In the seas of Asia we are seeing a significant shift in naval power, with China, not surprisingly, attracting the most attention. Its leaders have forged ahead with a relentless military buildup in line with the pledges they have made. In 2006, then President Hu Jintao vowed: “(China will) strive to build a powerful navy that adapts to the needs of our military’s historical mission in this new century.” In March 2013, his successor Xi Jinping declared in his first speech as the new Chinese president: “I will fight for a great renaissance of the Chinese nation and the Chinese dream.” With its new military power, China has trampled on international law, aggressively seeking to deprive its neighbors of their rightful territory.
　　　　　The Chinese never make public the true purpose, or actual state, of their military buildup, making it virtually impossible for any nation to come to grips with its hidden intentions. And yet, most nations generally realize that the strategy China most likely will try to implement once it has acquired more military power will reflect its “A2/AD (Anti-Access/Area Denial)” concept. This strategy is aimed at refusing US Navy battleships entry into the sea zones inside what the Chinese have defined as the “first island chain” (stretching from the Japanese archipelago to Taiwan to the Philippines) and the “second island chain” (linking the Bonin Islands, Guam, and northern Australia).
　　　　　The US has thus far countered this Chinese strategy with an “Air-Sea Battle” concept. However, this strategy presupposes a full-scale war against China in which many lives would be lost, requiring huge costs as the US would need a wide range of high-tech weaponry, including state-of-the-art stealth jet fighters, to penetrate China’s multi-layered defense networks.
　　　　　In point of fact, the total procurement required by the Air-Sea Battle concept could cost several hundred billion dollars, according to a provisional estimate. The US, which already has announced plans to drastically reduce its defense outlays, can hardly be expected to squeeze out such huge expenditures. As a result, a number of more economical strategies have been mapped out. One very intriguing plan is the “Off-shore Control” concept. Its flaws and problems are being seriously debated among US military and security experts, but it is in fact seen as one of America’s most promising strategies.
　　　　　This strategy has attracted much attention from America’s allies as well. For instance, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) Staff College has taken a keen interest in the concept, analyzing it in a series of reports in The JMSDF Strategy Review. Below I will introduce an outline of the concept, citing pertinent references from the magazine’s reviews.

Designed to Halt China’s Shipping via Wholesale Maritime Blockade

　　　　　Off-shore Control is a strategy proposed in 2012 by Dr. Thomas X. Hammes, Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Strategic Research at the Institute for the National Strategic Studies of the National Defense University. How should Japan as America’s major Pacific ally respond to this concept, which, if adopted, will constitute the official strategy for the national defense of the US?
　　　　　First, let us come to grips with its basic concept, which targets China and is quite different from the traditional military strategies of the past. Its objective is not a decisive victory over China or even the destruction of the Communist Party. What it proposes, in fact, is to wage the types of wars China itself has fought in the past.
　　　　　China has fought about ten wars of aggression over the past six decades, driven by its burgeoning militarism. However, China has not been the clear-cut victor in any of these disputes. In point of fact, China did not come off the winner in such conflicts as the Korean War of 1950-1953, the Sino-Russia border clash of 1969, or the Sino-Vietnamese hostilities of 1979. Even though it did not win, however, neither did China lose, managing to end the fighting without losing face, allowing it to declare in its propaganda that it had “taught the enemy a lesson.” Off-shore Control looks to use this type of a “Chinese approach” in its strategy.
　　　　　With this strategy, the ultimate purpose is to economically drive China into a corner by implementing an extensive blockade of its vital sea lanes.
　　　　　Here, one cannot but recall the strategy the Reagan administration employed in the late 1980s against the Soviet Union. President Reagan attempted to eliminate the Soviet peril without firing a shot, so to speak. America’s triumph owed a lot to Reagan’s superb staff including Thomas Reed, one of his chief security advisors. Reed argued that if the US maintained a military buildup at an annual growth rate of 4%, the Soviet Union would not be able to keep up in the arms race. The US economy could sustain a 4% annual increase in its military budget, but the Soviets’ controlled socialist economy would collapse in ten years. Reagan faithfully practiced what his advisors preached and, sure enough, the Soviet Union collapsed in exactly ten years.
　　　　　Under the Off-shore Control strategy, the US is expected to control the “first island chain” as the initial step toward economically driving China into a corner. An air-sea defense network would be formed by laying mines on the Chinese side of this island chain, deploying submarines with a small number of troops aboard while strengthening air defense over the area. This would make it practically impossible for large-sized Chinese tankers or container ships to leave the blockaded area.
Hammes explains that the real purpose of the operation is to sever China’s export-import routes, which account for approximately 50% of the nation’s trade, rather than blocking the flow of coveted energy into China.
　　　　　If the US controls the Straits of Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok, as well as the northern and southern seas off Australia, China would have to search for other routes. Chinese ships could try making a detour through the Panama Canal or the Strait of Magellan—America’s “home ground” in which they could be seized rather easily.
　　　　　Thus, China would see its valued shipping lanes blocked, sustaining crippling economic losses. Although it is generally assumed that the Chinese Communist Party can retain its authority if the nation’s economy continues growing more than 7% annually, a closure of sea lanes would undoubtedly seriously affect economic growth—creating instability in China and making for an uncertain future for the Communist Party.
　　　　　There is just one way for China to defeat this strategy, according to Hammes—by building a navy with global naval supremacy. This, however, would require many decades and trillions of dollars—which Hammes hopes would make the Chinese realize it wouldn’t pay to challenge the US in so disadvantageous a competition.
　　　　　China could not possibly expect to defeat the US, no matter how long it continued to fight, finding itself slowly strangled and critically weakened. The US would continue to exert pressure, eventually enticing the Chinese to agree to the termination of a conflict in which they could not possibly hope to win. This what Hammes is driving at.

This Is What Deterrence Is All About

　　　　　How then will the US expect its allies to cooperate with Washington over Off-shore Control? Some believe Washington most likely will not ask its allies and other nations friendly to its aims to send in troops to fight alongside American soldiers because this strategy does not require operational bases other than in Australia. The US is said to be capable of going it alone without turning to other nations for military support.
　　　　　However, in reality, cooperation from America’s allies would be necessary, however one looks at it. The blockade of the sea lanes would continue to slow economic growth in China, leading to a global economic downturn. In order to be effective, a long-term commitment to implementing the blockade would be required, meaning the effects of the world-wide recession would spare virtually no member of the international community, including Japan. Like-minded nations would need to get in step with each other, prepared to endure the hardships of the recession and fight on.
　　　　　Hammes’ strategy must be scrutinized from various other angles as well, such as the possibility of China launching a nuclear attack on the US, or firing missiles into America’s allies. Hammes does not expect China to resort to nuclear weapons because it is inferior to the US in terms of nuclear capabilities, but there are opposing views as well.
　　　　　Off-shore Control may not be a perfect strategy. However, that a strategy like this is publicly discussed is extremely healthy and meaningful. Any Chinese leader who reads what Hammes has to say may initially have a profound sense of crisis for the future of his nation. And beyond that, if he is a leader endowed with reason, he will carefully consider the American strategy and decide to avoid any confrontations that would put China in this disadvantageous position. This is what deterrence is all about. Through free and transparent discussions, followed by an open publication of pertinent points, and then by further discussions, a strategy like Off-shore Control is gradually brought to a higher perfection, subsequently enabling Washington to influence in no small way the future course China chooses to take.

(Translated from “Renaissance Japan” column no. 616 in the July 31, 2014 edition of The Weekly Shincho)