Incumbent Mayor Susumi Inamine of Nago, Okinawa was reelected on January 19th. However much the result may reflect the “will of the people,” the victory by the 68-year-old Inamine may very well over time be seen as a large mistake by the people of Okinawa.

　　　The focal point of the election was whether the Futenma Air Station of the US Marine Corps should be relocated from its current location in a heavily populated urban center to Ginowan in the Henoko coastal district. Inamine, who won thanks to his “adamantly anti-relocation” campaign, was backed by opposition parties such as the Democratic Socialist Party, the People’s Life Party, and the Communist Party. He won approximately 56% of the eligible votes to defeat his opponent, who was backed by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s Liberal-Democratic Party.

　　　Elections are certainly one method of settling disputes under a democratic system. Now that Inamine has attracted 19,839 votes (55.8% of the eligible votes—4,155 more than his opponent), one can credibly conclude that the will of the people favors the camp opposing the air base’s relocation. And yet, there is no guarantee that the “will of some 56% of the people” is always right. Rather, I am of the opinion that one serious effect of this decision based on the “will of the people” will be conflicts that China most likely will create over the East China Sea and the Nansei Islands (a chain of islands extending from southern Kyushu to northern Taiwan).

　　　Let us for a moment consider why Futenma Air Station must be relocated to Henoko—within Okinawa. It is precisely because China, having forged ahead with ruthless expansionism, will be sure to ultimately reach for the Senkaku Islands. The past pattern of China’s maritime advances, begun in the 1970s, eloquently predicts China’s likely offensive in the East China Sea in the near future.

　　　It was in the early 1970s that China began taking islands in the South China Sea belonging to nations such as the Philippines and Vietnam. Shigeo Hiramatsu is a well-known Japanese commentator who was probably among the first to sound the alarm about China’s intentions. As has been detailed in China’s Maritime Strategy and Sequel to China’s Maritime Strategy (published by Keiso Shobo, Tokyo, in 1993 and1997 respectively), he also points out that the US kept assuming a posture of non-intervention, even though its military was aware of China’s threatening and provocative moves.

　　　In July 1971, reports from US reconnaissance aircraft warned that Chinese transport ships, escorted by naval vessels, had carried construction materials over the past few months to the Paracel Islands, with a wharf, piers, and more than 50 buildings being constructed on Woody Island—the largest of the islands in the region. And yet, as will be mentioned later, the US continued to assume a posture of non-intervention, giving China tacit approval when it eventually attacked Vietnam and took the Paracel Islands.

Theft in the South China Sea

　　　From the early 1970s, China made steady preparations for taking the Paracel Islands, as it saw the reality of a South Vietnam, where people were increasingly losing the will to fight as their nation became evermore hard-pressed militarily and economically.

　　　Then in January 1974, assuming that the US had also significantly lost its will to fight and that its armed forces would not interfere, the Chinese swooped in. The South Vietnamese government and its armed forces were on their last legs at this point. As China had anticipated, two battleships of the South Vietnamese Navy were quickly sunk, the US did not interfere, and the Paracel Islands fell into the hands of the Chinese.

　　　Sensing the possibility of South Vietnam launching an operation aimed at recapturing the Paracels, the Chinese Liberation Army (PLA) stepped up its efforts to make the islands into a solid military base. Viewing the Paracels as “the Great Ｗall of China’s southernmost seas,” the Chinese posted tank corps and anti-aircraft artillery on Woody Island. By 1988, a 2,600-meter long runway had been completed on the island along with a wharf capable of berthing a 5,000-ton war ship. Chinese navy ships patrolled the surrounding seas around the clock, with helicopters repeatedly landing on, and departing from, the island.

　　　Furthermore, in 1986 a huge food storage facility was completed on Woody Island, and then in 1992 a mammoth 20,000 square meter water tank with a rain water purification system was added. These facilities resolved the food and water problems on the island. Today, a large number of Chinese inhabit Woody Island, which even boasts a fancy main shopping street called Paracel Avenue 1, reminiscent of the popular Wangfujin shopping district in Beijing.

　　　The Chinese were determined to bring more islands in the South China Sea under their control, and I don’t believe they—the Chinese Communist Party—would have given up this objective even if the US had intervened. However, there is no question that America’s posture of non-intervention has actually emboldened the Chinese to resort to more audacious acts of aggression.

　　　On February 9, 1995—some 20 years after the battle over the Paracel Islands—the Philippine Defense Ministry appealed to the international community, charging China with trying to take Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands, over which Manila claimed jurisdiction.

　　　In point of fact, a Filipino fisherman was detained by the Chinese while operating near the reef towards the end of January of the same year, prior to the defense ministry announcement. Released a week later, the fisherman was warned to never talk about the military facilities he saw being constructed there. The fisherman nevertheless reported to the Philippine government on what he had seen, but government officials at the time did not believe that the Chinese were in fact constructing military facilities on the reef, which daily goes under water at high tide.

　　　And yet, hand-picked soldiers of the PLA somehow managed to continue to live and work on this reef that sinks out of sight at full tide, as well as on strips of rocks barely protruding above sea level, as construction of the facilities progressed. Fortifying solidly the rock foundation of the submerged portions of the reef, they managed to build military installations above it secure enough to post troops there. The reality of Chinese aggression went far beyond the expectations of the defenders.

Obvious Targets of Chinese Aggression

　　　Observing relations between China and the Philippines prior to China’s plundering of Mischief Reef in 1995, one clearly is reminded of the contradiction between China’s words and its deeds. In June 1975, when President Marcos visited Beijing, Chairman Deng Xiao-ping promised to resolve the issue of the sovereignty of Spratly Islands through “friendly and cooperative negotiations.”

　　　However, in 1988, Deng proposed to President Aquino that further discussion of the issue be postponed. Then, five years later, in April 1993, President Jiang Ze-min proposed to President Ramos a long-term shelving of the territorial issue along with a plan to jointly develop the seas around the Spratly Islands.

　　　About the same time, demonstrations against US bases in the Philippines got into full swing, with the US bases finally being closed at the end of 1992—a turn of events that the Chinese must have found most fortunate. Then in February of 1995 China proceeded to take Mischief Reef outright, trampling underfoot all previous promises and commitments.

　　　Now, as President Obama increasingly looks inward and turns his back on strife in the international community, China once again has set out to deprive the Philippines of territory, this time Scarborough Reef—a tiny and scenic South China Sea coral island.

　　　With President Xi Jin-ping at the helm advocating a “great renaissance of the Chinese nation” and blatant expansionism, China is doggedly aiming at transforming itself into “the great empire” of the 21st century. As China goes all out in its campaign to dominate what it is calling its “second island chain,” the East China Sea, the Senkaku Islands, and the cluster of islands stretching from Okinawa are its obvious targets.

　　　China most likely will try to implement its long-term strategy despite the presence of the US armed forces in the Far East. Therefore, it behooves Japan to develop an effective deterrence first and foremost. For that purpose, we must make every effort to maximize the potential of our Self-Defense Forces and Coast Guard in terms of their resources and legally recognize capacity to act.  In addition, effective cooperation with US forces is mandatory.

　　　For that purpose, the proposed relocation of the Futenma Air Station to Henoko is absolutely required, allowing us to maintain the highest standard of support possible from the US Marine Corps in Okinawa.

　　　Surprisingly, these views were little discussed during the recent mayoral election. In this case, nothing is more dangerous than a “will of the people” that is devoid of proper recognition of the impending Chinese threat—or any agreement on how to safeguard the security of the Senkaku Islands. I might add that I have yet to hear anything from Mayor Inamine on how he plans to resolve the present stalemate over Futenma.

(Translated from “Renaissance Japan” column no. 592 in the January 30, 2014 issue of The Weekly Shincho)