There is a country that has become rare among the nations of the world in terms of being detached from reality and weak, so afraid of the controversies before one’s eyes that no one will say what needs to be said. That country is Japan. If this wall of fiction is not broken, then Japan’s future will not be bright. This in essence was how Kevin Maher described Japan on his recent visit to Tokyo.

　　　Maher is the former Director of the Office of Japan Affairs of the U.S. State Department of State. He directed “Operation Tomodachi” after the March 11 Great East Japan Earthquake. After joining the State Department in 1981, he had 30 years of experience as an expert on Japan, having seen 19 different prime ministers and their administrations -€ from Zenko Suzuki of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to Yoshihiko Noda of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ).

　　　In March of this year, Maher, who had previously been Consul General in Japan‘s southernmost prefecture of Okinawa, where anti-base sentiments runs high, was removed from his post as Japan Office Director for allegedly stating that “Okinawans are master of deception and lazy,” according to a Kyodo News report. However, he denies that he made such statements and says the Kyodo report is false.

　　　Maher, on a visit to Japan to promote his new book, The Japan That Cannot Decide (Bungei Shunju Ltd.; August 2011), recently spoke in Japanese for two and a half hours at the Japan Institute for National Fundamentals (JINF), a private Tokyo think tank which I head.

　　　Maher observed:“It appears to me that in Japan, the so-called ‘shiki-sha’ (intelligentsia), as well as members of the Diet and representatives of local governments, regard it as a good thing that they lack knowledge about domestic and international security, and generally consider it a wise policy not to explain what Japan’s security is about. Throughout my career as a Japan specialist, I never ceased to be stunned by such a timid approach to so vital an issue as their nation’s security by Japanese politicians and bureaucrats.”

　　　Maher, assigned to the Political-Military Affairs section of the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo from 1989 to1992, stressed he had repeatedly and painstakingly attempted to explain to officials of the Japanese Foreign Ministry the purpose, background, and details of U.S. military training conducted on Japanese soil. Unfortunately, his explanations went nowhere. Opposition parties, such as the Japan Socialist Party, denounced the government for allowing the U.S. military to engage in drills on Japanese soil. Both the government and bureaucracy hid behind the skirts of the U.S. military, claiming Japan “had no way to know about the operational matters of the U.S. armed forces.”

　　　“Repeatedly, I protested to Japanese officials, demanding to know why the Japanese government always failed to explain the significance of such training in Diet deliberations,” Maher continued. “But Foreign Ministry officials only replied: ‘If we dare explain, the opposition will be sure to ask more questions, which will make it necessary for us to explain still further. In any case, it is practically impossible to convince opposition members.’ These officials avoided responsibility.”

Failure to Face up to the Reality Confronting Japan

　　　“Since those days, different administrations have come and gone in Japan,” noted Maher. “In July 2009, two months before the DPJ took power, their victory was plainly predictable. On my way back to Washington, D.C. at the end of the three years (2006-2009) as U.S. Consul-General in Okinawa, I stopped over in Tokyo to lecture a group of some 15 members of the DPJ and the People’s New Party who said they were interested in security matters. What I discussed that day was very basic matters relating to the U.S.-Japan security alliance and the military.

　　　“And yet, all of them were vigorously taking notes. In view of their posture and the nature of their questions, I came to feel how naive they were about security in general and the U.S.-Japan security arrangement in particular. I honestly felt it was a little frightening to have these people at the helm of state very soon with so little security expertise.”

　　　According to Maher, the LDP, which had ruled post-war Japan for 54 years until defeated by the DPJ in 2009, understood the nation’s security problems but was not willing to directly face up to them. How much the DPJ really understands the problems remains uncertain. To be blunt, Maher feels ignorance about security on the part of the Japanese -€ especially politicians and bureaucrats -€ is born from a propensity to avoid controversy, as well as their reluctance to face up to reality.

　　　“Japanese officials and politicians try desperately to avoid in-depth discussions about the U.S. force’s training and exercises in Japan, not to speak of the overall U.S.-Japan security arrangement,” said Maher. “Without bothering to discuss why the U.S.-Japan security alliance and the U.S. bases in Japan are necessary, they blame the U.S. for everything. None of the Foreign Ministry bureaucrats, as well as politicians, want to explain what their nation’s security is all about, because explanation engenders responsibility. None of them wish to be held accountable. If this situation prevails in Japan in the future, I am afraid there will be virtually no chance for the Japanese government and the Japanese people to deepen understand of Japan’s security situation, to which the U.S. is genuinely committed.”

　　　The U.S. government’s dissatisfaction grew stronger over the Japanese government’s stance of evading responsibility, including in settling the issue of moving the Futennma Marine Corps Air Station to Henoko, a less congested area some 40 kilometers to the northeast, which the U.S. and Japan agreed on in 2006.

　　　Maher revealed that former U.S. Ambassador Tom Schieffer, who he said shared his criticism of Japan’s shirking of responsibility on security, urged him to stand up to controversy and tell the truth during his three years as U.S. Consul-General in Okinawa. Heeding Schieffer’s advice, Maher held monthly press conferences and briefed the media candidly on his views.

　　　“Ambassador Schieffer told me he will assume full responsibility if my official remarks drew complaints from Washington. It was very easy and wonderful to work under him. This was a major difference from the incumbent ambassador, John Roos, who I think behaved as though he were afraid of press reports.”

　　　Many of Maher’s public remarks were straightforward and to the point, markedly different from those by Japanese officials, who assumed a “do nothing, peace at any price” posture. But then, Maher’s statements were frequently reported by Okinawa’s two major dailies -€ The Okinawa Times and The Ryukyu Shinpo -€ as “slips of the tongue.” But Maher stresses they were “intentional remarks intended to make the press and people think” seriously about Japan’s security.

　　　For example, Maher argued that if the U.S. military base realignment plan in Japan is implemented as scheduled, land used by the U.S. forces in Okinawa will shrink from 19 percent to 12 percent, resulting in extensive land returns. In line with this, he tried to persuade people that, instead of trivializing the realignment plan as just limited to the Futenma problem, it is important for the plan to move forward. However, even today both Okinawa and the Japanese government continue to argue as if the Futenma problem is a special case.

The Foremost Line of Defense for Japan

　　　Maher pointed to a great contradiction involving Futenma Air Base. An air base next to an elementary school right in the center of a heavily congested city is not preferable, but he noted there were no school nearby and only a few houses nearby when the base was opened in 1945. He further noted that it was Ginowan City, which hosts Futenma Air Base, that originally approved later construction of nearby houses and even a school right next to the base. After a Marine helicopter had crashed into a nearby university campus in August 2004, there was a plan floated to relocate the school due to concerns about ﾂ黴€safety, but the then Mayor Yoichi Iha opposed the relocation, Maher pointed out. Maher wonders whether the mayor wanted to utilize the elementary school as a tool in a struggle against U.S. bases in Okinawa. The two major Okinawa dailies seldom report this possibility. Nor do Diet members representing Okinawa refer to the situation. The Okinawan media appear uninterested in fair arguments.

　　　Facing the ever expanding Chinese military threat, Maher believes, Japanese politicians must earnestly discuss the importance of the U.S.-Japan security alliance, as well as the significance of U.S. military realignment. By making sure to concentrate on solid facts, they must resolutely explain to the Japanese general public that, whether they like it or not, the foremost frontline of defense for Japan is the Ryukyu (also known as “Nansei”) Islands -€ an arch of islands stretching from south of Kagoshima Prefecture towards Taiwan .

　　　Maher added: “Realistically speaking, there are only two options left for Futenma -€ either the air base in question is transferred to Henoko based on the bilateral agreement, or stays forever fixed where it has been since the end of World War II. U.S. Marines are the only mobile land force of all the U.S. military units deployed in East Asia and the Western Pacific. They constitute the greatest deterrence because of their mobility. Their fortitude having been tested time and again around the world, the Marines are a symbol of America’s unyielding commitment to the defense of Japan.

　　　“The Marines cannot train satisfactorily unless their air units, ground forces, and combat logistic forces can train together in the same ranges. Training without integration is meaningless. Although the first DJP administration of Yukio Hatoyama, obviously valuing political theory over military, declared it would move the base off Okinawa, I told the Japanese side in May 2010 in no uncertain terms to relay a message to Prime Minister Hatoyama that, as long as I remain the State Department’s Director of Japan Affairs, there is absolutely no intention whatsoever of sacrificing young American Marines’ lives for the sake of Japanese domestic politics.”

　　　I am convinced that Maher’s argument as regards Futenma Air Base, as well as the security of the whole of Japan, is fair and sensible.

　　　Can the current administration of Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda, the third DPJ administration in slightly over two years, take seriously Maher’s argument concerning Futenma and Japan’s overall security, and act on it -€ something that the LDP failed to implement and Noda’s two DPJ predecessors apparently did not even think about?

　　　Only abandoning past measures -€ essentially ploys to pacify Okinawans -€ will protect Japan’s security. I believe this is Maher’s message. This former U.S. diplomat genuinely loves and respects Japan, its people, and its culture, and firmly believes the United States and Japan have a mutually beneficial future together.

(Translated from “Renaissance Japan” column no. 481 in the October 20, 2011 issue of The Weekly Shincho.)