On-going negotiations with North Korea will not succeed in bringing home abducted Japanese because normalization of diplomatic relations with Pyongyang remains the top priority of the Foreign Ministry, asserts a Japanese lawmaker who served as a special advisor for the abduction issue during the first Abe administration (2006-2007). Ms. Kyoko Nakayama, an upper house member of the Diet, made the remarks on October 31 during the weekly “Genron” Internet TV show which I host.

　　　　　“There has always been a view within the Foreign Ministry valuing restoration of diplomatic relations over rescuing the abductees,” declared Ms. Nakayama. “In point of fact, when the Japan-North Korea Pyongyang Declaration was issued on September 19, 2002, a high-ranking Foreign Ministry official was quoted as making the appalling statement that the government was unduly delaying restoration of diplomatic ties because of ‘just ten abductees.’ Even among Diet members, there was a move favoring diplomatic normalization over resolving the abduction issue. This was the case until five of the abductees were actually returned to Japan.” (Under the terms of the agreement, the abductees were returned in October 2002, nearly a quarter century after they were abducted from Japan by North Korean agents.)

　　　　　Their return acutely brought home to every Japanese the tragic reality that Japanese abductees actually did exist and that many of them apparently were still held in North Korea. At that juncture, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s proclamation that Japan would not normalize diplomatic relations unless the abduction issue was resolved became a national slogan. In view of the failed status of the on-going negotiations with Pyongyang, Ms. Nakayama’s interpretation—that Koizumi’s policy has now been reneged, replaced by the previous and mistaken line of the Foreign Ministry to prioritize diplomatic normalization—is exactly to the point.

　　　　　An agreement reached between Japan and North Korea in Stockholm on May 29 this year calls for Tokyo to: 1) recognize the wrongs of its unfortunate colonial past with Korea and normalize diplomatic relations; and 2) lift its restrictions on travel, monetary remittance, and port calls as soon as North Korea launches a probe into the fate of Japanese abductees.

　　　　　In turn, the Stockholm agreement calls for Pyongyang to conduct a number of thorough investigations into such areas as the remains and graves of Japanese citizens, the status of Japanese left behind after the war, the wellbeing of Japanese women married to North Koreans, as well as the status of Japanese abductees and others whom the Japanese government has reason to suspect have been kidnapped by North Korea. The agreement stipulates that these investigations are to be conducted comprehensively and simultaneously.

　　　　　In other words, the agreement obligates Japan to first reestablish diplomatic relations with North Korea, reflecting on its colonial rule over Korea and making amends for it. It has been reported that along with diplomatic normalization Japan would make a large payment—allegedly to the tune of 1 trillion yen (US$12 billion). North Korea’s intention is crystal clear—obtaining cash from Japan by using the “comprehensive and simultaneous” investigations as a pretext, when in reality it doesn’t have the slightest intention to resolve the abduction issue.

“War-Remains Business”

　　　　　In Ms. Nakayama’s analysis, it was almost as though the Foreign Ministry was acting in concert with Pyongyang’s wishes, as it committed itself to lifting Japan’s rigid sanctions just as soon as North Korea began the agreed-to investigations. She pointed out:

　　　　　“Under the leadership of the United Nations, the world has imposed economic sanctions on North Korea denouncing its illegal development of nuclear weapons and missiles. Angered by the abductions of its citizens, Japan took additional steps to restrict travel between the two nations, remittances to the North by pro-Pyongyang elements in Japan, and port calls by North Korean ships. However, for some reason the Japanese government has now quickly eased these restrictions simply because the North set up a special investigative committee—even before it launched its investigations. What are the sanctions supposed to be for? How could the government make such a ridiculous compromise, naively trusting the North for what it has only verbally committed itself to?”

　　　　　There is a great danger that the search for the remains of Japanese citizens could be taken advantage of by North Korea to gain foreign currency. The US has been paying Pyongyang US$20,000 for the remains of each soldier returned. There are believed to be some 20,000 Japanese souls still unrecovered in North Korea, worth US$40 billion if this formula is applied.

　　　　　Ms. Nakayama emphasized that the US government, offended by North Korea’s greed to profit on the remains of American soldiers killed during the Korean war, now describes this as “Pyongyang’s war-remains business.”

　　　　　 “From what I have heard from my American sources, North Koreans are mercilessly persistent in this regard,” continued Ms. Nakayama. “They just come up with a tiny piece of human bone, claiming it belongs to a dead American soldier, and demand $20,000 be paid for it. I understand the US government has suspended its search for the remains of American soldiers, refusing to play this game. Now, Japan appears to be replacing the US as an ideal customer for this business.”

　　　　　In the midst of this entire discussion, there remains one question that is very puzzling. The North desperately covets foreign capital, while Japan is determined to do everything in its power to realize the release of the abductees.

　　　　　Why, then, doesn’t the North simply release the abductees? They must realize not a penny will be sent from Japan unless the abduction issue is resolved on Tokyo’s terms. Once a settlement is reached, the North will not only get compensation for the return of the remains of the dead, but will also receive a large amount of capital resulting from normalized diplomatic relations with Tokyo. With its ties with Beijing steadily deteriorating, and with Seoul refusing to extend economic assistance, the only possibility that Pyongyang has of obtaining significant foreign currency lies in improved relations with Tokyo. Ms. Nakayama provided the answer when she explained:

　　　　　“According to information obtained early this year, I was under the impression that the North realized Tokyo would not budge an inch in its posture towards Pyongyang and that North Korean leaders felt a sense of urgency in resolving the abduction issue. However, the North Koreans got a different impression when the negotiations with the Japanese Foreign Ministry resumed, viewing their counterparts as naïve and easy to handle. They began to sense that there was a way to extract considerable money from Japan without bothering to seriously grapple with the abduction issue. Then they signed the Stockholm agreement in May. I am sure they secretly declared victory at the time.”

　　　　　That, I believe, is why the North did not present any concrete results for its investigations when a Japanese government delegation, led by Junichi Ihara, head of the Asia and Oceanic Affairs Bureau of the Foreign Ministry, visited Pyongyang last month.

　　　　　“Past negotiations conducted by the Foreign Ministry have been a series of complete failures,” deplored Nakayama, declaring: “I honestly believe that the Foreign Ministry is letting North Korea make fools of us. The Foreign Ministry cannot save the abductees. Putting it more precisely, the ministry is not cut out for this job. They have no idea how to go about rescuing Japanese who may face such trouble overseas.”

Is Japan a Sovereign State?

　　　　　Recalling the situation in 2002 in which government officials led by Abe, then Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary, decided under “the state’s will” to not allow the five Japanese abductees to return to North Korea, Ms. Nakayama had this to say:

　　　　　“That was only 12 years ago, but there was strong criticism against the government from across the nation then. It is hard to imagine now, but at the time the use of the word ‘kokka’ (‘nation state’ ) was taboo for the government. It was even necessary to refrain from referring to ‘national defense.’ I believe it is not too much to say that, for a long time after World War II, the government could not openly say it was the duty of the ‘nation state’ to protect its land and people. I am of the opinion that the Foreign Ministry, made up of a group of extremely bright individuals, regards its role as that of cementing friendly relations with Japan’s neighbors, acting in conformity with the existing ‘peace constitution,’ while making certain to avoid words such as ‘the Japanese nation’ or ‘the state of Japan. ’”

　　　　　The Stockholm agreement is a logical extension of this type of thinking. When North Korea’s abductions of Japanese citizens first came to light, Mrs. Sakie Yokota, mother of one of the victims pleaded: “Is Japan truly a sovereign state? Why can’t the state rescue my daughter when it is its role and responsibility to rescue its people?!” When I heard this, I felt that, for the first time since the end of the war, Japanese were made painfully aware of the responsibilities of the state Ms. Nakayama’s words resonate with me in a similar way.

　　　　　Only the Foreign Ministry is still chained to its old ethos, unable to respond to the needs of the new times. Ms. Nakayama gently observed:

　　　　　“In a way, it would be too harsh to expect the Foreign Ministry to resolve the abduction issue. It is mandatory to replace the chief Japanese negotiator, and impose sanctions on North Korea once again. We must definitely enlist the support of the police and public security officials, as well as specialists in the private sector in well-orchestrated efforts to get the abductees home to Japan.”

　　　　　It was Abe, then Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary, and Akitaka Saiki, then Deputy Asia and Oceania Affairs Bureau Chief, who defied the intention of Hitoshi Tanaka (who was Saiki’s boss at the time) to return the five abductees to the North as initially promised. In view of the complicated and unstable situation in North Korea, resolving the abduction issue is a hard nut to crack. And yet, North Korea being a dictatorship, things will move quickly once a decision is made by the top leadership to allow the abductees to go back to Japan.

　　　　　Abe has imposed strict sanctions on the North in order to entice its leadership to do so. It is now essential for the Japanese government to put those sanctions back in place and move forward from there with a new team of negotiators who can act with Japan’s real national interests in mind.

(Translated from “Renaissance Japan” column no. 630 in the November 13, 2014 issue of The Weekly Shincho)