On June 3-4 discussions about closer cooperation between India and Japan were held in Tokyo between representatives of the Japan Institute for National Fundamentals (JINF) of Tokyo and the Vivekananda International Foundation (VIF) headquartered in New Delhi. Both are private think tanks dedicated to domestic and international policy studies. At these meetings, the importance of broader harmonious relations across Asia -€ what might be called “the Concert of Asia” -€ was highlighted.

　　　Subtle differences emerged in the two nations’ perception of the broader framework of proposed closer bilateral collaboration, specifically in terms of how they strategically position the US and Russia. Obviously, closer ties with the US are indispensable as India and Japan each strives to develop a grand strategy aimed at deterring China. And yet India entertains delicately complex sentiments towards the US alongside a strong affinity with Russia.

　　　Clearly, the US is as yet the world’s only super power, although India is unwilling to fully recognize this fact. Since making clear its return to a more active posture in the Asia-Pacific region in November 2011, the US has continued to lay down the groundwork for a military buildup which very much keeps China in mind. Almost immediately after announcing that the US would station Marines in the northern Australian port city of Darwin, President Obama headed for Bali, Indonesia, voicing a renewed US commitment to security and human rights in the region.

　　　Soon afterwards, he sent Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to Myanmar as
a gesture of the US backing of democratization efforts in that Southeast Asian nation.

　　　The fast improvement in US relations with Myanmar and Vietnam, which pursue diplomacy marked by a rapport with socialism and the People’s Republic of China, as well as with ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) in itself is developing into a form of encirclement of China. The US is characterized as the pillar of security for most Asia and Pacific nations aiming to cope effectively with the Chinese threat. While fully recognizing its importance, however, India continues to hold highly delicate -€ and not-so-positive -€ sentiments towards the US.

　　　US-India relations took a significant step forward in 2005, precipitated by a successful visit to the US by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. At the time, President George Bush decided to provide India civil nuclear cooperation without its signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The following year, Bush paid a return visit to India, singing praises for the newly formed ties between “the world’s oldest democracy and the world’s largest democracy.” Six years later, in November 2010, Obama visited India, declaring the US would support its bid for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Japan and India are the only two nations whose permanent UNSC membership the US has pledged to support.

India’s View of Russia

　　　The US has thus treated India with special care, entering into a close bilateral relationship under which their navies frequently engage in joint drills. And yet the Indian side has not quite put full trust in its new partner. What really is at the root of India’s hesitation? Explains Professor Brahma Chellaney, a prominent Indian scholar of international strategic issues at the Center for Policy Research headquartered in New Delhi:

　　　“When a border conflict ensues between India and China, the US only expresses its hope for a peaceful solution, maintaining neutrality and siding with neither party…And when it sells weapons to India or Japan, it does so while being greatly nervous about the reaction from China. This becomes ever more conspicuous when it sells weapons to Taiwan.” (Japan and India: Two Democracies Tied together, a compilation of essays and remarks by 13 leading Indian and Japanese commentators, edited by Yoshiko Sakurai and the Japan Institute for National Fundamentals; Bungei Shunju Co. Ltd., Tokyo; May 2012; page 204-206)

　　　Chellaney further states that the US strategy vis-a-vis China is based on two elements -€ “engagement” and “hedging” -€ and describes promotion of its own national interests as “the only factor that forms the basis of the US strategy in this region.” Noting he believes the US strategy has always been based on “engagement and hedging” -€ certainly not “engagement and containment” -€ the professor questions the credibility of the US view of the Chinese threat. He further points out that it is actually engagement and hedging that forms the basis of China’s strategy vis-a-vis India and Japan, emphasizing these two nations have in fact been feeling the Chinese threat most acutely.

　　　Pursuing national interests should rightly be the top priority for any nation. Therefore, accusing the US of doing so does not amount to a legitimate criticism, even if its fundamental strategy is in fact based on promotion of US national interests. And yet there clearly exist complex sentiments towards the US on the part of India’s strategic experts. I would assume that such sentiments are derived from past international incidents which caused the Indians to feel the US did not quite treat India fairly. For instance, Indians ask why the US, and the world for that matter, failed to hold China accountable when in 1962 it brazenly waged a war of aggression against India, and then provided India’s archenemy Pakistan nuclear technology. Strobe Talbot, Deputy Secretary of State under the Clinton administration, comments that India holds a grudge that “(the US) has permitted the world’s largest dictatorship (China) to own nuclear weapons while refusing to grant the world’s largest democracy (India) the same benefit.” (Japan and India: Two Democracies Ties Together; page 137-138)

　　　Conversely, India’s view of Russia is quite generous in absolute contrast to Japan’s. Against this backdrop, India has frequently proposed to Japan that Russia be added to a group of nations comprising the US, Japan, members of ASEAN, Australia, and India, in coping with China effectively, calling for greater efforts to commence a cooperative relationship with Russia.

　　　Allow me to introduce India’s view of Russia here, borrowing an explanation by Chellaney, who says he always regards the ties among India, Japan, and China as a triangular relationship, with China as the base. Stressing that the Indian and Japanese portions of the triangular will always be bigger than China’s, he reasons: “If you entice Russia to join the trio and expand the triangle into a square, there will be absolutely no possibility of China ever controlling Asia.”

Japan as India’s Trustworthy Strategic Partner

　　　Continuing to amplify on his theory, Chellaney notes: “Under such partnership enabling the three nations to watch over China -€ Russia from the north, India from the south, and Japan from the east -€ China would eventually be forced into a weaker position.” He declares there would be “absolutely no chance for China and Russia to join hands together” because, as he sees it, they are fundamentally antagonists in every sense of the word.

　　　Citing marked contrasts between Russia and China -€ such as, Russia’s low population density versus China’s high population density; Russia’s wealth of rich natural resources versus China’s insatiable hunger for natural resources; and, Russia’s abundance of land versus China’s strong appetite for more -€ Chellaney notes that Russia and China have become deeply suspicious of each other.

　　　Vladimir Putin visited India shortly after assuming the presidency in 2000, urging India to “regard China as a common security threat to Russia and India,” according to Chellaney. Japan, however, cannot possibly view Russia in the same way. There are those in Japan who do advocate greater efforts to improve Japan-Russia relations through trade to eventually resolve the problems concerning the Russian-occupied Northern Terrirtory. Tadae Takubo, JINF Deputy Director and International Affairs Professor of Kyorin University, Tokyo, is not one of them. Says Professor Takubo:

　　　“Some urge the Japanese government to make more vigorous efforts to expand economic interchange with Russia so the NorthernTerritory can be reclaimed by taking advantage of a stronger economic position vis-a-vis Russia. But I wonder if Japan is really capable of such diplomatic maneuvering under the present constitutional constraints. As you know, Article 9 of the Japanese ‘peace’ constitution makes it impossible to resort to arms should a contingency develop. Being unable to vigorously assert its territorial claim, which international law recognizes as legitimate, has diminished Japan’s diplomatic leverage in general. More than anything else, such a half-hearted posture weakens Japan’s position with China and Korea in other territorial disputes in the region.”

　　　With a shared historical perspective and common democratic values, I believe, India and Japan can be more firmly tied together in a relationship of deep affinity and mutual trust than any other two nations. As India elaborates to Japan on the merits of seeking closer ties with Russia, so I believe Japan should expound to India on the merits of dealing more positively with the US, which shares many common values with both India and Japan. I would consider it more than worthwhile to keep explaining to our Indian friends that Japan promises to be a much more useful and trustworthy strategic partner for India than Russia, and that it is a civilized nation committed to bringing peace and prosperity to its partners and neighbors.

(Translated from “Renaissance Japan” column no. 514 in the June 21, 2012 issue of The Weekly Shincho)