In May last year, an incredible ‘incident’ took place at Tokyo University in which a professor turned down a request from the Defense Ministry to investigate the causes of a malfunction of an Air Self Defense Force transport plane.
I am one to earnestly support academic freedom and the freedom of faith and creed to the best of my ability. But if Tokyo University continues to reign over the nation’s academic world, I strongly believe that its professors must break away from the yoke of archaic academic ideas and recognize the harsh realities of today’s international community.
(Translated from “Renaissance Japan” column no. 661 in the July 4, 2015 issue of The Weekly Shincho)