Now we’ve seen China’s true colors—this, I suspect, is how the international community reacted to China’s blatant show of barbarism in the South China Sea earlier this month.

　　　Almost as soon as President Obama wound up his visit to Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, and the Philippines—each with its own territorial dispute with Beijing—some 80 Chinese vessels, including seven military ships, attacked Vietnamese patrol vessels in disputed waters near the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea. The sovereignty of the islands is claimed by China, Vietnam, and Taiwan.

　　　At the center of the dispute is an oil platform for deep sea drilling completed two years ago at an estimated cost of US$1 billion. The platform is seen as a key strategic weapon in China’s deep sea oil field development. Measuring 100 meters tall, the rig is reputedly capable of drilling at depths of 3,000 to 10,000 meters. Having begun drilling with such a large state-of-the-art operation, China must naturally have anticipated strong objections from the Vietnamese.

　　　Sure enough, Vietnam deployed a total of 29 vessels in an attempt to prevent the Chinese from drilling. But the Chinese far outnumbered the Vietnamese fleet, and their convoy of 80 ships rammed the Vietnamese vessels time and again over the next several days.

　　　This latest Chinese act of aggression reveals a number of things about the Chinese modus operandi, including the Chinese propensity to constantly lie in order to secure an advantageous position in international conflicts.

　　　In point of fact, Hua Chunyin, spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, had this to say unflinchingly during a May 9th news conference in Beijing: “By the night of May 8th, the Vietnamese vessels had rammed into Chinese boats more than 180 times.”

　　　A look at video images released by the Vietnamese government unmistakably shows Chinese boats in fact repeatedly rammed Vietnamese patrol ships. Clearly, it is part of the Chinese modus operandi to brazenly announce what is far from the truth—reminiscent of the trick they used during the September 2010 incident in the Senkaku Islands in which a Chinese trawling ship rammed a Japan Coast Guard patrol boat. Although video footage subsequently released clearly showed the Chinese fishing boat ramming the Japanese Coast Guard vessel, the Chinese government at the time insisted it was the other way round.

　　　China has attempted to tie the issue of the Senkakus to the war, asserting that Tokyo’s claim to the islands is a ploy to change the post-war international order. Here is another case of the Chinese fabricating history to meet their needs. The public relations war China wages over the Senkakus has extended far and wide across the US and Europe. Nicholas Kristof, the New York Times former Asian correspondent, had this to write in an article dated September 10th, 2010: “So which country has a better claim to the islands? My feeling is that it’s China, although the answer isn’t clear-cut.”  (Obviously, Kristof based his opinion on unsubstantiated Chinese assertions.)

As the US Looks On With Indifference

　　　Evident in China’s move to rob Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines, and other Asia-Pacific nations of their rightful territory is an unswerving determination to resort to every conceivable means, including historical fabrication and the use of military power.

　　　Behind the Chinese acts of aggression is a cold calculation reflecting an adroit anticipation of a change in the international balance of power. When Russian President Putin took the Crimean Peninsula, the English-language Global Times—the international edition of the People’s Daily—had this to say in its March 20th editorial: “Ukraine has the West on its side, but these Western countries will never be willing to take the risks of engaging in a war with Russia, which has the second largest nuclear stockpile in the world. Western nations, standing on the side of Ukraine, talk about such things as international treaties and international law. But those flowery words have no meaning.” The editorial then noted it was “Russia’s warships, jet fighters and missiles”––not the ballots of Crimean residents—that would decide the fate of Crimea, declaring: “it has to be admitted that this is the reality of world politics.”

　　　Referring to the overwhelming Russian military superiority over Ukraine, the editorial pointed out that if one nation has superior military power over another, then the latter can hardly act contrary to the former’s intentions.

　　　Without doubt, China has absolute military and economic supremacy over Vietnam. In addition, China can be fairly certain that the US will not intervene militarily in the on-going conflict in the South China Sea. Such a conviction can be derived from the announcement the US government promptly made on the occasion of Russia’s annexation of Crimea that it would not take military action to help stabilize the situation.

　　　Even so, as China proceeds with its plans, it is prudently scrutinizing how the US would react if a military clash were to develop between China and Vietnam over the oil platform. In that Vietnam is not allied with the US militarily, the degree of US commitment to Vietnam would obviously be different from that to the Philippines or Japan. In the same way as the US was compelled to inevitably accept the tragedy of Ukraine, with which it had no military alliance, there is a possibility that the US would not dare resort to military force in order to stop China from plundering Vietnam’s undersea resources. As Russia’s annexation of Crimea is rapidly become a fait accompli, so China’s rule over the waters surrounding the Paracel Islands could also become a reality, aided significantly by the failure of the US to take action.

　　　The recent series of weak-kneed US responses to international incidents have given the international community further cause for concern. Last March, Obama was in the Hague for a summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping, telling his counterpart he was “willing to push ahead” on a new type of major-country relationship with China.

　　　In each of his stop-overs during his four-nation Asia-Pacific visit April 23-31, Obama reaffirmed the US commitment to Asia. Simultaneously, however, he made a special point of stressing his concern for Beijing by reiterating wherever he went that the US goal is not to “counter” or “contain” China, stressing the US welcomes “China’s peaceful rise.”

　　　Similarly, the remarks by Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel make one unsure about the state of the US commitment to Asian nations. On April 8th, during his visit to Beijing, Hagel conferred with his Chinese counterpart Chang Wanquan, later telling a news conference that he and Chang discussed the air defense identification zone (ADIZ) that China had established arbitrarily over a vast area of the East China Sea, including the Senkaku Islands, declaring: “Every nation has a right to establish an air defense zone, but not a right to do it unilaterally – with no collaboration, no consultation. That adds to tensions, misunderstandings, and could eventually…get to dangerous conflict.” To this, Chinese Defense Minister Chang replied: “We are not afraid of any provocation.”

　　　Although the press reported this as a testy exchange between the two, Hagel’s remarks later during an address at the National Defense University gave one a different impression. In point of fact, Hagel enthusiastically proposed ways to promote a new type of big-country relationship between the armed forces of the US and China. In his address, Hagel tenaciously stressed the importance of China as a big country. What I sensed exude more conspicuously from his lengthy lecture was a reconciliatory—rather than confrontational—posture towards Beijing.

　　　What about the security of the Senkaku Islands, then? Because the weight of an ally is completely different from that of a non-ally, one naturally expects the US to take a much stronger stance than it would with Ukraine or Vietnam. However, if one takes into consideration this important element called time, a different picture—much less favorable to Japan—emerges. China, continuing its aggressive military expansion, is expected to continue narrowing the gap of military power with the US, whose military budget is steadily shrinking.

　　　Meanwhile, the gap of military power between Japan and China will continue to be wider the more time lapses. The US may not necessarily be standing by our side ready to provide military support in the same way in, say, three, five, or ten years. That is exactly why Japan must recognize its right to collective self-defense expeditiously and start strengthening its alliance with nations sharing similar values.

(Translated from “Renaissance Japan” column no. 607 in the May 22, 2014 issue of The Weekly Shincho)