“China will complete its own space station by 2020 and build a base on the moon by 2030. Its objective is to control the air space between the moon and the earth and thereby gain a military advantage over the US.”

　　　So declared American military strategist Richard Fisher in an interview I conducted with him five years ago. Fisher is the author of China’s Military Modernization: Building for Regional and Global Reach (Stanford Security Studies, 2010).

　　　China’s Chang’e-3 spacecraft touched down on the moon in Sinus Iridum, or the Bay of Rainbows, shortly after 5:11 a.m. Pacific Time on December 14th after a 13-day flight, successfully deploying the “Yutu” (Jade Rabbit) rover. For the next three months, the rover is expected to survey the moon’s topography, geology, and mineral resources, transmitting pertinent data around the clock.

　　　The national New China News Agency (NCNA), noting that the former Soviet Union “succeeded in soft-landing a spacecraft (1966) only on its 12th attempt,” took pride in China’s success on the first attempt. Chang’e-3’s successful landing may well be China’s pride and joy. But no nation on earth has actually congratulated the Chinese wholeheartedly for this feat. Beijing has only itself to blame for the fact that its success has enhanced the doubts of the international community concerning its true intentions.

　　　China’s space program has been accelerated in inverse proportion to the reduction of the US space development budget. According to The Wall Street Journal, the declining space budget for the US was further reduced from 2011 to approximately US$17.2 billion in 2012. The total scope of China’s space development budget is unclear. What is clear is that its space development program is commanded by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) primarily with military objectives in mind.

　　　NCNA quoted Sun Hui-xian, Deputy Engineer-in-Chief of the second phase of China’s lunar program, which includes Chang-e 3, as commenting: “Compared to last century’s space race between the United States and the former Soviet Union, mankind’s current return to the moon is more based on curiosity and exploration of the unknown universe. China’s lunar program is an important component of mankind’s activities to explore a peaceful use of space.”

　　　One must guard against flowery rhetoric. China’s military rise was—and is still—explained as a “peaceful rise.” Against the backdrop of military power born out of this so-called “peaceful rise,” China never hesitates a moment to assert that Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea all constitute its core interests. The Beijing Times—Beijing’s largest selling commercial morning tabloid—quoted a Chinese military expert as opining: “Construction of a missile base on the moon will enable attacks on an enemy’s military targets without being counterattacked.”

“China Able to Go on the Offensive Across a Very Broad Area”

　　　Even without resorting to missiles launched from the moon base, China’s space supremacy would be secured by putting scores of man-made satellites in orbit in outer space, with the proposed moon base and China’s space station working in tandem.

　　　The more advanced a nation is, the more vulnerable it is to cyber attacks.  Because the social infrastructures both in Japan and the US depend predominantly on intricate computer systems, the losses could be immense should cyber attacks prove indefensible. That is why the possibility of China securing supremacy in outer space, as well as in cyber space, is a serious threat to both Japan and the US.

　　　Let us recall China’s strategic objectives. China’s mission as a future maritime power, as directed by the late Deng Xiao-ping, has been talked about in terms of China conquering the “first island chain” and the “second island chain.” [Editor’s note: The “first island chain” refers to the first chain of major archipelagos spreading out from the East Asian continental mainland, principally comprising the Kurile Islands, the Japanese Archipelago, the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, and the northern islands of the Philippines. The “second island chain” refers to the next chain of archipelagosspreading out from Honshu—the main island of Japan—down to New Guinea, comprising the Bonin Islands, the Mariana Islands, and the Caroline Islands.] During a US-China summit in Sunnylands, California, last June, Chinese President Xi Jing-pin told President Barak Obama that the “vast Pacific Ocean has enough room to accommodate the development of two great powers in the world,” viewing the two nations as launching “a new type of great power relationship.”

　　　The idea leading to Xi’s assertion that the Pacific Ocean be divided into US and Chinese spheres of influence—using Hawaii as the dividing point— is based on a proposal made by Chinese Rear Admiral Yang Yi to Admiral Tim Keating, Commander, US Pacific Command (March 2007-October 2009) during Keating’s visit to China in 2007.

　　　In order to secure the mastery of the sea required to realize its long-cherished goal of dividing and ruling the Pacific, however, air supremacy over the western half of the Pacific is mandatory. With high-altitude surveillance, air supremacy will prove all the more effective. For that purpose, China has regarded as mandatory man-made satellites orbiting the earth, a space station, and a base on the moon. China has also faithfully followed its space development program as a means of forcing the international community of the 21st century to recognize a world in which China will in general play a more central role.

　　　The Communist Party of China (CPC) has demonstrated an outstanding ability to keep its eyes open in all directions in order to achieve its objectives. It is the CPC’s one-party rule that has enabled the continuous military build-up over the years as well as the development of the Chang-e spacecraft. This could not possibly be emulated by other nations. The Chinese push forward towards the CPC’s goal at all costs. The same approach applies to China’s plans to control the disputed Senkaku Islands.

　　　Comments Professor Yoshihiko Yamada of Tokai University:

　　　“The Chinese can go on the offensive across a very broad area. While we Japanese were preoccupied with the Senkaku dispute, the Chinese demonstrated their capability to encroach on the Goto Islands if need be.”

　　　Prof. Yamada refers to a July 18, 2012 incident, in which a Chinese fishing fleet of 109 brand new, large-sized boats forced its way deep into Tamanoura Bay on Fukue-shima—one of the Goto Islands off the coast of Nagasaki Prefecture near the border between Japan and China—dropping anchor in an orderly fashion and staying on for a week. Granted that the fleet had ostensibly taken the action to take shelter from a violent typhoon, but the Chinese fishermen must have reported to the authorities that Tamanoura could easily be brought under control, because their ships could without difficulty penetrate into an area more than 100 kilometers (approximately 60 miles) from the median line between the exclusive economic zones of Japan and China.

　　　A quick look at a globe easily shows Okinawa could readily be seized if the Chinese were to take over the Goto and Senkaku islands. It is not unreasonable to assume that they are not only after the Senkakus, but also plotting to exert Chinese influence over—and ultimately put under their control—Okinawa as well as the rest of Japan.

　　　In that vein, we should not overlook China’s on-going plans to advance to strategic areas in the Sea of Japan. Prof. Yamada points out that Chinese fishing boats are sailing into the Sea of Japan in large numbers today, using the North Korean port of Rason as an operational base, and that squid fishing off the North Korean coast is solely conducted by Chinese vessels. In point of fact, the rich fisheries in the middle of the Sea of Japan, known as the Yamato-tai Undersea Ridge, is packed with Chinese fishing vessels.

Treating Japan as a Chinese Vassal

　　　It is Sinocentrism—China’s entitled sense of itself as the center of the world—that fosters the Chinese strategic objective of expansion into the East China Sea, the Sea of Japan, and the South China Sea.

　　　Take for instance China’s arbitrary creation, announced on November 23rd, of a new air defense identification zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea, encompassing the Senkakus. Clearly violating international law, Beijing made the announcement as though it were its prerogative to do so, warning that China’s armed forces would adopt “defensive emergency measures to respond to aircraft” that did not cooperate in identifying themselves or refused to follow instructions. The Nihon Keizai Shinbun, a mass-circulation economic daily, dispatched a disquieting report in connection with the announcement.

　　　The daily reported that on November 22nd (Friday), China’s National Defense Ministry abruptly “ordered” the Japanese military attaché at the Japanese Embassy in Beijing to present himself at the ministry the following day. No explanation was reportedly made. The attaché called on the ministry as requested on Saturday morning, and was informed of the decision on the new ADIZ. The official announcement allegedly followed by “30 to 40 minutes.”

　　　The Chinese gesture seriously lacked diplomatic courtesy, treating Japan as though it were a Chinese vassal. It is the PLA that is in command of the ministry which resorted to this sorry act of barbarity. And it is the PLA that has also been in charge of China’s space development scheme, including the Chang-e spacecraft.

　　　Clearly, the PLA is pivotal to the success, or failure, of the Xi Jing-pin regime. It would be natural to expect Xi’s foreign policy, amply accommodating the wishes and desires of the Chinese army, to increasingly lean toward a tough line. Under such circumstances, China’s primary target will most likely be Japan. That is why Japan must enhance its national security capabilities while strengthening its alliance with the US and solidifying its relations with other democracies in Asia. Building a strong Japan should by all means be our biggest and immediate goal.

(Translated from “Renaissance Japan” column no. 588 in the December 26, 2013 issue of The Weekly Shincho)