The 44-minute video footage of the so-called “Senkaku Incident,” leaked through YouTube on November 4, was quite dramatic. The footage depicts the 166-ton Chinese trawler Minjinyu 5179 first throwing its weight against the Mizuki, a 195-ton Japan Coast Guard (JCG), then accelerating and ramming directly into the Yonakuni, a 1,300-ton JCG patrol ship – contrary to the Chinese claim that the JCG ships caused the collision. The movement of the video camera up and down as the patrol boat belched black smoke from its stern and its sirens wailed, showed the Yonakuni pitching wildly when hit during a desperate effort to keep the trawler at arm’s length.

　　　In quite a shocking manner, the clips allowed viewers to come to grips with how dangerously difficult the daily patrol duties of the JCG are, while  ordinary Japanese do not have the least idea what it is like to be assigned to the task of protecting Japanese territorial waters. The clips also enabled the viewers to comprehend that Japanese territorial waters, as well as the thousands of isolated islands, are protected thanks to the selfless and strenuous efforts by the men and women of the JCG and the Maritime Self Defense Forces. Furthermore, the video unmistakably demonstrated the willful and violent act of provocation on the part of the Chinese trawler, thus proving totally unsubstantiated China’s outlandish claim, once and for all, that it was “the JCG patrol ships that encircled and slammed” into the Chinese vessel.

　　　However, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshito Sengoku reacted to the video leak by ordering a hunt for the culprit, further referring to the need to strengthen the laws covering protection of sensitive national security information on November 8. The government then grudgingly decided to show a six-minute, condensed version of the video to a small audience made up primarily of members of the Lower House Budget Committee; representatives of the press were excluded. A six-minute, behind-the-doors release of footage of the incident can only be termed as a complete farce compared to the “44 minutes of truth” which most Japanese are aware of now.

　　　The loose management of information which led to such a serious leak must be thoroughly investigated, but prior to that the government must by all means explain to the nation why it made the decision not to make the video public in the first place.

　　　The government has repeatedly stated that the video could not be shown publicly because it constitutes evidence in an on-going investigation against the captain of the Chinese trawler. But the captain, held initially on suspicion of violating Japanese territorial waters as well as obstructing JCG officers in the performance of their official duties, has since been prematurely released under mounting pressure from China. Although Article 47 of the Japanese criminal procedure law stipulates that documentary evidence “should not be made public before a trial,” it also states that this principle does not necessarily apply when “the public interest” is involved.

　　　If the government continues to refuse to release the video to the public, despite the fact that an overwhelming majority of Japanese strongly desire to view it, then Prime Minister Naoto Kan and Chief Cabinet Secretary Sengoku owe an explanation as to how and why making the video public is not in Japan’s public and national interests. Needless to say, Messrs. Kan and Sengoku have yet to make such an explanation. If and when the video is released, it appears plain that the public will seriously question why the government released the captain without pressing charges when the clips show beyond all doubt that he is guilty. Aren’t Messrs. Kan and Sengoku simply trying to avoid political responsibility by refusing to release the video?

They Just Aren’t Willing to Learn

　　　Since November 8, when a criminal investigation was launched into the leak of the collision video, words of encouragement have been pouring into the JCG from all over Japan. The reason appears plain and simple: it is because a majority of Japanese are convinced that their government, which released the Chinese captain prematurely, has erred, and that it is putting the cart before the horse by trying to hunt for and indict the person who presumably was driven by a desperate sense of justice to inform the public. Even some members of the ruling Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) have voiced their anger over the captain’s premature release. Right after the captain was let go, 43 DPJ members led by Akihisa Nagashima, former Parliamentary Vice Minister for Defense Affairs, issued a “petition.” Seventy-three others including Jin Matsubara, a member of the House of Representatives, announced “an urgent communiqué,” protesting the government’s decision and its meek posture towards China.

　　　However, instead of admitting his responsibility as Chief Cabinet Secretary, Sengoku introduced the idea to fortify the laws regulating protection of sensitive national security information. I myself feel very strongly that such laws must be revised because, unfortunately, there have been cases in which the international community questioned Japan’s credibility with regard to the management of sensitive information, especially concerning national and international security. However, I do think creation and maintenance of a solid information management infrastructure and the recent video leak are two diagonally different matters that must not be dealt with on the same plane. In a word, the video leak is the responsibility of the Kan administration, and why that is so is self-evident if one reviews how this whole incident has been handled.

　　　The collision itself occurred in the morning of September 7 and its entire sequence was video-taped on the spot. The Chinese side quickly launched a series of protests which never ceased to intensify, such as summoning the Japanese ambassador in Beijing five times, but throughout the crisis the Japanese side has failed to work out any telling countermeasures. In fact, the Japanese government initially even lacked a proper awareness of the grave problems the incident embraced. It was largely because Kan was too preoccupied with matters relating to the DPJ presidential election, which was held a week after the collision. Kan was campaigning hard in a desperate effort to beat Ichiro Ozawa, his powerful opponent who was formerly the DJP Secretary-General.

　　　Meanwhile, any employee of the JCG was in a position to view the video. As a matter of fact, such a video constitutes an ideal tool when it comes to teaching and/or learning how to cope with a real contingency at sea. One would deem it quite natural for many of the JCG staffers to want to view it. The prime minister and the chief cabinet secretary, too preoccupied with the intra-party election to take the Senkaku Incident seriously, completely failed to make the necessary assertions regarding Japan’s sovereignty over the islands and the waters around them. Furthermore, the Japanese government has failed to explain convincingly – both domestically and internationally – the full scope of the incident. Messrs. Kan and Sengoku defended their inaction by repeatedly calling their response “rational and mature.” It all sounds hollow, but one thing is certain; these two men, lacking the ability to responsibly deal with a national crisis over matters pertaining to sovereignty, certainly are in no position to bring charges against those involved in the task of actually protecting Japanese territories.

　　　On November 8, the prime minister agreed to be interviewed by CNN, and told the interviewer: “I believe that in any country matters relating to its territory inevitably provoke strong sentiments among the people of that country. But I trust that five years, or ten years down the road, people then will appreciate how my cabinet dealt with the issue in a calm manner.” This is certainly a baffling statement from the politician supposedly in charge of Japan.

　　　Any person who deplores the sad reality of Japan’s national interests being impaired must naturally be angered by the absence of a resolute government policy. This I believe is the crucial factor prompting the leak of the video. That is why this whole problem must be dealt with by Messrs. Kan and Sengoku by first recognizing they have been in error in the handling of the Senkaku Incident. Only afterwards can they realistically begin to discuss how to fortify the laws to protect sensitive national security information.

　　　Those in the leadership position must grasp how things are evolving around them by first viewing the big picture, and then decide on what steps to follow. Unfortunately, one has so far failed to detect any signs of Messrs. Kan and Sengoku showing the willingness to learn. Meanwhile, China this time appears to be already learning some important lessons from the recent run-in with Japan as well as with other nations bordering the South China Sea. Points out Professor Tadae Takubo, Deputy Director of the Japan Institute of National Fundamentals (JINF), a 100 percent privately-financed think tank headquartered in Tokyo:

Signs of A Shift in China’s Diplomacy?

　　　“’The Global Times,’ a hugely influential newspaper affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party organ ‘People’s Daily,’ recently carried an editorial which indicated China needs to ‘consider holding back a little bit’ on territorial issues in the East China Sea and the South China Sea, because “what China needs to do is not simply to get tougher.’ This incidentally was reported only very briefly in the Sankei Shimbun, one of Japan’s major dailies. This may be a sign that China is switching its diplomacy from a hard line to a softer line. A meticulous analysis of this shift is mandatory.”

　　　The editorial noted that China’s high-handed posture over territorial issues has aggravated fear of the country among East Asian nations to the benefit of the United States, as these countries have sought closer ties with the U.S. Also, because the Senkaku Islands are under the control of Japan and “cannot be taken back in a short period of time,” China must switch to a softer foreign policy befitting the reality of Asia today.

　　　The current situation reminds one of what happened to China at the time of the 1996 presidential election in Taiwan. To prevent the election of Lee Ten-hui, a tough advocate of Taiwan’s independence, China fired missiles into the Straits of Taiwan. But the international community, as well as Taiwan, reacted sharply against China’s military pressure, and Lee was elected president despite China’s efforts to fail him through intimidation. Realizing that a get-tough policy had created an adverse effect, China then switched to a flexible policy towards Taiwan with an emphasis on the promotion of economic and cultural interchange. Today, Taiwan is falling further under China’s influence through this more flexible, “smile diplomacy.”

　　　The hard line policy towards Japan which China this time demonstrated has created the unwelcome effect of compelling the United States to declare that Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty does indeed cover the Senkaku Islands, and propose there be a tripartite (U.S.-Japan-China) conference to resolve the Senkaku problem. In addition, Asian nations are this time highly critical of China, even including South Korea, which has an on-going territorial dispute with Japan over the Takeshima (“Tokto” in Korean) Island in the Sea of Japan.

　　　International criticism against China also intensified over the Nobel Peace Prize incident involving novelist and human rights activist Liu Xiaobo. Professor Takubo notes that the top echelon in the Chinese government may now be reflecting on their diplomatic approach in much the same way as they did when China fired missiles into the Taiwan Strait to intimidate Taiwan, adding that the Global Times editorial sends a noteworthy message.

　　　Maybe so. But, even if so, one should not be misled into believing that China’s shift to soft power diplomacy means it is also discarding its goal of one day taking over the Senkaku Islands, as well as the whole of the East China Sea. It is only a shift of the method and means of China’s diplomatic strategy. The important thing is not to be readily overjoyed at China’s mild manners and smiles, which are only skin deep after all. At the same time, Japan should make every effort to cope flexibly with the expected Chinese posture. Additionally, it would seen mandatory for Japan to develop the mettle – as well as military power – with which to defend itself.

(Translated from “Renaissance Japan” column No. 436 in the November 18, 2010 issue of The Weekly Shincho.)