Taking advantage of the New Year holidays, I read a book that I had long looked forward to reading—President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941: A Study in Appearances and Realities by Charles A. Beard (Yale University Press; 1948). The author was one of America’s most influential historians in the first half of the 20th century who, among other things, headed the American Historical Association (AHA) and the American Political Science Association (APSA). He passed away at 73 in 1948.

　　　　　In this voluminous work, Beard presents a convincing case for how Roosevelt got the US to enter World War II.

　　　　　Viewing war against Nazi Germany and Japan as unavoidable in the wake of the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact in 1939, Roosevelt secretly prepared for the contingency of war. However, deep-rooted pacifism and war-weariness persisted among Americans and in the Congress. During the presidential election in 1940, Roosevelt himself repeatedly vowed to not get the US involved in another world war, unless subject to an enemy attack. Not able to turn his back on his own pledges, Roosevelt continued to hide his real thoughts and intentions.

　　　　　Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull adroitly manipulated the media, keeping the nation and the Congress absolutely in the dark about all secret preparations for the war, including the commitment by Roosevelt to enter the war made to British Prime Minister Winston Churchill at the Atlantic Conference in Newfoundland August 9-10, 1941.

　　　　Beard verifies these and other facts based on a wide range of materials, including government documents,Congressional minutes, and press reports. His findings were compiled into this monumental work, which attributes the cause of America’s entry into World War II to not only the actions of Japan and Nazi but also to those of the US.

　　　　　When Beard’s book was published in April 1948, his assertions quickly came under fire as unpatriotic, and the book was even boycotted in some areas. His reputation as a leading historian who had previously served as president of the AHA was severely damaged, while he lost many friends and faced social ostracism.

　　　　　At yet this book has since run into several editions—proof of the persuasive nature of the arguments Beard presents in his portrayal of the realities of the American foreign policy of this era.

Roosevelt Resorts to Fabrication of Incidents

　　　　　In reading Beard’s book, we are reminded of the importance of the war in Europe as a factor leading to the war in the Pacific—something we Japanese tend to overlook by being overly focused on the Sino-Japanese and the US-Japan conflicts.

　　　　　Beard clearly outlines how Roosevelt pushed America toward entering the war, building a shared strategy with Churchill, convinced that helping him to defeat Hitler and realize Britain’s victory over Nazi Germany was in America’s national interests.

　　　　Not that Beard was particularly pro-Japan, but the sense of fairness with which he examined history, I believe, has the potential to change the world’s view of Japan, which, as one of the Axis Powers, has long been considered an absolute evil in some quarters. All the more reason for us Japanese to read Beard’s President Roosevelt in earnest.

　　　　　Inhibited by the aforementioned factors from entering World War II while convinced his nation should, Roosevelt went beyond just hiding pertinent information from the congress and the public, going so far as to fabricate incidents. The purpose: creating a situation in which the US, subject to an attack, would be compelled to take the plunge and enter the war. Take the USS Greer incident in the Atlantic, for instance.

　　　　　On September 4, 1941, an unidentified submarine allegedly launched an attack against the USS Greer bound for Iceland. In a radio broadcast a week later, Roosevelt officially identified the submarine as German, charging: “…I tell you the blunt fact that the German submarine fired first upon this American destroyer without warning, and with deliberate design to sink her…”

　　　　　Germany totally denied Roosevelt’s announcement, while in Washington, D.C. the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs engaged in a detailed investigation of the “incident.” The Committee’s findings may be summarized as follows:

　　　　　Informed by a British reconnaissance plane that a submarine was cruising submerged some 10 miles ahead, the USS Greer began chasing it. The chase lasted more than three hours, at the end of which the British aircraft dropped four depth charges while the sub fired a torpedo, which missed the Greer. The Greer then countered by dropping eight depth charges, to which the sub replied with another torpedo, missing the American ship again. Two hours later, the Greer again spotted the sub, and once more launched depth charge attacks. The Committee’s reported proved that Roosevelt’s explanations were incorrect and inappropriate.

　　　　　Several similar “incidents” followed, including one involving the USS Kearny on October 17, 1941, showing how Roosevelt desperately kept up his efforts to create justifiable grounds for declaring war against Nazi Germany. However, each of his attempts fell apart as a result of further investigations by the Senate committee and the media. Writes Beard: “With the prospects for an all-out war in the Atlantic beclouded by crimination and recrimination, the President and the Secretary now gave special attention to the conversations with Japan, which, it was publicly known, were in a state of high tension about the middle of November (1941)…

　　　　　“For the majority of those Americans who were openly and overtly advocating war, Hitler, not Hirohito, was ‘the’ enemy, and to many of them avoidance of war with Japan was highly desirable, since it would permit the concentration of American energies on the defeat of Hitler and his European allies.”

Absolutely Unacceptable Conditions Thrust on Japan

　　　　But Roosevelt didn’t think so. He went on to freeze Japanese assets in the US in July 1941, and brought bilateral trade to a halt, steadily driving Japan into a corner. He went on to hold the aforementioned Atlantic Conference with Churchill August 9 and 10 in Placentia Bay in Newfoundland. Then in a report to Congressional leaders on August 18, Roosevelt declared that the chief danger of an early involvement in a “shooting war”―as he saw it―lay in the situation in the Far East, where, he intimated, “chances were about even that Japan would start new aggressions.”

　　　　　On November 29, 1941 the US thrust on Japan what in essence was a final set of demands—the so-called “Hull note,” although at the time neither Roosevelt nor Hull positioned the demands as an ultimatum. Both also knew very well that the Note contained demands that were tougher than those discussed during the seven months of previous negotiations, and that the proposed terms were absolutely unacceptable to the Japanese.

　　　　　Beard further mentions that on November 27, 1941, the day after the Hull note was delivered to Tokyo, the US Department of the Army sent a confidential warning to American commanders in the Pacific, to which a clause was added under orders from the President that if war with Japan were unavoidable, “the United States desires that Japan commits the first overt act.”

　　　　　In this connection, Kunio Kasugai introduces an intriguing anecdote in his Intelligence and Intrigue (Kokusho Kanko-kai, Tokyo; 2014): On November 26, 1941 when Hull delivered his note to Ambassador Kichisaburo Nomura, Roosevelt told William Stevenson (codename: “Intrepid”), a British intelligence officer posted to Washington by Churchill, that negotiations with Japan would meet with failure. “Intrepid” relayed the information to Churchill the following day, informing his boss of the US military’s readiness to commence hostile operations against Japan within two weeks, according to Kasugai.

　　　　　Here, Beard’s statement, based strictly on publicly available information, meshes perfectly with what Kasugai attributes to secret information from intelligence sources. Roosevelt used every word he could think of to denounce the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. However, from what Beard has to say it is obvious that the attack constituted an opportune “excuse” for America’s participation in the war that Roosevelt had eagerly been awaiting.

　　　　　Beard’s work reminds one of the fierce nature of information warfare and what comes out of it if waged successfully. At this juncture, Japan is sustaining serious damage from China’s tenacious anti-Japanese propaganda. That is why I strongly believe that Japan must resolutely engage in effective information warfare. The destiny of our nation rests on it. (End)

(Translated from “Renaissance Japan” column no. 639 in the January 22, 2015 issue of The Weekly Shincho)