For someone who has assumed the office of the prime minister, Yoshihiko Noda is alarmingly ill-prepared to deal with the rapidly changing geo-political situation in the Asia-Pacific region. And yet he has scheduled a series of rapid year-end summit talks with his counterparts in South Korea, China, and India, while hoping to meet with US President Barack Obama sometime in early 2012. Was he -€ or will he be -€ amply prepared and ready for these high-level discussions? Far from it, judging from the grossly disappointing results of the talks he had with South Korean President Lee Myung-bak in Kyoto December 17-18.

　　　In South Korea, a civic activists’ body demanding the Japanese apologize to and compensate Korean “comfort women” (“the Korean Council for Women Drafted for Sexual Slavery by Japan”) erected a bronze monument on December 14 in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul symbolizing the alleged Korean victims of sexual exploitation by the Imperial Japanese armed forces. The Japanese Foreign Ministry had failed to block its erection. Less than four months earlier, on August 30 to be specific, South Korea’s Constitutional Court had ruled illegal the government’s failure to take concrete measures to resolve the “comfort women” issue. On October 11, the South Korean government took up the issue at the Third Committee of the United Nations General Assembly (known also as “the Human Rights Committee”), urging all of the UN member nations to make efforts towards helping and compensating victims of war-time sexual violence.

　　　On October 18, against such a backdrop and with South Korea further abuzz with the possibility of a currency crisis, Prime Minister Noda visited Seoul for a summit with his Korean counterpart. During his stay, Noda committed Japan to a support mechanism under which it would expand its bilateral emergency swap arrangement with South Korea to US$70 billion (more than a 500% increase over the current ceiling of US$13 billion). In an additional effort to smooth over prickly ties between Tokyo and Seoul, Noda hand-carried to President Lee several volumes of looted historic Korean royal texts traceable to the Joseon Dynasty, which ruled the Korean Peninsula from 1392 to 1910. These texts were taken out of the country during the 35-year Japanese colonial rule (1910-1945). By taking these actions, it appears Noda was attempting to improve Japan’s relations with South Korea by building a personal relationship of trust with Lee, rather than by objectively analyzing the geopolitical relationship that exists between the two countries.

　　　How fragile such a personal relationship of trust can be was duly proven during the Japan-South Korea summit held in Kyoto in December. President Park devoted some 40 minutes of the one-hour meeting to discussing the “comfort women” issue, warning:“Without sincere action from Japan, second and third statues will be erected.” How could President Park possibly make such a statement, which was discourteous to say the least, as it represented a blatant show of populism which totally disregarded the bilateral treaty signed in 1965 when the two nations normalized diplomatic relations. That treaty determined that all of the old scores, including the “comfort women” issue, were formally settled. As the prime minister of Japan, Noda was reported to have resolutely brushed aside the issue in question as having been resolved long ago. However, he committed the government to appeasing South Korea one way or another in the future when he told Lee that Japan would continue to make efforts from “a humanitarian standpoint.”

　　　The significance of the Japan-South Korea summit in December 2011 should first and foremost have been to discuss how the two nations can broadly cooperate with each other in dealing with China, which continues to forge ahead with a reckless and aggressive foreign policy in the region. Also, Noda should have concentrated on exploring ways to implement closer teamwork between Japan, the US, and South Korea vis a vis the situation in North Korea. Sadly, however, the Noda-Lee summit was mostly spent on discussing the “comfort women” issue, failing to tackle these more critical issues.

Terrible Blunder by Noda

　　　Not only did the Foreign Ministry and the Prime Minister’s Office fail to understand the true intentions of the South Korean government regarding the “comfort women issue,” they also failed to come to grips with a historic view on how the matter has evolved. The root cause of Noda’s terrible blunder was his decision to face the summit with Lee with naive expectations of the merit of the “relationship of trust” he thought he had been able to build, while neglecting to properly analyze the situation or sort out the Korean points of contention.

　　　Actually, the problem began in January 2005 when the South Korean government under then President Roh Moo-hyun released the minutes of the negotiations leading up to the signing of 1965 Treaty of Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea. Explains Professor Tsutomu Nishioka of Tokyo Christian University, who serves as a member of the Planning Committee of the Japan Institute of National Fundamentals (JINF), a private Tokyo think tank which I head:

　　　“A joint government-private sector commission was set up in South Korea to examine the diplomatic documents that had just been released, with then Prime Minister Lee Hae-chan chairing it. The leader of the pro-Pyongyang civic activists’ body -€ the People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD) -€ served as one of the commission’s members, and the conclusion they drew was:Matters pertaining to the requisitioning of goods and materials, as well as the conscription of Korean citizens, were discussed during the two-nation negotiations, but that ‘illegal and unhumanitarian matters, including the exploitation of comfort women,’ were not. Therefore, the commission concluded that Japanese responsibilities for these matters must continue to be pursued. Matters pertaining to the ‘comfort women’ were not taken up during the lengthy diplomatic negotiations simply because everybody including Korean negotiators was fully aware at that time there had been no proven coercion by the Japanese military. However, President Roh, who put his heart and soul into carrying out a flagrant anti-Japanese policy, adroitly appealed to populism to induce the issue to become a matter for which the Japanese government was held responsible years after relations between the two nations were normalized. This, I believe, eventually led to the ruling by the Constitutional Court last August.”

　　　Despite the fact that it was clearly in a position to fully brief Noda and Foreign Minister Koichiro Genba on this background, the Foreign Ministry blatantly failed to fulfill its responsibility. Here lies the reason why Noda found himself in the sorry position of allowing President Lee to rattle away with his assertions about the “comfort women,” instead of simply stating that this matter “has already been formally settled.” The summit would be meaningless, unless Noda was able to respond gently, objectively, and without undue compromise to the stance taken by the South Koreans.

　　　Kim Jong-il’s death was announced immediately after the Japan-South Korea summit in Kyoto. At that electric moment on December 19, Noda was scheduled to speak together with other members of his cabinet, including the popular minister of government revitalization, Ms Renho, at a busy station plaza in Shinbashi, central Tokyo, obviously to try and raise his cabinet’s fast declining approval rating. The Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office (CIRO) had already informed the Prime Minister’s Office that a “special broadcast” would be made in Pyongyang at noon that day, while the Foreign Ministry had sent word that this “special announcement” would be extremely important in that it would be the first from the North since the death of Kim Il-sung in1994. These pieces of information had swiftly been delivered to Noda. And yet the prime minister left his official residence for his scheduled street corner oratory, only to rush back to his office upon hearing about Kim’s death. It was indeed a terrible blunder by the prime minister. Does Mr. Noda really think speaking on street corners is one of the essential tasks for him as prime minister? If he truly intends to get his message across to the general populace, he can always select the proper means, such as by properly conducting press interviews on a regular basis.

　　　After rushing back to his office, Noda convened the National Security Council at 1 p.m. Obviously, there were a number of pertinent issues to discuss, such as:

　　　・Can the successor to the North Korean dictator -€ his third son who is young (in his late twenties) and inexperienced -€ command the loyalty of the North Korean military and alleviate the people’s hunger?

　　　・How will the new leader read the danger of a mass exodus of refugees from North Korea in an emergency?

　　　・How will North Korea deal with China? China has not quite forgotten its history -€ one marked by the crumbling of several of its dynasties as a direct or indirect result of emergencies on the Korean Peninsula, including the Sino-Japanese war. Therefore, China will be sure to take every possible measure to control North Korea after the death of Kim Jong-il, viewing it as a battle with its national destiny at stake.

　　　・How should Japan cope with these anticipated Chinese actions?

　　　・How should North Korea’s nuclear arms, as well as the chemical and biological weapons all of the units of the North Korean armed forces are said to possess, be contained?

　　　・If an emergency develops on the Korean Peninsula, the US will be expected to move quickly -€ before the UN reaches a resolution -€ to contain all of the nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons in the North before China tries to take preemptive action. How should Japan support the American and South Korean armed forces if they swing into action? Should Japan act together with them? In that case, what legal measures should Japan take?

Ten-Minute Session of the National Security Conference

　　　・As concerns the most critical issue of rescue of the Japanese abductees, how can their whereabouts in the North be confirmed? Would it be possible to dispatch teams of rescuers to where they are presumably allowed to live ? (Euphemistically called “invitees’ quarters,” these sites are actually tantamount to concentration camps run by the Workers’ Party of North Korea.)

　　　・What Japanese personnel should be ordered to accompany US and Korean troops if they march into the North? Will they be Japanese Self Defense Force troops, or other forces replacing them? Japan should align itself with South Korea to the maximum degree possible to support a democratic reunification of the peninsula under South Korean leadership.

　　　In that case, what constitutes the most effective and useful support that Japan could provide South Korea? Also, how should Japan cooperate with the US forces?

　　　Obviously, there is a lot for the Japanese government to think about. Also, many tough decisions must be made in preparation for a possible emergency situation on the Korean Peninsula. In this vein, the National Security Conference is definitely the right venue to debate these topics thoroughly.

　　　However, its December 19 session actually lasted only ten minutes. What critical issues could the attendees -€ the most powerful ministers of the DPJ cabinet -€ have discussed in such a short span of time? Besides Noda, there were Defense Minister Yasuo Ichikawa, Finance Minister Jun Azumi, Trade Minister Yukio Edano, and Chief Cabinet Secretary Osamu Fujimura, among others.

　　　It is truly appalling that, when these most important members of the cabinet got together, faced with the possibility of seeing a drastic historic change on the Korean Peninsula, not even one of them obviously had anything substantial to discuss. That is the chilling truth about the ten-minute conference -€ proof that the Noda administration is almost completely devoid of substance.

　　　In the midst of these sorry circumstances, Noda was next headed for China and India, and will soon be en route to Washington, D.C. Unless he makes up his mind to rouse himself to action and put his political life at stake, I am afraid the diplomacy pursued by Noda’s administration will run the risk of allowing China to cajole Japan into playing into its hands rather easily. Under the present circumstances, Japan will not be able to live up to the expectations of India and the US, among other nations. The only appreciable accomplishment achieved by the Noda administration since coming to power last September is its decision to modify Japan’s rigid ban on arms exports, which will have important political and economic bearings on the nation. If he is sincere in his desire to survive 2012 and conduct valid politics, he will have no alternative but to take the lead in transforming Japan into a self-respecting power by giving up on his futile effort towards seeking intra-party harmony within the DPJ and giving his own principles concrete form.

(Translated from “Renaissance Japan” column no.492 in the January 5-12 combined issue of The Weekly Shincho.)