Confessions of a Former ‘Court Poet’ to the Kim Dynasty”—(Bungei Shunju Ltd., Tokyo; October 2013)—by Jang Jin-sung, a North Korean defector, is a shocking revelation of the realities in the North.

　　　Jang is also the author of “I Will Sell My Daughter for 100 Won” (Bansei-sha, Yokohama; August 2008), a compilation of his poems depicting the agonies of private citizens in North Korea, which I introduced in this column in the June 26, 2008 issue of this weekly.

　　　Born in 1971, Jang (pseudonym) studied music and literature at the Pyongyang College of Music and Dance and Kim Il-Sung University. After graduation, the authorities recognized his ability as a poet, selecting him in 2000 for a position with the Operations Division of the United Front Department—a propaganda outfit of the North Korean Workers’ Party. Promoted out of the blue to a staff position of the central party synonymous with absolute power in North Korea, Jang started writing epics glorifying Chairman Kim, among other things.

　　　While praising Kim, however, Jang managed to compose a series of poems on the sly, depicting the miseries and desperation of ordinary North Koreans, based on the notes he had secretly jotted down over the years. In 2004, Jang defected to the South via China, carrying his poems with him. The death-risking escape across the border led to the publication of I Will Sell My Daughter for 100 Won, among other works.

　　　After settling in the South, Jang tried to write a book about the real state of affairs of the power struggle within the hierarchy. However, being under government protection, Jang found himself, as expected, under stringent constraints in revealing classified information. He was at the time working for the Institute for National Security Strategy affiliated with the National Intelligence Service of South Korea. Based on an interview I had with him, I wrote a special feature on North Korea’s abduction of Japanese citizens in the January 1-8, 2009 combined issue of this magazine, disclosing that the administration of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi had concluded a secret agreement under which Japan would extend to Pyongyang a whopping1 trillion yen (US$10 billion) when the abduction issue was resolved.

　　　Leading Japanese figures involved in the negotiations with Pyongyang denied my report outright. Meanwhile, in South Korea, Jang was severely reprimanded by the South Korean National Intelligence Service.

　　　When we met again in Tokyo some time later, I asked Jang how much trouble that report of mine put him to. He just smiled silently. In response to my apology that I had unwittingly caused him a great deal of trouble as a result of my reporting, Jang said assuringly: “Please do not worry about it as you reported the truth.”

　　　After experiencing such hardships for a period, Jang resigned from the Institute for National Security and Strategy in December of 2010, inaugurating New Focus—an Internet newspaper for defectors from the North. Able now to write as he wishes, Jang went on to publish Confessions this month (October 2013).

“Annals of the Kim Dynasty”

　　　Jang says there actually are two North Koreas—the real North Korea and the fictitious North Korea created by scholars. Taking official North Korean releases and announcements at face value and judging the country on the basis of the values of a free and democratic state naturally creates gross misconceptions, leading to a false image of North Korea. What is depicted in Confessions is the actual state of affairs of the North Korean hierarchy that Jang himself experienced, which is far more intriguing than expected.

　　　While in the North, Jang was ordered to compile the “Annals of the Kim Dynasty”—the official record of the dynasty then led by Chairman Kim Jong-Il. This project was entrusted to Jang, as Kim declared it unpardonable that there were no “Annals of the Kim Dynasty” when even the Yi, the rulers of the Joseon Era (1392-1910) had their own “Annals of the Yi Dynasty.” Thanks to this assignment, Jang got unlimited access to rare historical material kept at the Korean Institute of Historical Research, some of which was most definitely not flattering of the Kim family. Jang introduces some new vital historical facts about North Korea in Confessions. For example, he provides the answer to the question that still baffles South Korean academic circles:—Why did North Korea, when occupying Seoul in June 1950, choose to remain in the South Korean capital for three days drinking in celebration instead of immediately moving south?

　　　Jang quotes Kim Il-Sung as discussing this incident in 1976 as follows:

　　　“Every time I recall how easily we could have liberated the South, I still am grossly chagrined and agonize over the costly mistake of our occupying Seoul for three days then. If we had taken advantage of the circumstances at the time and kept pressing on, instead of taking it easy in Seoul as we did, we could have forced the Americans to change their strategic thinking. The truth of the matter, however, is that the Russians failed to provide us the weapons they had promised. I bet Stalin had no intention whatsoever of giving us the weapons because he was terrified of the US right from the very beginning.”

　　　After spurring on Kim Il-Sung to instigate the Korean War, writes Jang, Stalin hoped to draw the US and Chinese forces into fighting against each other, visualizing the Korean Peninsula as the arena for a bitter confrontation against each other. If that happened, according to Jang, Stalin calculated that a rapprochement between Washington and Beijing—Stalin’s worst nightmare—could be blocked.

　　　Jang further introduces Stalin’s viewpoint as follows: The US could not possibly defeat China, which had enormous troop strength. Therefore, the US would be incapable of bringing about World War III in the near term. The Soviet Union would thus be able to mark time in Europe in its efforts to strengthen socialism. Further, the struggle between the US and China would revolutionize the entire Far East.

　　　Contemporary Japanese must come to terms with this fierce struggle for power that was underway as part of the backdrop to the Korean War. At this time, South Korea under President Park Guen-Hye is steadily leaning left, the US becoming inward-looking, and Russia’s power waning. As South Korea appears in danger of being absorbed into the Chinese sphere of influence at almost any time, it is all the more important to view in strategic terms the rapidly changing international situation.

　　　Confessions also contains important testimony as regards the abduction issue, detailing the circumstances under which then Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi led a government delegation to Pyongyang in the fall of 2002. Jang explains that, the North Korean side was marked by a bitter confrontation between the Foreign Ministry and the Anti-South Operations Department over the abduction issue.

　　　According to Jang, the Foreign Ministry took the lead in negotiating with Japan, but its primary purpose was to extract Japanese aid on the assumption that the abduction issue could be dealt with on the Red Cross level, from a humanitarian point of view.

Kim Orders North Korea’s “Self-Rehabilitation” with Anticipated Japanese Aid

　　　However, the anti-South Operations Department, specializing in intelligence operations, had predicted the negotiations would not progress easily if matters pertaining to abduction were taken up. On the grounds that even a partial recognition of involvement would prove absolutely detrimental to the North Korean national interests, Jang writes, the department adopted a signed petition at the outset of the negotiations maintaining that it was opposed to such tactics.

　　　Negotiations with Japan opened with the Foreign Ministry taking the lead, setting the date of the Japan-North Korea summit for September 17, 2002. But the ministry misinterpreted the main Japanese purpose of the summit as a ploy to primarily increase the approval rating for the Koizumi administration, wrongly assuming that the Japanese side was more interested in merely reaching a broad agreement on diplomatic normalization on the administration level, rather than pursuing concrete steps to resolve the abduction issue.

　　　On the other hand, the North Korean Foreign Ministry had in mind a diplomatic normalization on the basis of an apology from Japan for its colonization of the Korean peninsula (1910-1945), in tandem with huge economic assistance.

　　　Jang explains that, while North Korea initially demanded a whopping US$40 billion—approximately 4 trillion yen at the current exchange rate—the Japanese side countered with a surprisingly meticulous calculation of what was logically due North Korea, leading to a mutually acceptable sum of US$11.4 billion as a total compensation package.

　　　Based on this agreement, asserts the author, Chairman Kim directed North Korean bureaucrats to swiftly work out a plan to build an economic infrastructure enabling his nation to rehabilitate itself on its own, presupposing that the fund would be obtainable from Japan. Jang points out that, in particular, Kim was dreaming of a double-track railway network across the North as the centerpiece of his economic rehabilitation scheme.

　　　The author vividly depicts a scene in which Kim and his top echelon were ecstatic about the rare chance of resuscitating their devastated economy, utilizing the trillion yen aid they thought could be extracted from Japan.

　　　But the Koizumi-Kim summit took an unexpected turn. Determined to not accept the attitude of Kim, who refused to admit North Korea’s involvement in the abductions or make an outright apology during the morning session, Shinzo Abe, who then served as deputy cabinet secretary, sternly suggested to Koizumi during a lunch break: “Let us all go back to Tokyo without signing the declaration—if they continue to refuse to admit their involvement and fail to apologize.” In point of fact, Abe had fully expected his remarks to be wiretapped by the North Koreans, which turned out to be exactly the case. As almost everybody knows by now, Kim heard what Abe had to say, and then at the outset of the afternoon session admitted that North Korea had indeed been responsible for the abductions and apologized.

　　　Detailing the actual state of affairs of North Korea coupled with the behind-the-scenes circumstances of Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang, I am eagerly counting on Confessions to help awaken many of us Japanese to a fresh realization of what actually is taking place on the Korean Peninsula today and how Japan should formulate its foreign policy vis-a-vis Pyongyang.

(Translated from “Renaissance Japan” column no. 578 in the October 17, 2013 issue of The Weekly Shincho)