Spirit of Sovereign Independence Absolutely Necessary Despite Alliance with the US
The world—especially the Asia-Pacific region—is in the middle of unprecedented change. China’s ambitious expansionism combined with President Obama’s focus on domestic matters and his reluctance to intervene in conflicts overseas have seriously destabilized Asian and world order.
Obama recently made an eight-day visit to Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, and the Philippines in an attempt to regain the confidence of America’s Asia-Pacific allies. But it will not be an easy task to restore the influence of the US now that it has been undermined.
“It takes two to tango” would sum up how I feel about the state of US-Japan relations following Obama’s visit to Tokyo April 23-25. But I could not help noting that the state guest, who spent two nights and three days unaccompanied by his First Lady, failed to leave a glowing impression in Japan. Even the big smile he showed as he shook hands with his counterpart in front of an exclusive sushi shop in central Tokyo the first night looked artificial and calculated rather than spontaneous. Like his smiles, his commitment to Japan’s security also appeared business-like, simply the well-staged execution of a plan.
No doubt this is what diplomacy is all about. And yet, to the extent that diplomacy also is about human behavior, top level meetings between heads of state should be marked by some degree of personal trust and human touch on both sides. Unfortunately, I saw very little hint of this in Obama’s behavior.
In Seoul, on the other hand—his stopover immediately after Tokyo—Obama appeared to be a different man. The smile he showed sitting next to a somewhat dour-looking President Park Geun-hye seemed more natural. It made one suspect he was on a much closer wavelength with Ms. Park—who continues to expend much of her energy on painting Korea as a colonial victim of Japan—than with Mr. Abe, who is focused on the future and his plans to rejuvenate his country.
That said, Japan this time did benefit tremendously from Obama’s visit: In his own words during a joint news conference, as well as in the joint US-Japan communique released at the end of his visit, Obama clearly committed the US to Japan’s security, declaring that Article 5 of the US-Japan Security Treaty covers “all territories under Japan’s administration, including the Senkaku Islands.”
“Epoch-Making” Summit
Although US secretaries of state and defense have previously also made similar statements, the impact of the President’s commitment is incomparable. During a recent appearance on an Internet TV show which I host, Tadae Takubo, Deputy Director of the Japan Institute of National Fundamentals, a private Tokyo think tank, remarked:
“Previously, the US government had stated that it did not take a position on the sovereignty of any disputed territory, expressing the hope that the nations involved would resolve differences peacefully. It did say, however, that, in case the Senkakus were attacked militarily, it would see to it that the US and Japan would jointly cope with the situation under the terms of Article 5 of the Security Treaty. In other words, the US chose a subtle two-pronged approach to the “Senkaku” issue.
“This time, however, the President declared that the US commitment to Japan’s security is absolute, specifically underlining that Article 5 covers all territories under Japan’s administration, thus combining the two ‘separate’ issues into one for the first time. This is indeed a big plus for Japan.”
That is exactly the reason why China strongly objected to Obama’s declaration, which makes the latest US-Japan summit “epoch-making,” as Abe described it.
The problem that remains unresolved has to do with the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free trade negotiations. In sharp contrast to Akira Amari, Minister in charge of the TPP talks, whose facial expressions exuded anguish after hours of difficult ministerial negotiations, US Trade Representative Michael Froman appeared in high spirits. Based on his own coverage of the US-Japan textile negotiations in Washington, D.C. more than four decades ago as a wire services correspondent, Takubo had this to say:
“Japan and the US, with Prime Minister Eisaku Sato and President Richard Nixon at the helm, engaged in tough textile negotiations in the early 1970s. The pressure the US exerted on Japan to compromise at the time cannot be compared to today. At a Washington hotel, we correspondents stood close by the door of a conference room with our ears pricked up. We heard someone pounding the table, and then, we heard Secretary of Commerce Maurice H. Stans shouting at Minister of International Trade and Industry Kiichi Miyazawa: “Don’t you understand this!” A short while later, Miyazawa walked out of the room, his face deathly white.
“In negotiations with Americans, we must realize they make it a rule to press extreme demands based on specific numbers. They will do whatever is necessary to win concessions. Whereas we Japanese, surrounded securely by the sea for centuries and with limited experience dealing with adversaries, have not been really exposed to tough international negotiations. We really don’t know how to handle such difficult negotiations in which our counterparts are determined to not even budge an inch. Our gentle character is clearly a handicap in this respect.”
Japanese officials confide that the Japanese side continued to make “desperate compromises” in the latest round of TPP negotiations with the US team headed by Froman. As regards the tariffs on imported US pork, a focal point of the negotiations, Japan agreed to concede to lower tariffs which, if accepted by Washington, would significantly increase US pork exports to Japan. And yet, the US side refused to give the nod. In addition, the Americans demanded that Japan change its domestic safety regulations in order to open the way to more imports of US-made automobiles. But an official contends that Japan cannot possibly concede over matters having to do with human hygiene and safety.
This official charges Froman with assuming an “arrogant attitude” in TTP negotiations with Japan. It would be possible to assume Froman may have expected the Japanese side to make a matching compromise in exchange for the US commitment to the security of Japan centering around the “Senkaku” issue.
Needed: Restrained US Non-Intervention
And yet, this is all within the realm of tough international negotiations. Takubo described what he has seen through the rounds of negotiations as follows:
“In the prime minister’s decision to appoint Amari to his TPP post, I see his determination to take the higher ground in these difficult negotiations in a concerted attempt to realize his nation’s national interests. For the first time in a long time, I see in Abe a Japanese leader with a lofty perspective.”
And yet, unfortunately, the bilateral TPP negotiations failed to reach a settlement. The medium and long-range objectives of the projected trade agreement are aimed at not only boosting the economy of member nations but also at breaking China away from its deviant ways by helping establish democratic rules. In the short term, it also acts as a superb deterrent against China’s expansion. That is why Obama and Abe—especially the former—should have exercised greater leadership in bringing the negotiations in Tokyo to a successful conclusion.
With their own vain attempts to successfully conclude the TPP negotiations still fresh in their minds, it is only natural that Mr. Obama’s remarks in Seoul concerning the “comfort women” issue left a bad taste in the mouths of Japanese officials. In his talks with his South Korean counterpart, Obama described the case of the “comfort women” as “a terrible and egregious violation of human rights…even in the midst of war,” noting that the victims “deserve to be heard and respected.” But I believe the US should refrain from intervening in disputes between nations without due reflection, especially when it comes to historical issues.
I seriously doubt to what extent President Obama really knows the truth about the “comfort women.” Would I be wrong to assume that he was sympathetic toward Park’s contentions on this issue, while from the beginning being reluctant to listen to Abe’s side?
If the US wishes to arbitrarily intervene in this issue, then there are a number of things Japan may also wish to bring up in terms of the behavior of US forces in Japan during the American occupation after the war. But we refrain from doing so, fully aware that such a development would certainly not benefit current and future US-Japan relations. That is why I emphasize that a restrained non-intervention over historical issues by a third party is highly desirable.
Tough negotiations and unreasonable accusations concerning each other’s history are an inevitable aspect of bilateral relations even between close allies. We must nurture our tenacity and sense of pride to surmount any difficulties that may lie ahead. That is what I felt most strongly after observing the words and deeds of Barak Obama on his recent visit.
(Translated from “Renaissance Japan” column no. 606 in the May 8-15, 2014 issue of The Weekly Shincho)