The spacious reception hall at a hotel in central Tokyo was filled with great excitement last weekend as Taiwanese residents in Japan hosted a gathering in support of a popular physician running in the Taipei mayoral election scheduled for November 29.

　　　Reform of Taiwan must start from changes within the capital city of Taipei, asserted Dr. Ko Wen-je (55) as he spoke passionately to his supporters, stressing that Taiwanese must secure their identity as Taiwanese and repossess their indigenous culture and values. Ko’s plea is a challenge to the changes that have been forced on the education system by the Kuomintang’s President Ma Ying-jeou, who has steadily been pushing the nation towards China while eliminating all traces of Taiwan’s traditions and the legacy of the colonial Japanese education system.

　　　Preaching the importance of efforts to identify with Taiwan as their motherland, Ko has received significant support in various opinion polls across Taiwan. Ms. Kim Bi-Ling, who once fought for Taiwan’s independence and has since become a naturalized Japanese citizen, introduces Ko as follows:

　　　“When I asked him why he has given up his affluent life as a successful physician to go into politics, he replied that he simply could not suppress his strong love for Taiwan, his motherland, and that he made up his mind to devote the rest of his life to his country.”

　　　Her remarks prompted me to recall the words of Aritsune (Koson) Fukuda, the late playwright and literary critic, who once remarked that he asked himself why he loved Japan and realized that he was perfectly content with the thought that “I was destined to love my motherland.”

　　　The coming Taipei mayoral election—part of a cluster of nationwide local elections constituting a prelude to the 2016 general elections—is extremely important for Taiwan’s future, notes Koh Sekai, who was chief representative of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Tokyo (2004-2008) under the administration of the Democratic Progress Party (DPP).

　　　“Ten years ago, there were mayoral elections in the five major cities of Taiwan—Taipei, New Taipei City, Taichung, Tainan, and Kaohsiung—accounting for 13 million (57%) out of the 23 million population in Taiwan,” explains Koh. “The ruling party got the better of the DPP in three of these cities, but the latter did better in terms of the percentage of votes—50% against 45%. Sure enough, the TMT barely was victorious, and now hardly any Taiwanese supports the Ma administration. It’s the DPP’s turn to claim victory so Taiwanese can really join hands in launching the task of transforming Taiwan into a nation worth its true self.”

Truth about China’s “One-Nation, Two-System” Scheme

　　　Seven years after assuming office, the Ma administration is a political lame duck in   its second term, its approval rating having slipped to barely 9%. Meanwhile, Taiwan’s dependence on the Chinese economy continues to grow. Observes Koh:

　　　“Hillary Clinton once expressed her concern to Taiwanese business leaders about being too dependent on the Chinese economy. Many of us are also seriously alarmed about Taiwan being one day totally overtaken and incapacitated by the Chinese economy.”

　　　The situation in today’s Taiwan is a golden opportunity as far as Beijing is concerned. At the Great Hall of the People on September 26 President Xi Jinping received a delegation of pro-unification Taiwanese groups, including Yok Mu-ming, who heads the opposition New Party, reportedly declaring: “‘One country, two systems’ is the best way to realize a peaceful national unification.”

　　　Incidentally, the New Party, formed out of a split from the KMT in 1993, is a center-right conservative minority party which started with only six seats in the parliament.

　　　In his talk with Yok, Xi was also quoted as describing the China-Taiwan relationship as facing “a new situation with new problems”—a statement that Koh criticizes.

　　　“Although Xi himself claims the ‘one country, two-system’ scheme is the best way for unification,” argues Koh, “the truth of the matter is that no Taiwanese is longing for unification. We desire to maintain the present status quo; in other words, we strongly desire to maintain Taiwan’s status as an independent state for good. Unification is, therefore, absolutely out of the question. Xi also said that he is concerned about our ‘new situation with new problems,’ which I assume was a reference to the Sunflower Student Movement—the protest movement driven by a coalition of students and civil groups that took place last March and April. However, this movement had the broad support of the people of Taiwan—very much an expression of the democratic will of the people—and we view Xi’s characterization of this movement as absolutely incompatible with your values.”

　　　Reflecting bitter opposition from the general populace, angry student demonstrations erupted on March 18 in protest against President Ma’s signing of the Cross-Straits Service Trade Agreement, whose objective is to liberalize trade in services between Taiwan and China.

　　　Under the terms of the agreement, service industries—such as banking, health care, and telecommunications—will be opened to investment. Its opponents see it as designed to implement a fundamental economic consolidation between China and Taiwan, regarding the “two Chinas” as one. If the Taiwanese economy becomes a part of China’s economic sphere, it could be easily overwhelmed by the huge Chinese market. Beyond that lies a complete unification of Taiwan with China—both in name and reality. In short, the Sunflower Movement constituted a strong protest against the trade agreement by members of Taiwan’s younger generation who recognized the agreement as the first step toward eventual unification with China.

　　　China regards the unstable situation in Taiwan under the Ma administration as a fine opportunity to lay a more concrete foundation for future unification. Presumably, that is why Xi referred to a “one country, two-system” scheme for Taiwan for the first time since becoming the Chinese head of state in November 2012. Hong Kong’s present situation shows exactly what will inevitably happen when China’s “one country, two-system” game plan is implemented.

　　　Exactly 30 years ago, in 1984, the United Kingdom and China provisionally signed the Agreement on the Transfer of Sovereignty over Hong Kong. It took effect 13 years later, in 1997. The reversion of Hong Kong’s sovereignty to China was to be made under an international agreement that would keep Hong Kong’s system of democracy intact under a “one country, two-system” scheme for the first 50 years.

Typical Chinese Modus Operandi

　　　What is actually taking place in Hong Kong today is a manifest violation of that international agreement and a suppression of the former crown colony’s democratic system. China’s efforts to undermine Hong Kong’s high level of autonomy has intensified since the Xi administration was inaugurated. Most significantly, when Leung Chun-ying became Chief Executive of the Executive Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the spring of 2012, he was selected by an election administration commission backed by the Chinese Communist Party. Leung’s appointment marked the first deliberate step towards political control over Hong Kong by the Communist Party.

　　　Following Xi’s wishes, Leung has worked out an election policy that will critically affect Hong Kong’s autonomy. While promising full and free election from 2017 on, Leung’s new policy will enable the CPC to pre-select the candidates for Hong Kong’s Legislative Council, making it impossible in actuality for democratic candidates to run. This means that Hong Kong will sooner rather than later be thoroughly incorporated into the political framework of the CPC. Only 17 years after regaining Hong Kong’s sovereignty, China is already abandoning its pledge.

　　　This is a typical Chinese modus operandi—ducking immediate issues with honeyed words, steadily intensifying control by playing for time. We know, because Japan has also been subjected to these tactics by the Chinese.

　　　Tokyo signed the Treaty of Peace and Friendship with China in 1978, normalizing bilateral relations severed by the war. Although Deng Xiao-ping once said Japan and China had agreed to shelve any issues pertaining to the Senkaku Islands, no such agreement actually exists. For a number of years after 1978, The Chinese continued to maintain that “territorial issues should be shelved” and that the Senkaku issue should be resolved peacefully by later generations of Japanese and Chinese—all the while continuing to receive hefty official development aid (ODA) from Tokyo. Then, 14 years later, in 1992, the Chinese arbitrarily instituted a new law, declaring the Senkakus Chinese territory. And now, their patrol ships violate the Japanese territorial waters around the Senkakus on almost a daily basis in an attempt to implement effective control over the unmanned islands.

　　　China has already violated its pledge, made only 17 years ago, that Hong Kong’s “one country, two-system” scheme would remain intact for 50 years. Clearly, the best policy for Taiwanese is not to put faith in what Xi has to say about the “one country, two-system” scheme for Taiwan—although what exactly he means by this is ambiguous at best.

　　　The CPC stands like an insurmountable wall blocking the way of those Taiwanese, including mayoral candidate Ko Wen-je, who are desperately challenging China’s interference with Taiwan’s politics. I wish them the best of luck from the bottom of my heart.

(Translated from “Renaissance Japan” column no. 625 in the October 9, 2014 issue of The Weekly Shincho)