The just published book, My Father Kim Jong-il and I:An Exclusive Confession, by Kim Jong-nam (Bungei Shunju Ltd, Tokyo), is a bona-fide scoop by Tokyo Shimbun journalist Yoji Gomi. Many of the things the eldest son of Kim Jong-il discusses in the 256-page book vividly depict the background to the thoughts and policies of the late dictator who ruled over the world’s most reclusive communist nation. Jong-nam’s observations are a stern warning -€ especially to Japan, the US, and South Korea.

　　　The author developed a personal relationship with Jong-nam after a chance meeting at Beijing Capital International Airport in 2004 while being based in the Chinese capital as a correspondent. He says he has since interviewed him three times and exchanged more than 150 emails over a seven-year period. The overall impression one gets of Jong-nam as depicted by Gomi is that of a rational man prone to viewing himself objectively -€ hardly imaginable from the image of the arrogant man who glared insolently at reporters while being deported to Beijing from Tokyo’s Narita International Airport in 2001 after failing to smuggle himself into Japan on a false passport.

　　　Jong-nam had studied in Geneva for nine years before returning home in the 1980s. Gomi quoted him as confessing that, while in Geneva, he had not particularly felt lonely, but did “feel a great sense of loneliness after completing my studies overseas and coming home to Pyongyang.” Here I discern a great sense of desolateness Jong-nam must have felt as a young man who, after having tasted the sweetness of freedom -€ mankind’s fundamental yearning -€ suddenly realized that his native land was nothing but a hopeless prison without freedom. After returning home, Jong-nam says he “did not go to school” and instead “worked closely” with his father, frequently appealing to him for the need to reform and open up North Korea, which apparently caused Kim Jong-il to watch his son with caution.

　　　Jong-nam reasons that Jong-un, his half brother and the Dear Leader’s third son, was named heir apparent because he was “faithful and had a strong sense of loyalty” to their father -€ a statement that makes one figure that Jong-il anointed his youngest son as his successor precisely because he wanted assurance that the secrets of his life would by no means be exposed after his death.

　　　Jong-nam is of the opinion that China, which had been fundamentally opposed to a hereditary transfer of power in North Korea, recognized Jong-un as successor because of China’s policy of not interfering with other nations’ internal affairs, rather than a strong desire to recognize the transfer itself.

　　　Jong-nam brushes aside the “hereditary system, which North Korea has itself chosen as a stable succession scheme” as “a farce in the modern era, something to be found only in Korea’s ancient feudal dynasties.” He takes quite a sensible view of North Korea’s policy of seeking to become a strong and prosperous big power while closing its doors, saying “I consider economics a science dictated by numbers, and I find it ridiculous to think that a place like Rason City -€ with nothing more than rocks, dirt, and marine products, and with no reform or opening up to the outside world, nor any large scale investments by the US or other western countries -€ could be built into the next Singapore.”

Pressure Against Kim Jong-nam

　　　Behind Jong-nam’s conviction advocating reform and liberalization undoubtedly lies his experience acquired in China. Living in China since 1995, he had a chance to witness the phenomenal development of Shanghai for nearly a decade. General Secretary Kim Jong-il was said to be so stunned by Shanghai’s dramatic growth as the center of the Chinese economy that he once called it “the beginning of everything.” And yet Kim kept his nation stubbornly chained shut, because as Jong-nam sees it, “he feared the threat that reform and opening up would inevitably bring.”

　　　Each piece of information concerning the outside world brings forward incontrovertible evidence of the delay in North Korea’s development and progress. Unless the government manages to keep the eyes of the general populace turned away from the truth, the legitimacy of the Kim dynasty’s three-generation heredity will immediately be brought into question. Therefore, the North Korean authorities desperately try to warp the reality -€ to prevent the people from seeing the truth, which in turn engenders a hard-line foreign policy.

　　　Jong-nam hit the nail on the head with the following interpretation of the nature of the North’s artillery bombardment of Yongbyong Island in the South in November 2010:“The incident constituted an outright provocation committed by the North Korean military to give prominence to the reasons for their existence and status, as well as the legitimacy of their possession of nuclear weapons.”

　　　General Secretary Kim Jong-il, who died detesting China and yearning for normalization of relations with the US, was determined to keep developing nuclear weapons. In this vein, Jong-nam’s analysis of North Korea is completely identical with those of us who live in a different world. He says, for instance, “North Korea derives its national power from nuclear weapons”; and “I don’t think it is easy for a country like North Korea, located in a geopolitically sensitive spot on earth and feeling its existence threatened by the outside world, to abandon nuclear weapons once and for all.”

　　　Jong-nam claims he has never met Jong-un. Summing up his wishes for the new ruler, who he says resembles their grandfather Kim Il-song, he calls on his half brother to:

　　　–inherit our late father’s great achievements and help the people live in

affluence;

　　　–make efforts to reshape North-South relations so that no Yongbyong-like incidents will ever happen again;and

　　　–conduct enlightened politics so as to create a Korean Peninsula that will contribute to the peace of Northeast Asia.

　　　Will these wishes be fulfilled? In what appeared to sound like some wishful thinking, Jong-nam told Gomi in an earlier email that he believed Jong-un was “big-hearted enough to heed his brother’s sincere advice.” But his tone clearly changed when he said in a later email: “I really have no intention of contending with a party who obviously lacks the bigness of mind with which to listen to my sincere suggestions and advice.”

　　　Jong-nam sent this particular email in April 2011 when, in the wake of the major incidents that the North had caused the previous year -€ the sinking of the South Korean patrol boat Cheonan in March and bombardment of Yongbyong Island in November -€ the international community had begun casting an increasingly colder eye on North Korea, with Pyongyang leaning towards a harder line, unable to get out of the impasse. From the emails Jong-nam sent Gomi later, it can easily be assumed that pressure against him would have intensified with the passage of time for transmitting from overseas information the North Korean leadership would deem offensive, such as:

　　　・“As always, Pyongyang continues to keep a close watch
　　　　over me”;

　　　・“The present situation makes it personally disadvantageous
　　　　for me to be exposed to the mass media”;

　　　・“At any rate, I would like for you to refrain from reporting
　　　　on me for the time being. I beg of you for my own
　　　　security as well as that of my family”
　　　　(dated June 2, 2011);and

　　　・“There is also the possibility of the North regime putting
　　　　me in jeopardy.”

　　　　(dated December 31, 2011)

　　　The last entry is a fresh reminder that Jong-nam finds himself in a fierce battle in which, even though North Korea’s young successor is his own brother, his life may very well be at stake.

Regression of History

　　　Gomi predicts China will persuade Jong-nam -€ a staunch advocate of reform and opening up -€ to take over the reins in North Korea when the Kim Jong-un regime comes to an end, which Beijing sees as inevitable. The minute the regime in the North collapses, the US, South Korea, China, and Russia will employ various strategies trying desperately to shape a new future for the Korean Peninsula. Anything is possible. The only thing that can be said for sure at this juncture is that no nation on earth wants a North Korea intent on taking a tougher line while forging ahead undauntedly with nuclear weapon development.

　　　When the North Korean system shakes to its foundation, perhaps the best scheme will be for the North to take the first step forward towards a peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula based on freedom and democracy, with the South taking the leadership. South Korea stands at the most critical crossroads in its history, a period which will determine whether or not the Peninsula can move towards reunification.

　　　In point of fact, however, an incredible regression of history is being witnessed in the South today. On January 15, the leading opposition Democratic United Party (DUP) elected as its leader Ms Han Myeong-sook, who served as South Korea’s first female prime minister under the late President Roh Moo-hyun. Ms Han is known to have devoted her whole life to promotion of left-wing movements in the South along with her husband.

　　　The “economic democratization” policy Ms Han advocates reflects outright hostility towards big businesses, as well as promotion of welfare over growth by acting as an ally of the have-nots. Her political creed is distinctly pro-Pyongyang.

　　　Typically, when North Korea declared itself in possession of nuclear weapons in 2005, Han defended Pyongyang by remarking “the North has national interests of its own.” She again came to the defense of the North the following year when it went ahead with a nuclear test, emphasizing that “one factor that drove the North to the test was international pressure, including financial sanctions by the US.”

　　　Kim Jong-nam, who knows the reality of North Korea better than anyone else, clearly wishes to guide the out-and-out hard-line dictatorship towards reform and opening up -€ an idea even China has endorsed. If, against such a backdrop, South Korea -€ best suited to induce the North towards an open society -€ were to make a rapid turn to the left in an effort to become the second North Korea, this would indeed be a grand irony of history.

(Translated from “Renaissance Japan” column no. 495 in the February 2, 2012 issue of The Weekly Shincho.)