America’s Vacillating Foreign Policy and How Japan Must Set Its Course
The situation in Iraq is undergoing a dramatic and bloody sea change, pointing to the more general failure of President Obama’s Middle East policy. As of this writing (June 18), the terrorist army of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)—believed to be far more radical than Al Qaeda—has captured the northern city of Mosul and is attacking Tikrit and Samarra, a Shiite sacred site, as it moves south ever closer to Baghdad. Within just a few days, Iraq has reverted to the world’s most unstable and dangerous battleground.
On May 28th, Obama declared during commencement at the US Military Academy at West Point: “…you are the first class to graduate since 9/11 who may not be sent into combat in Iraq or Afghanistan…We have removed our troops from Iraq. We are winding down our war in Afghanistan. Al Qaeda’s leadership in the border region between Pakistan and Afghanistan has been decimated, and Osama bin Laden is no more…”
Just about ten days later, ISIS commenced its attack, demonstrating how wrong Obama was in his assessment of the Middle East situation.
Major US dailies, including the Wall Street Journal (WSJ), reported that Iraqi soldiers—supposedly entrusted with Iraq’s security—fled at the sight of the ISIS force, which has obtained deadlier weapons as it advances, steadily enhancing its fire power.
As the armed radicals of ISIS, believed to be 3,000 to 5,000 strong, move in on Baghdad, Iraqi soldiers reportedly are dressing in civilian clothes beneath their military uniforms in case they have to flee. One thing is evident at this juncture—whether or not Baghdad falls: the power relationship has completely been rewritten in the Middle East. While declaring early in the game that the US would not dispatch ground troops to mitigate the situation in Iraq, Obama said he was “considering” some military options, including airstrikes. However, there is no denying the danger of ISIS extending its influence across a wider region of the Middle East.
Hillary Clinton Declares She Doesn’t Believe in a “G2”
Initially, Obama pursued a diplomatic and security policy directly opposite of that of his predecessor George W. Bush, who started the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Obama, who became president on a pledge to bring American soldiers back home, completed the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq in 2011, with a total pullout from Afghanistan planned by the end of 2016.
The troop removal implemented by Obama has in effect tossed Iraq right back into fierce battles—an Iraq where his administration was once credited with having finally managed to “regain the coveted peace, thanks to the war on terrorism waged by the US troops,” as the press put it. In its editorial dated June 15, the WSJ criticized Obama for his decision to withdraw US troops from Iraq and his non-intervention policy vis-à-vis the civil war in Syria: “After more than five years, we’ve come to know we should expect no such leadership or strategic ambition from the President…”
Obama’s weak-kneed posture has negatively affected not just the Middle East but Asia as well, emboldening China to engage in a series of unlawful transgressions in the East and South China Seas. Despite this, Obama continues to talk about “positively pursuing a new big country relationship” with China. While Obama has criticized Beijing’s actions in the South China Sea, he has also stated that the US will not intervene, in effect accepting China’s rule by force over the area.
Yasushi Tomiyama, a former foreign correspondent who serves as a member of the planning committee of the Japan Institute for National Fundamentals, a privately-financed Tokyo think tank which I head, points out the US Department of Defense (DOD) assumes a position that is diametrically the opposite of Obama’s indecision. In its recently released Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013, the DOD asserted for the first time that the modernization program of the Chinese armed forces is aimed at preparing for conflicts in the East and South China Seas in addition to the Strait of Taiwan.
The DOD analysis—to which Beijing objected fiercely—is a reflection of its determination to cope realistically and resolutely with the Chinese threat, but nobody knows to what extent President Obama shares the DOD’s concern and whether he will decide to take military action if push comes to shove.
Assuming it is no longer possible to expect Obama to lead the US to develop a legitimate strategy as a major power, as the WSJ sadly points out, what kind of a nation will the US be in two and a half years when the next President is inaugurated? Intriguing in this vein was an exclusive interview with former Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton carried by the mass-circulation economic journal Nihon Keizai Shimbun on June 14th. Asked about the so-called “new big-country relationship” advocated by Chinese President Xi Jinping, the Democratic front-runner for president in 2016 said: “Well, I don’t know about ‘a new type of relationship.’ I don’t believe in a ‘G2.’ I don’t believed that’s appropriate.” These remarks are especially interesting in terms of assessing how her recognition of China has evolved.
“G2” is a word that was very popular during the first year of the first Obama administration. At the time, both Obama and Clinton felt strongly that the “US-China Strategic Economic Dialogue” initiated by the Bush administration should not be limited to the economic sphere alone, advocating that it be expanded to take up security and international relations as well, enabling the two nations to resolve major international issues as the world’s two biggest powers. This led to the creation in 2009 of the “US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue,” allowing for a more comprehensive exchange of views.
Japan Just an Afterthought
This is detailed in Clinton’s Hard Choices—a memoir written obviously with the likelihood of putting herself forward as a candidate for the 2016 presidential election. In it, Ms. Clinton explains she once leaned towards the “G2” relationship but that she quickly came to realize the Chinese threat behind it. China came to the fore to fill the vacuum the US had left in the Asia-Pacific region while it was fully engaged in the Middle East, fighting difficult wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Threatened by China’s rise, the US made a policy decision to “pivot” back toward Asia in 2010.
So, it is quite understandable when Clinton freshly asserts she does not believe in the “G2” proposition that the US and China lead the world. However, how different is her view of China from that of Obama, who obviously is still inclined to favor a new type of relationship with Beijing based on the “G2” concept? Her memoir provides some useful indicators.
Despite a rich assortment of anecdotes about her days as the Secretary of State, Clinton’s memoir makes few references to Japan, and only as mere afterthoughts, meanwhile showing a deep emotional attachment to China, its culture, and its people.
Ms. Clinton actually chose Japan as the first stopover on her first foreign trip as Secretary of State in February 2009. However, her memoir is almost completely devoid of references to her experience at the time, with no mention of intimate conversations with Japanese political leaders. On the contrary, she depicts in glowing terms her interchange with Chinese leaders she met on the last leg of her Asian trip. For instance, she describes her meetings with Dai Bingguo, state councilor 2008-2013 and President Hu Jintao’s right-hand man for international relations, most endearingly—like reuniting with a bosom friend.
Ms. Clinton’s attachment of great importance to China has not fundamentally changed how she values America’s own national interests. The US and Japan are allies closely sharing common values, but that should hardly be viewed as a guarantee we can always rely on. Such an awareness makes it mandatory for we Japanese to be ready to face up to the harsh reality of today’s geopolitics objectively.
“Translated from “Renaissance Japan” column no. 612 in the June 26, 2014 issue of The Weekly Shincho)