Top Priority for Japan’s New Prime Minister: Reconstruction of Northeastern Japan and Development of Anti-Disaster Infrastructure
An editorial headlined “Next, Mr. Noda” was carried in the September 6 edition of the International Herald Tribune. It was written with a dispassionate eye on the Japanese political scene, which has seen prime ministers change in too rapid succession - 13 of them in the last 18 years.
Given the host of daunting problems which the country faces, this is really no time to be leisurely reshuffling key government and party personnel in an “intraparty reconciliation” scheme aimed at allowing party members to lick each other’s wounds sustained during the fierce infighting leading up to Noda’s nomination. The new prime minister must instead immediately tackle critical issues related not only to the recovery of eastern Japan following the March 11 Great East Japan Earthquake, but also to foreign relations and national and international security.
Now that Japanese experts point to a drastically increased probability of gigantic earthquakes hitting a wide stretch of Japan’s heavily populated areas on the central Pacific coast from Tokyo to the western regions as an after effect of the March 11 quake, it is crucial for the government to develop a solid anti-disaster infrastructure to minimize damage. Professor Satoshi Fujii of Kyoto University, a city planning expert who published Strengthening the Archipelago (Bungei Shunju Ltd.,Tokyo; May 2011) two months after the March 11 quake, has spoken out on this issue.
“The March 11 quake,” says Prof. Fujii, “sends an important message. Viewed scientifically, as a large number of seismological experts point out, the chances of devastating earthquakes occurring in the Pacific in the Tokai, Tonankai, and Nankai seas off the Pacific coast are unavoidable. The more we learn how all of the colossal earthquakes that had previously struck various regions of the Japanese archipelago actually led to equally massive quakes in other regions, the less can we find a rational ground on which to deny the possibilities of big earthquakes happening right in the Tokyo area as well as the western regions of the central coast. I believe it can safely be concluded that there is a 75% probability that earthquakes of more than magnitude 8 that hit Japan’s Pacific northeast coast during the past 2,000 years were interconnected with big earthquakes that later hit the western regions of the central coast. And when it comes to the Tokyo area, we are indeed 100% certain of the connection.”
Prof. Fujii made these assertions with surprising clarity. Of course, no one can say for sure what happened before will definitely happen again exactly in the same fashion. And yet, we should at least try to learn on what scale and in what time frame the great earthquakes of the past were interconnected with each other.
Nine years after the “Jogan” earthquake (believed to have been magnitude 8.3 to 8.3) struck northeastern Japan in 869, the “Sagami-Musashi” earthquake (magnitude 7.4) hit Tokyo and the surrounding area, i.e., Sagami and Musashi. Eighteen years later in 887, the “Ninna” earthquake (magnitude 8.0-8.3) occurred in the Tokai and Tonankai regions (the regions running roughly from Nagoya to Osaka).
Revitalization of Japan’s Economy Must Take Precedence
In 1611, the “Keicho Sanriku ” earthquake (magnitude 8.1) occurred off Japan’s Pacific northeast coast in about the same region damaged by the March 11 quake - with the “Keicho Edo” earthquake (magnitude 6.5) four years later hitting populous areas of Edo (present-day Tokyo) and the surrounding area. Six years prior to the “Keicho Sanriku” quake, in 1605, the “Keicho Edo” earthquake (magnitude 7.9-8.0) had hit the western regions of the central coast, i.e., the Tokai, Tonankai, and Nankai regions.
In 1896, the “Meiji Sanriku” earthquake (magnitude 8.2-8.5) occurred on the northeast coast; two years earlier the “Meiji Tokyo” earthquake (magnitude 7) had hit Tokyo and Kanagawa Prefecture, including Yokohama. The “Great Western Japan Earthquake,” believed to have been interconnected with the “Meiji Sanriku” earthquake, happened some 40 years later. However, experts’ opinions are divided on whether or not this particular quake should be viewed as related to the “Meiji Sanriku” quake.
Then in 1933, a magnitude 8.2-8.3 earthquake - the “Showa Sanriku” earthquake - again struck the northeast, with a number of areas along the eastern and western regions of the central coast hit by equally strong earthquakes before and after. The one that hit the eastern region 10 years before the “Showa Sanriku” quake was the Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923, registering a magnitude of 7.9; the ones that hit the western region 11 years later in 1944 were the “Nantokai” earthquake (magnitude 7.9, July) and the “Showa Nankai/Tonankai” earthquake (magnitude 8.0, December).
A chart indicating the years in which these deadly earthquakes occurred shows that big earthquakes have attacked regions within a 150-kilometer (93-mile) radius from Tokyo in a maximum cycle of ten years before or after the four big “east Japan” earthquakes in Japan’s Pacific northeastern coast. Meanwhile, in the western regions, powerful earthquakes have occurred in a maximum cycle of 18 years, with the exception of the “Meiji Sanriku” quake. Notes Prof. Fujii:
“History shows great earthquakes have occurred quite sequentially. Therefore, I believe it reasonable to regard the Great East Japan Earthquake - magnitude 9 and considered probably the most massive quake that ever hit Japan - as being interconnected with big earthquakes expected to hit Tokyo and the surrounding area, as well as the western regions, in the not too distant future. Of course, we all hope nothing of the sort will ever take place. However, if the harsh possibility of devastating earthquakes hitting Japan sometime in the future cannot be denied, the Noda administration has the responsibility to not turn its eyes away from such a reality and immediately make all necessary provisions with the worst case scenario in mind.”
The earth’s surface is covered by 14 rock beds called “plates,” each as thick as 100 kilometers (some 60 miles); the Japanese archipelago sits on the boundaries formed by four of these plates. The plate moves several centimeters (1 or 2 inches) every year, creating deformations on the earth’s crust, which intensify gradually. Then, after a certain lapse of time, the intensified deformation in the plate abruptly releases stress thus accumulated within, causing earthquakes and tsunamis.
While it is not humanly possible to prevent such massive natural calamities from happening, human wisdom can make it possible to minimize damage. Prof. Fujii advocates an eight-point, ten-year program divided in two phases to re-strengthen and revitalize Japan. He proposes that the first five years be spent primarily on post-quake revitalization of the Pacific northeast coast, using the rejuvenation scheme to enrich the land and forge economic growth. The next five years would then be devoted to re-strengthening the entire archipelago on the basis of the success expected to be achieved during the first five years.
Prof. Fujii’s eight points start with a proposal to solidify “disaster prevention/disaster reduction” infrastructure, and includes the need to share risk awareness in preparation for future contingencies, regeneration of local communities, maintenance of a sustainable energy system, and guarantees to sustain lucrative and vigorous economic activities on the part of Japanese corporations. However, to cope effectively with these potential disasters across Japan, it is undeniable that vast funds will be needed in terms of both hardware and software. That makes nation-wide economic revitalization absolutely mandatory. The administration of Mr. Naoto Kan, Noda’s predecessor, failed to mete out even a basic policy for the recovery of Fukushima and the neighboring prefectures. The new prime minister has a marathon task in store for him, as his administration must rebuild and rejuvenate the Pacific northeast coast, while at the same time creating a state capable of effectively dealing with future disasters. There are a good many reasons for concern, however.
The series of programs Noda envisions will certainly be tough to implement without being backed by vigorous economic growth. The DPJ has so far managed to secure a recovery budget of more than 6 trillion (US$77 billion) as it struggled through the first and second supplementary budgets for 2011, but this is only the beginning. The Noda administration expects the post-quake recovery to require 19 trillion (US$244 billion) over the next five years, reportedly hoping to provide for the remaining 13 trillion (US$167 billion) in a third supplementary budget. Even financing this amount, which itself looks hardly sufficient, is a matter of the most serious concern. The new prime minister has indicated that he would obtain the required funds through such measures as reduction of annual expenditures, temporary tax increases, and non-tax revenues resulting from the sale of government assets, including stocks.
Mistaken Financial Policy
But are there indeed any realistic prospects for the proposed reduction of annual expenditures to succeed? After all, the DPJ staged budget cutting shows to big fanfare when it came to power in 2009, claiming it would easily secure more than 16 trillion (US$205 billion) by reducing wasteful tax expenditures, but so far it has succeeded in securing only about one-tenth the promised amount.
As for temporary tax increases, I have no objection to implementingツ黴them in the name of restoring financial discipline. However, is now truly the right time to increase corporate and other taxes? Wouldn’t the proposed tax hikes cause economic activity to shrink, rather than expand? Let us look at some numbers that show how much the Japanese economy has lagged behind under the direction of the Ministry of Finance.
In 1990, Japan accounted for 14.3% of the world’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), constituting the second biggest economic power, but that figure dropped to 8.9% in 2008. Until 2010, Japan remained the world’s second largest economic power, but was surpassed by China that year. In 2000, Japan’s per capital GDP was ranked third in the world, but fell to 23rd place in 2008. Also, in terms of global competitiveness, Japan was ranked first in the 1990 World Competitiveness Yearbook published by the International Institute for Management Development (IMD), headquartered in Lausanne, Switzerland. By 2010, Japan fell to 27th place. This stunning retrogression is not attributable to the shrinkage of the Japanese economy, per se. Rather, it is because the economies of other nations have grown by leaps and bounds over this period. While Japan sat idly by, unable to achieve marked growth, other nations steadily gained strength.
But why has this sorry state of affairs come about? There obviously are a host of plausible reasons, but I can only attribute it to the mistaken economic and financial policies forged and pursued by the Japanese government - the Ministry of Finance, to call a spade a spade. At present, the government is toying with corporate tax hikes. However, Japanese corporations are already burdened with high tax rates and are panting under the additional heavy load of an extremely strong yen, with no prospects of tax cuts in sight. If this situation remains unchanged for too long, they may just pack up and leave for new operational bases overseas, refusing to pay high taxes which the state plans to levy to finance post-quake reconstruction.
The government should instead introduce a taxation system which enables Japanese corporations to compete with foreign corporations on an equal footing. Rather than seeing them flee overseas, a system of preferential treatment should be created, enticing Japanese corporations to expand their operations into local communities across Japan, thus enabling them to prosper in tandem with serious-minded, high-quality local workers. If the new administration is unable to take charge of its own economic and financial policies and, instead, continues to expect the bureaucrats at the Ministry of Finance to take the initiative, I am afraid both the recovery of Japan’s Pacific northeast coast and the broader rejuvenation of Japan will indeed be difficult.
(Translated from “Renaissance Japan” column no. 476 in the September 15, 2011 issue of The Weekly Shincho.)