A number of events were held across Japan earlier this month, marking the first anniversary of the Great East Japan Earthquake and subsequent tsunami. I had a chance to attend one of them on March 10 -€ an open discussion during the “Recovery & Rebirth Forum 2012” sponsored by the Japan Junior Chamber　in Takizawa Village in Iwate Prefecture. Also present were Goshi Hosono, Minister of the Environment who concurrently is Minister for the Recovery from and Prevention of Nuclear Accidents, and Yoshifumi Tajiri, Secretary General of the Japan NPO Center.

　　　A host of reasons exist for reconstruction delays, but one emblematic example is the tremendous amount of debris still left untouched in the wake of the tsunami. True, this was a colossal natural disaster on an unprecedented scale, but it is difficult to believe that only 6 percent of an estimated 22.5 million tons of debris was cleared in the first 12 months. In appealing to local governments to help dispose of the debris, the government has explained that debris from Fukushima, where hydrogen explosions occurred in three buildings surrounding as many reactors, will be left to the prefecture and that communities across Japan are only asked to take debris from Miyagi and Iwate prefectures, which are virtually devoid of radioactive contamination. However, only Tokyo and two prefectures -€ Aomori and Yamagata -€ have so far complied.

　　　On the other hand, public opinion polls show approximately 60 percent of respondents take kindly to the government appeal for nationwide cooperation regarding debris disposal. Why, then, has disposal been stalled this much? The reason, I quite frankly suspect, boils down to a lack of competence on the part of the ruling Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), as well as the minister in charge, namely Mr. Hosono. Only when political leaders make decisions and work out a system making debris disposal possible, can restoration of Japan make headway. It is precisely such decisiveness that is logically expected of those in charge of Japanese politics.

　　　Facing such criticism during the discussion, Mr. Hosono looked obviously quite discontented, as he himself is known to have a history of dealing with matters relating to nuclear power generation. If he is unhappy because he regards not only himself and his party, but also the successive generations of Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) administrations as responsible for the sorry state of affairs, he certainly has a point there.

　　　Atsuyuki Sasa, one of Japan’s leading crisis management experts who once served as head of the Cabinet Office of Security Affairs, sharply pointed ﾂ黴€out some sobering facts about Japan’s nuclear power administration, including the lack of proper government response to the Fukushima nuclear accident. Sasa explained: “On September 1, 1974, when there was an accident involving radioactive leaks aboard the experimental nuclear-powered liner Mutsu, I was with the Security Bureau of the National Police Agency as its section chief. There was strong opposition to the Mutsu on grounds that the ship’s operation would inevitably result in radioactive proliferation of the seas. As a result, the ship’s home port -€ Mutsu City in Aomori Prefecture -€ was enveloped in an atmosphere of great disquiet as a huge number of protestors congregated from across Japan to oppose the ship’s entry.”

Make-Shift Solutions

　　　Against such a backdrop, there was a small amount of radioactive leakage during a power test conducted aboard the Mutsu on the high seas some 500 miles east of Cape Shiriya on the northeastern tip of Aomori Prefecture. The amount of radiation involved, according to Sasa, “was less than what one would be exposed to when having an X-ray taken,” while the on-line edition of the mass circulation conservative newspaper Sankei Shinbun noted the radioactivity detected was “as faint as would result from the luminous paint on the face of a wrist watch.” (October 17, 2011)

　　　In other words, the leakage was so little it should not have been called into question. In point of fact, a check with a Geiger counter at the time showed the radiation level around the Mutsu’s nuclear reactor to be less than 0.1 millisievert.

　　　Sasa, who as a police official witnessed the vivid drama of the “Mutsu incident” at the time, angrily holds Japanese political leaders responsible for having turned this scientifically negligible radioactive leak into a major tragedy for the management of Japanese nuclear power.

　　　“Practically all those concerned, especially politicians, came up with spur-of-the-moment explanations time and again in order to avoid responsibility. Because the radiation levels involved were too low to be a problem, making oceanic contamination totally unthinkable, it was the duty of our politicians and government leaders to explain the basic facts concerning the leakage painstakingly to the nation, as well as those engaged in the fisheries in and around the Mutsu area. However, they single-mindedly tried hard to avoid confrontation in view of the emotional resistance put up by the opposition camp, readily made compromises, and finally went to the extreme of lavishing public works projects as a ploy to make possible the ship’s entry into port.”

　　　Sasa at the time was a member of a round-table discussion made up of government officials and politicians involved in the Mutsu matter, but was not ranked high enough to freely state his views. However, he says he couldn’t help proposing that the National Police Agency play the thankless role of assuring the smooth entry of the Mutsu into port, this despite the strong objections of the fishing industry and the opposition parties. In turn, Sasa expected that the government would explain to the nation that the levels of the leaked radioactivity were absolutely safe and that it was determined to push ahead the Mutsu project.

　　　But Sasa was blatantly told to “shut your mouth” by the then Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary and the government began lavishing public works projects worth a total of 2 billion (US$5.6 million at the time), with LDP power broker Shin Kanemaru taking the initiative. Eventually, the Mutsu was decommissioned, an agency aimed at bringing the Mutsu project to fruition was disbanded, and the Mutsu’s home port reclaimed as land fill.

　　　“The LDP’s political leaders involved in the Mutsu project were unable to explain what they were logically obligated to,” laments Sasa. “I was concerned that they were running the risk of eventually killing the future of Japan’s atomic power industry. I genuinely worried about what would become of the LDP if its leaders remained so weak-kneed.”

　　　Successive generations of LDP administrations continued to resort to evasiveness, repeatedly coming up with make-shift “solutions.” In so doing, they miserably failed to cope squarely with the critical issues the nation was faced with, including the Mutsu project, in a systematic way as a means of fortifying Japan’s crisis management system.

　　　The JSP administration headed by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama (June 1995 -€ August 1995) behaved no differently. In January 1995, the Great Hanshin Awaji Earthquake occurred, followed by the Subway Sarin Incident two months later. At a time when the Japan Self Defense Force, police, and firefighting brigades had to work in close cooperation with experts on poison gas, bacteria, and radiation to work out truly effective countermeasures, Japan lacked a legal system to deal effectively with crises by first concentrating power in the hands of the prime minister. Although reviews of such laws and institutions were proposed, Mr. Murayama stubbornly refused to implement appropriate measures throughout his time in office, afraid such revisions would create a “coercive image” for his populist administration.

　　　Later, administrative reform was implemented under the late Prime Minister Ryotaro Hashimoto. The offices of the government and ministries were shrunk -€ to the Office of the Prime Minister and 12 ministries (previously 22), and atomic power administration underwent a distorted separation into two entities. ﾂ黴€Atomic power as an object of research and a field of learning was placed under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education, Science and Culture; meanwhile, atomic power generation as an energy-related matter came under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. In a normal nation, the military would be charged with controlling matters pertaining to nuclear power. But the Hashimoto administration was obviously as terrified of projecting a coercive image as its predecessor.

Failure to Fulfill Political Responsibilities

　　　“In every other country,” Sasa continues, “you will notice that it is the military that protects nuclear power stations. It is the military that has the authority to regulate the industry and to take the necessary actions in case of an emergency. However, by completely ignoring the crisis management aspect as it put nuclear power administration under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, as well as the Ministry of Education, Japan in effect has driven itself into a precarious position of virtually developing no crisis management capabilities. That in fact is the horrible reality of Japan today.”

　　　Obviously, not only the government party but also the opposition have failed to learn any pertinent lessons from the life-and-death crises that have befallen Japan on several occasions in the past. In fact, the DPJ failed to keep any minutes of the government response team’s meetings following the quake and tsunami; this simply means the government party did not even bother to ponder where and what went wrong in terms of the government’s handling of the disaster.

　　　During the discussion, Hosono appealed to his audience, saying: “The government is not properly equipped to deal with debris. Local governments are our only recourse. But it will take at least two years to revise the law to so direct local governments or to come up with the government’s own incinerating facilities.”

　　　I wonder if Mr. Hosono genuinely thinks the government lacks such authority. He mentioned government incinerators. But I seriously question if he is aware that already nearly 75 percent of the world’s incinerators are concentrated in Japan. Instead, he ought to be thinking in terms of taking advantage of the existing facilities rather than building new ones. In other words, what he needs to work on is the revision of laws designed to give the government the authority to issue directives beyond merely soliciting cooperation. I would think that most Japanese essentially believe that all local governments should take debris from Miyagi and Iwate -€ in amounts suiting local conditions -€ in the same way that Tokyo, Yamagata and Aomori have agreed to.

　　　However, if a handful of noisy dissenters attempt to block debris disposal despite majority consent, then the government ought to have the authority to force disposal. After all, the government is simply asking for cooperation in disposing of debris that is safe for the human body in terms of radiation levels.

　　　The DPJ already has enough seats in the Lower House to revise the pertinent laws. Although opposition parties constitute a majority in the Upper House, I see no reason why they would oppose such a revision. But the DPJ doesn’t seem to be remotely interested in bringing its political power into full play as regards debris disposal. That is why I strongly maintain that this party is not fulfilling its political responsibilities.

(Translated from “Renaissance Japan” column no. 502 in the March 15, 2012 issue of The Weekly Shincho)