With the first anniversary of the Great East Japan Earthquake just around the corner, what can we learn from this colossal, once-in-a-thousand yearﾂ黴€catastrophe? Can we make sure that the more than 19,000 victims did not die for naught, that Japan will indeed bounce back and achieve a full recovery?

　　　I have with me some document which I believe will provide some answers to these questions. Namely, the minutes from a 1968-69 Tohoku Electric Power conference which was held to determine the elevation of the site on which to build its Onagawa Nuclear Power Station (located in Miyagi Prefecture which neighbors Fukushima Prefecture).

　　　The Onagawa complex, situated far closer to the epicenter of the 3/11 quake than the Fukushima No. 1 Nuclear Power Station managed by Tokyo Electric, survived the earthquake and tsunami in good shape, even though it was subject to more violent tremors and a larger tsunami. As is widely recognized, the decisive factor that saved Onagawa was the crucial decision the company had made to choose an elevated site for the construction of its nuclear power plant.

　　　Nuclear power stations require vast amounts of coolant. Proximity to the sea makes it easier to take in and drain water, contributing to reduced costs for transportation of spent nuclear fuel rods. Building a nuclear complex on an elevated site adds many complications to the project and also greatly increases construction costs. Tohoku Electric dared decide to set the elevation of the site at 14.8 meters above sea level, with the height of all of the buildings including the reactor buildings at 15 meters at the first floor level. This decision was based on the accumulated knowledge within Tohoku Electric that any earthquakes bigger than magnitude 7.5 would necessarily trigger a gigantic tsunami.

　　　This priceless decision was made possible because experts who participated in the conference never neglected to hold nature in awe and respect, points out Tadashi Narabayashi, Professor of Nuclear Engineering at the Graduate School of Engineering of Hokkaido University.

　　　Eleven years before construction began in 1979, Tohoku Electric set up a nine-member expert committee at the company’s headquarters to explore the feasibility of constructing a nuclear power station in a coastal area. The document in my hand is the very record of the committee’s deliberations. With Hitoshi Homma, then a professor of Toyo University, at the helm, the committee comprised leading experts in such fields as seismology, civil engineering (including hydraulics, coastal engineering, and tsunami engineering), as well as geophysics.

　　　One of the committee members was the late Professor Kinjiro Kajiura of the Institute of Seismology at Tokyo University, famous for his studies of the origin and spread of tsunami. Another committee member was Seiji Horikawa, Professor at Tokyo University’s Civil Engineering Department; Horikawa is credited with having established coastal engineering as an academic field in Japan. Coastal engineering originated in the US in 1950 as a branch of civil engineering, and was introduced to Japan three years later following Typhoon No. 13, also known as the Ise Bay Typhoon, in which Japan’s central western Pacific coastal regions centering around Mie and Aichi prefectures sustained severe damage mainly from violent storm waves. Professor Horikawa was the nation’s foremost expert in this field. (Source: The Japan Academy homepage).

Laws That Govern Mother Nature and the Universe

　　　The theme of the conference attracting several of the nation’s leading experts was primarily focused on scrutiny of the geographical and social conditions of the projected nuclear power station, with effective countermeasures against tsunami uppermost in everyone’s mind. In 1958, the Onagawa area had been hit by a series of violent tsunami measuring 2.7 to 3.3 meters high during the Sanriku Earthquake, and again in 1985 by a tsunami of 3.1-meter waves in the wake of the Santiago Earthquake in Chile. Based on these precedents and what Tohoku Electric refers to as two separate equations, the company initially set the ground elevation at 15 meters, then sought experts’ counsel.

　　　The minutes show that details of past records of quakes and tsunami were frequently introduced during the deliberations. The precedents referring to the Jogan and Keicho earthquakes and accounts of experiences cited in the minutes include:

　　　― “In working out effective countermeasures against future tsunami, the coastal regions of Miyagi Prefecture should be most concerned about benchmarking earthquakes with epicenters further south than the Sanriku earthquakes of 1898 and 1933”;

　　　― “There are records of major tsunami hitting the coastal areas of Sendai Bay, in what now is Miyagi Prefecture, at the time of the Joganﾂ黴€ (869) and Keicho earthquakes (1611)”;

　　　― “Legend has it that a fishing boat was found atop a pine tree in the Iwanuma district following the Jogan earthquake; and,

　　　― “Therefore, it is necessary to particularly watch out for earthquakes occurring in locations further south.”

　　　The minutes constitute a reminder that Tohoku Electric attached particular importance to what actually had happened a long time ago. After all, the Jogan earthquake (magnitude 8.3 to 8.6) occurred in 869 during the Heian Era, while the Keicho Sanriku earthquake (magnitude 8.1) occurred in 1611 during the Edo Era. The minutes note that, through intense discussions of this nature, the committee eventually judged a 15-meter elevation appropriate for the site on which to build the nuclear power plant, and that Vice President Norio Suzuki of Tohoku Electric decided to submit that recommendation, subsequently winning the president’s approval.

　　　As March 11 amply proved, damage at the Onagawa nuclear complex was held to the minimum. The company is widely known to have opened the plant’s premises as a shelter for refugees immediately after the disaster.

　　　When discussing the Onagawa complex, those involved from Tohoku Electric unanimously repeat that they are eternally grateful to the past generations of corporate leaders for their wisdom in implementing appropriate precautionary measures. But wisdom in this case boils down to a sense of awe and respect for nature, the importance of which Prof. Narabayashi openly stresses. To hold nature in awe and respect and to deal with it sincerely is to discern the laws that govern Mother Nature and the universe; in other words, one must grapple squarely with knowledge derived from experience and willingly listening to what one may not wish to hear. Understanding the truth of things and finding ways to cope with them belongs to the realm of experts. While it is humanly impossible to prevent earthquakes and tsunami from occurring, it should definitely be possible to hold damage to the minimum -€ if we understand the rules governing all creation and honestly work out countermeasures. That is where the experts’ wisdom is needed.

　　　It is largely because the Democratic Party of Japan has not bothered to utilize the knowledge of experts that the ruling party has kept implementing incredibly unsophisticated countermeasures for nearly one full year since the very minute the tragedy struck. Former Prime Minister Naoto Kan and Chief Cabinet Secretary Yukio Edano must be held sternly accountable for the failed efforts towards a full recovery, including the failure to listen to experts. Kan and Edano’s culpability goes beyond their inability to cope effectively with the disaster during the initial stage of crisis management.

　　　A quick look at the make-up of an independent body formed June 7, 2011 under the Kan-Edano regime to investigate the Fukushima disaster -€ known as “The Investigative Commission on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Station” (hereafter, “the Commission”) -€ reveals an almost utter contempt of experts, especially those on nuclear power generation, on the part of Messrs. Kan and Edano.

Attaching Undue Importance to Those in the Judicial Field

　　　The Commission issued an interim report last December, and is expected to issue its final report this summer. Although it may be a little premature to render judgment based on the interim report, it sorely fails to bring forward substantial questions about nuclear power generation itself. This has resulted from the absence of qualified personnel capable of probing the disaster from a technical standpoint, as the commission must attempt to investigate what really happened at the Fukushima nuclear complex and why. The ten-member commission includes a radiology specialist, a former diplomat, an author, and three people in the judicial field -€ a former prosecutor, a former judge, and a lawyer. Presumably, they are all qualified individuals with significant achievements in their respective fields, but one cannot help being dismayed by the absence of one single soul well versed in the structure of a nuclear power plant, or an atomic reactor for that matter. Which makes one wonder if attaching such undue importance to people with judicial background might not have been the choice of Mr. Edano, himself a lawyer. Even so, such a choice does not necessarily appear to match the grand purposes of the Commission.

　　　Noting that hydrogen explosions occurred at reactor No. 1 at Fukushima immediately after steam was vented, followed by similar explosions at reactor No. 3, also after steam was vented twice, Prof. Narabayashi feels that a device called an “anti-pressure vent” may have had something to do with the accident. In other words, the operators at Fukushima may have vented hydrogen and steam from the primary reactor containment shell in an effort to reduce pressure within, leading to hydrogen explosions instead.

　　　The importance of venting was recognized internationally at the time of the Chernobyl accident. It subsequently became evident that the conventional design of containment shells could not sustain pressure when hydrogen and steam were vented from the shell, leading to installation of new devices which included plumbing capable of withstanding 1 megapascal (a pressure of 10 atmospheres). The problem was that, because the operators of the plant apparently failed to review the newly added functions of the atomic reactor closely enough, the precious anti-pressure vents have turned into precarious “self destructive” vents, points out Professor Narabayashi. The Commission totally fails to take notice of essential issues such as this.

　　　To investigate accidents at nuclear power plants, which can very well be viewed as the essence of the most sophisticated and specialized 21^st century technology, one cannot do without the knowledge of experts in the field. Without such knowledge, one cannot help but seriously question to what extent the Commission will be able to draw pertinent lessons for the future. Soon, it will be a full year since March 11, 2011. All of the good people of Japan must more sincerely face up to our failure in every respect -€ whosever’s fault it may be -€ and in the process gain the strength with which to go on building our future more vigorously and positively. Above all else, we must seize every opportunity to transform our incompetent politicians, who habitually shy away from resolving critical issues only to aggravate the already serious realities of today’s Japan.

(Translated from “Renaissance Japan” column no. 499 in the March 1, 2012 issue of The Weekly Shincho.)