On September 11, Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda went ahead with a decision to nationalize the disputed Senkaku Islands in order to “maintain and manage them in a peaceful and stable manner.” How much of this goal has since been achieved? The situation pertaining to the Senkakus has, in fact, become clearly less peaceful and stable, with Chinese government vessels in the surrounding area of the East China Sea violating Japanese territorial waters almost daily.

　　　The first violation occurred early in the morning of September 14, when six patrol boats belonging to China’s State Oceanic Administration entered Japanese territorial waters around the Sensakus, refusing to leave until 1:20 p.m. It was the first reported case in which so significant a number of large Chinese government patrol vessels violated these waters at once, but this was only the beginning.

　　　The following day, two Chinese Fisheries Department patrol boats, along with ten State Oceanic vessels entered the contiguous zone between the territorial waters and the exclusive economic zone ( EEZ), cruising around the Sensakus in a circle. During this maneuver, three of the State Oceanic vessels violated Japanese waters.

　　　Then on September 24, eleven more Chinese government vessels approached the Senkakus, with four of them – two State Oceanic and two Fisheries – again violating Japan’s territorial waters.

　　　In October, the Chinese actions escalated further, with six government vessels entering the contiguous zone on October 1, and four State Oceanic patrol boats violating Japanese waters on October 2.

　　　Further, three State Oceanic vessels violated Japanese waters on October 3, with one of the patrol boats conducting on-the-spot inspections aboard two Chinese fishing boats inside the Japanese EEZ. Obviously, these inspections were a Chinese ploy to claim that their sovereignty extends to the Japanese EEZ, the contiguous zone, and the entire Japanese territorial waters around the Senkakus.

　　　With the almost daily Chinese incursions into territorial waters and the surrounding area, the Japanese media has seemingly become blasé about the story and less and less enthusiastic about covering it. In sharp contrast to this attitude on the part of some Japanese, the Chinese have continued to relentlessly send government vessels into Japanese waters, with daily sorties still ongoing as of this writing (October 9).

But the Islands Are Deserted and Unattended

　　　Let us review the present situation objectively. Chinese government vessels engage in on-the-spot inspections of Chinese fishing boats within Japan’s EEZ almost daily, while numerous patrol boats cruise in the contiguous zone, with some violating Japanese territorial waters. When a Japan Coast Guard patrol ship rushes to the scene of a territorial violation and demands that the vessel leave immediately, the Chinese side retorts: “Do not obstruct our lawful cruise”; or, “These are Chinese territorial waters.” Simultaneously, the Chinese State Oceanic Administration maintains that their ships are “conducting regular surveillance activities aimed at protecting our national interests,” while Minister Han Zhiquian of the Chinese Embassy in Tokyo keeps repeating: “The Senkakus are China’s indigenous territory.”

　　　The Japanese government asserts it has effective control over the islands, but is far from preventing repeated territorial violations by Chinese vessels. Meanwhile, neither Japan nor China has allowed their nationals to land on the islands, leaving them deserted.

　　　This in effect leaves Japan and China evenly matched – despite Japan’s claim that it effectively controls the islands. A common practice for a normal nation under such circumstances would be to show a strong national will by either seizing the vessels that have repeated violated its territorial waters, or by imposing economic sanctions. It is absolutely meaningless for Japan to remain as passive as it has since September 11, refusing to react to Chinese provocations or allow Japanese nationals to land on the islands it legitimately owns, while claiming effective control over the islands which actually remain completely deserted and unattended.

　　　It is clearly a regression on Japan’s part that, despite the nationalization, it has failed to change the actual situation concerning the islands, leading to more Chinese ships trespassing into Japanese territorial waters than before September 11. The administration of Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda must come to terms with this reality, take steps to prevent further regression as soon as possible, and back its claim of the islands’ nationalization with actual results.

　　　China’s track record in the South China Sea over the past 40 years shows it is dead set on wrenching the land and the seas from others once it sets its mind – no matter how long the scheme may take. Japan should bear in mind that in all matters, not just those pertaining to the East China Sea, China will under no circumstances change its thinking. Therefore, the Japan-China dispute over the Senkakus likely will last interminably, unless Japan gives up its will to hold on the islands. In that case, what ultimately will make the difference will be power, particularly military might.

　　　In pursuing its scheme to wrench the Senkakus from Japan, the Chinese will adroitly have its “civilians” take the first action as they have done in the South China Sea, landing men disguised as fishermen on one of the rocky little islands. They will then send surveillance ships into Japanese territorial waters around the islands, ostensively to protect their citizens, and after that go all out to preempt Japanese countermeasures while closely watching how Japan’s trusted ally, the US, reacts. Already in June of 2001, China decided to implement a plan to substantially increase its naval war potential in an attempt to completely overpower and outmaneuver Japan if and when the two nations clash in the East China Sea. Specifically, China’s State Oceanic Administration will by 2020 double its current fleet of 280 patrol ships, bolster its number of men from the current 9,000 to 15,000, and add nine planes to its current force of seven for a total of 16 planes.

　　　Japan must therefore definitely make clear its national will to safeguard the Senkaku Islands at all costs. With the Japanese government right in the middle of drafting the national budget for 2013, China is obviously watching very closely every move Prime Minister Noda makes. The Chinese know very well that the Japanese national budget now being compiled will demonstrate the true extent of seriousness of Japan’s national will to defend and protect the Senkakus.

　　　In the same vein, the US is also keenly watching what conclusions the Japanese government will make in this respect. At a time when even small nations in Asia-Pacific are desperately trying to strengthen their national defenses, a further reduction of defense spending by Japan, a regional big power, will simply be unacceptable.

Strategic Importance of the Nansei Islands is Obvious

　　　Japan must first and foremost express its will, loud and clear, to implement solid plans to defend the Senkakus on its own. It must prepare a budget that explicitly reflects a new strategy with which to face up to the Chinese threat after taking a hard look at the overall security situation in the Nansei Islands (the chain of Japanese islands stretching southwest from Kyushu to Taiwan, including the Sankakus).

　　　For that purpose, the defense budget must by all means be increased significantly. However, the estimated 2013 defense budget requested by the Defense Ministry is a mere \4,636 billion (approximately US$59.5 billion) – even less than this year’s budget of \4,713.5 billion (US$60.4 billion). The meager request has obviously resulted from the Defense Ministry’s decision to follow the Treasury’s instructions. However, at a juncture where Japan’s sovereignty is at stake, how can the government safeguard Japan’s integrity without Prime Minister Noda, Defense Minister Satoshi Morimoto, and the other cabinet ministers exercising stronger political leadership? Now is the time for government leaders to resolutely instruct the bureaucracy to prioritize measures to solidify our national defenses.

　　　Looking at a map of Japan’s southwestern seas, one will see the Nansei Islands (known in Japan also as the Ryukyu Islands) spread out over some 1,000 kilometers (635 miles), with Okinawa’s main island situated some 600 kilometers (375 miles) southwest of Kagoshima Prefecture and the southernmost island of Yonakuni some 500 kilometers (312.5 miles) beyond that. When one realizes how close the Nansei Islands are to both Taiwan and the South China Sea, the region’s strategic importance becomes all too clear. As has been amply demonstrated by the recent discovery of rare earth deposits near Minami Torishima Island, the easternmost island in the chain, the seas around the Nansei Islands are also Japan’s priceless reservoir of coveted natural resources. (The rare earth deposits near Minami Torishima are estimated to be equal to a 20,000 years worth of supply, based on Japan’s current needs.)

　　　Despite these compelling facts, these islands are virtually empty. The Japan Ground Self Defense Force maintains its only base in this region on Okinawa Island, and the JSDF radar network never extends beyond Miyakojima Island. The void of a surveillance network and military preparedness offers an adversary like China a golden opportunity for aggression. As is generally known, Japan lost the Kurile Islands to the former Soviet Union following its defeat in the Greater East Asia War. At the time, the Russian forces first confirmed that Japan had just surrendered and agreed to disarmament of its forces and that US forces were not nearby before going about wresting away the Kurile Islands, which had been left in a military void.

　　　Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechin effectively called Japan “a thief” at the United Nations General Assembly on September 27. In fact, quite the opposite is true, as China now attempts to steal the islands from Japan, and for this “thief” the military void in the Nansei Islands at this electric moment must constitute a great chance. If so, a marked increase in our defense budget to fill the void is imperative. Only by giving evidence that it is determined to fend for itself in terms of the defense of its southwestern region will Japan be able to begin to thwart the Chinese threat.

 (Translated from “Renaissance Japan” column no. 530 in the October 18, 2012 issue of The Weekly Shincho)