The administration of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe will postpone until next spring a decision on whether to alter the government’s interpretation of the existing constitution to enable the nation to engage in collective self-defense. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has found it necessary to make compromises with its junior coalition partner Komeito over the issue. Granted that the pacifist, Buddhist-backed Komeito is tenaciously opposed to the proposed change, but why has the administration let this golden opportunity slip by?

　　　Campaigning for the upper house elections last July, Komeito resorted to an unusually strong expression―“We are absolutely against it”―in opposing the LDP’s plan to allow Japan to exercise its right to collective self-defense. During an appearance on a BS Asahi TV news show on July 6th, Komeito party leader Natsuo Yamaguchi even hinted at his party leaving the coalition over the issue, remarking: “I believe the LDP will be shunned by the people…In that case, I will certainly discuss with my people whether or not the coalition with the LDP will still be sustainable.”

　　　On July 21st, during a special election program on Fuji TV, I asked Yamaguchi about Japan’s right to collective self-defense after it became obvious that the LDP had failed to obtain an absolute majority despite a landslide win. Again, the Komeito chief essentially voiced his opposition, resorting to various expressions, such as, “It is absolutely essential to deepen public discussions on this issue,” “We must strive to seek people’s understanding of this issue,” and “It is important to conduct prudent discussions among all parties concerned.” But he clearly failed to explain precisely why he and his party are opposed to it.

　　　Accepting the explanations of Yamaguchi and his party at face value, the only reason one can figure for their opposition would be that the Japanese are generally diffident about our nation exercising its right to collective self-defense.

　　　Again, on August 29th, Yamaguchi said, “Opinion polls show the public is cautious. It will not be easy to gain public understanding.” He added it was unlikely that the ruling bloc of Prime Minister Abe’s LDP and Komeito would reach an agreement on the issue by the end of this year.

　　　But are the Japanese really that incapable of coming to grips with the importance of this issue, as Mr. Yamaguchi repeatedly claims we are? The question of collective self-defense confronted the Japanese acutely in the wake of the September 11, 2001 Al Qaeda attacks of the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington. When the US took steps to make reprisals against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, NATO nations readily fought with the US in exercising their collective self-defense. However, Japan did not fight alongside the US, as it was under constitutional constraints. Instead, Japan enacted the Anti-terrorism Special Measures Law, allowing it to cooperate with the US away from the battleground.

　　　The issue was extensively discussed across the nation at the time, and has always remained a matter of public debate in the twelve years since. And yet, Yamaguchi and his followers refuse to recognize this reality, claiming that not enough national discussion has been conducted, implying that we should keep discussing it still further.

Changes in Komeito´s Thinking

　　　The international situation is much harsher today than a decade ago. For example, at the time there were no Chinese vessels that dared violate Japanese territorial waters around the disputed Senkaku Islands (called the Diaoyu in Chinese). China had not designated the Senkaku as a “core interest,” nor did it daily send its vessels into our territorial seas or the contiguous waters. Its naval vessels did not lock weapons-targeting radar on our naval vessels, nor did they chase Japanese vessels in and around our territorial waters.

　　　And yet, what we are witnessing today may be a relatively minor threat compared to China’s military capability in the future. We must work our imagination and foresee what China’s threat will look like in 10 years, or 20 years. China has expanded its annual military budget approximately 33 fold in the last 25 years. Presumably, it will strive to make similarly strenuous efforts for the next 10 to 20 years. How much bigger will the Chinese threat be then? Surely, it will be incomparable by today’s standards.

　　　Considering the increased Chinese threat of the near future in tandem with those in full view at present, anyone can easily understand the dire need to modernize and strengthen the peace-keeping ability of the Japan Coast Guard and the Japan Self-Defense Forces. Because it would be hardly possible for Asian nations to individually counter an attack from China, the nations in the region sharing common values obviously require a security scheme enabling them to protect each other by coping with the threat collectively. Hence the concept of collective self-defense.

　　　When an ally comes under attack from a third nation, a member of the United Nations (UN) is entitled, as is generally understood in accordance with  Article 51 of the UN Charter, to take military action against the adversary by regarding the hostility as akin to a direct attack against itself. Why must Japan alone refrain from exercising this right which the UN recognizes for all of its members?

　　　Whenever one brings up collective self-defense, Komeito members, as well as a large percentage of Japanese politicians, reiterate time and again that gaining public support is mandatory. That being the case, don’t they realize they also have the responsibility to make every effort to deepen public understanding of the issue in question, while calling attention to the seriousness of the international situation surrounding Japan?

　　　In the meantime, I have recently begun noticing some changes in Komeito’s assertions, which had long appeared to be completely devoid of any sense of crisis as regards Japan’s security environment. On September 10th, chatting with members of the press in Washington during an official visit, Yamaguchi remarked that he would meet Prime Minister Abe sometime in September to discuss the necessary steps to be taken to set the stage for his party agreeing to allow Japan to exercise the right to collective self-defense.

　　　At about the same time, there was also a somewhat puzzling explanation from the Komeito side: The party said that during the election campaign it had been compelled to resort to strong language in order to call the public’s attention to matters pertaining to collective self-defense. The party feared the people had not fully come to grips with the importance of this issue, and that now was the time to take a closer look and discuss it wholeheartedly. That the top echelons of Komeito, including Yamaguchi himself, are making such statements undoubtedly reflects changes in the party’s basic policy as regards the nation’s security scheme.

　　　In the political background of this “change” is a report about a meeting between Yamaguchi and Mark Lippert, chief of staff for the US Secretary of Defense, who was quoted as remarking to the visitor that the US would welcome if Japan lifting the ban and beginning to play an even bigger role in the international community.

China, not Japan, Poses Threat to Stability

　　　Not only Yamaguchi but all other politicians who are opposed to collective self-defense, question how a consistency with the longstanding constitutional interpretation can be maintained if the government decides to exercise the right to collective self-defense. Speaking at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace on September, Yamaguchi was asked if his party is diffident about collective self-defense because of theoretical questions having to do with the law, his party’s founding policy, or a political concern about possible adverse reactions from Japan’s neighbors. Here’s what he had to say in a nutshell:

　　　Because the Japanese government’s longstanding constitutional interpretation of collective self-defense has been meticulous, systematic, and solid, extensive discussions are naturally required if it needs to be revised at any stage.

　　　However, this type of argument is next to meaningless. The constitution―the nation’s basic law―offers a fundamental framework designed to safeguard the security and peace of the nation and its people. As circumstances change, so must the constitution. Indeed, the interpretation of Article 9 (the so-called “no war clause”) of the constitution has undergone changes over the 66-year post-war history of this nation, has it not?

　　　There are those who voice a concern that Japan’s neighbors and allies will feel uneasy if Japan takes the plunge to exercise the right to collective self-defense. However, if we try to expand our horizons and see beyond nations other than China alone, it becomes quite clear that the US as well as a host of our Asian neighbors are actually waiting anxiously for Japan to exercise the right.

　　　Some people accuse the proponents of the right to collective self-defense as wanting Japan to once again become a militaristic nation prone to war. But how can one expect Japan to be a militaristic state again when it has so prudently dealt with China’s assertiveness in the air and the sea around the Senkakus? Also, judging from how the people in this country have thought and behaved over these seven decades since the end of the Pacific War, it just isn’t realistic to expect Japan to start a war again. If ever there is a nation far more likely to start a war, China quickly comes to mind.

　　　Given the fierce anti-Japanese sentiment now current in China, the intolerant one-party rule of the Communist Party, the strong sense of China’s own greatness on the part of Chinese leaders, and China’s underestimation of the inward-looking US―given all these factors—it is China that has all of the conditions that might lead to behaving recklessly. It is China, not Japan, that poses a threat to the stability of the region.

　　　Every Japanese politician must sincerely bear in mind the historical importance of establishing―and resolutely exercising―the full-fledged right to collective self-defense as a badly-needed deterrence against any possible future Chinese military adventure. In order to be true to its long-held principles of peace, it is crucial that Komeito also come to grips with the harsh reality of today’s China and retract its opposition.

(Translated from “Renaissance Japan” column no. 576 in the October 3, 2013 issue of The Weekly Shincho)