China has brazenly begun drilling for natural gas at the Shirakaba (“Chunxiao” to the Chinese) gas field in the East China Sea. Having earlier brought in drilling equipment, it appears that the Chinese started their drilling at least by September 17, as evidenced by a discoloring of the surface in the area which appeared at the time. An aerial photo on the front page of the September 18 edition of the mass-circulation Asahi Shimbun newspaper clearly shows the change in color. The start of the drilling comes shortly after the so-called “Senkaku incident,” in which a Chinese fishing trawler violated Japanese territorial waters, also in the East China Sea.
　　　China has built a drilling platform only 4 kilometers within the Chinese side of the median line which divides the adjacent Japanese and Chinese exclusive economic zones (EEZs). A huge deposit of undersea natural resources, believed to embrace an estimated 4.7 billion cubic meters of natural gas plus 3.8 billion barrels of oil, stretches across both zones. If China continues drilling unilaterally, neglecting a bilateral agreement reached in 2008 between the two governments on joint development of the gas field, China can easily siphon natural gas from the deposit within the Japanese EEZ. It is for this reason that Japan, since the days of the Liberal-Democratic administration, has continuously asserted that China should under no circumstances carry out unilateral development.
　　　Since 2008, when China finally agreed on the joint development after protracted negotiations, the Japanese government has made clear it would take “countervailing measures” should China begin unilateral drilling operations in the field, demonstrating what then looked like a strong will to restrict Chinese moves not reflecting the spirit of the agreement.
　　　How does one ascertain drilling has actually begun at a submarine gas field? There has constantly been a single — though somewhat primitive — answer to this in Japan: study the degree of discoloration of the surface seawater. Japanese politicians and bureaucrats have continuously repeated that discoloration of the seawater in a suspected area is sure-fire proof that deep-sea drilling has started. And the seawater in the area around the Shirakaba drilling platform became visibly discolored twice after the September 7 trawler incident. Said Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara on October 11, responding to a question from the media:
　　　“We have confirmed that the Chinese have indeed transported drilling equipment to the area. However, we have yet to officially confirm that they have actually started drilling there. Rest assured that the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy is examining the situation very closely.”
　　　Meanwhile, Hirohide Hirai, chief of the agency’s Oil and Natural Gas section, said on September 24, at a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Division of the No. 1 opposition LDP, that there is “a high possibility that drilling has already begun.” And yet, saying it is “still confirming,” the DPJ government is actually procrastinating — whatever the reason may be — reluctant to work out the “countervailing” measures — an act that can only be described as a gutless escape from reality. Such a posture can only encourage China to entertain a mistaken notion that they can get away with it. On this matter, Mr. Maehara has this to say:
　　　“We are currently in consultation with China on a broad range of Japan-China issues including this particular case. The Chinese side made the move (regarding Shirakaba) while Japan still held the Chinese trawler captain in custody for violating Japanese territorial waters around Senkaku. After his release, however, their attitude has obviously changed. We are analyzing the Chinese posture, collectively and minutely, including the recent change following the release.”
　　　However, Mr. Maehara acknowledged that, as of October 8, the Chinese government has plainly failed to reply to queries from its Japanese counterpart, as well as the fact that the surface seawater around the Shirakaba drilling platform became markedly discolored on two occasions since September 17 — obvious signs the Chinese undersea drilling operations were underway with  drills pulled out of the seabed and cement poured in to fill the gap.

The Real Strategic Importance of the Sea Area in Question
　　　Professor Shigeo Hiramatsu, a leading Japanese expert on China’s political and national defense policies, was instrumental in reporting on the problems concerning the Chinese development of the East China Sea gas field, and has since repeatedly warned the Japanese government about the dire implications for Japan. Judging from the present circumstances, he asserts that drilling by China is definitely in progress. Professor Hiramatsu notes that China obviously has thrown the bilateral agreement into the wastebasket, warning that the people in Japan, blinded by the recent Senkaku incident, have created a precarious situation in which they are not paying much attention to the far more critical issue pertaining to the East China Sea gas field. Explains Professor Hiramatsu:
　　　“A closer look at where Shirakaba is located will allow you to have a bigger picture of the strategic importance of this part of the East China Sea. When China eventually attempts to move into the western Pacific, Shirakaba will become one area the Chinese fleet must sail, no matter what. Stated differently, it means that if China takes control of the waters there, the U.S. fleet won’t be able to come near the Chinese coast through this route. Study the map of this entire region, and you will begin to recognize that China actually is using development of natural gas at Shirakaba, as well as oil resources elsewhere in the region, simply as a pretext for pursuing their real objective — that of establishing a stronghold for its grand scheme of eventually advancing far into the western Pacific. I, for one, have been made acutely aware of the strategic importance of this sea region.”
　　　In 1996, when China fired a total of 13 missiles into the Strait of Taiwan, the United States deployed two aircraft carriers. One of them, the Independence, sailed northward from the western Pacific between the main island of Okinawa and the outer island of Miyako-jima, then headed west to reach Taiwan’s second biggest port of Keelung. The U.S. managed to cope with the 1996 Third Taiwan Strait Crisis because it commanded the very sea area in question in an emergency, allowing the Independence to sail unobstructed.
　　　China readily withdrew in1996 in the face of strong pressure from the U.S., which made clear its commitment to defend Taiwan. There is no knowing if it will do so in the future. If Japan this time is to allow China’s unilateral drilling at the Shirakaba gas field, it will run the risk of conceding to China as much as half of the entire East China Sea, which constitutes Japan’s legitimate exclusive economic zone (EEZ). In other words, Japan would end up by making huge concessions in the face of China’s claim that the entire East Asian Sea belongs to China. If that should happen, China’s control over the East China Sea would so drastically be increased as to make the waters not readily accessible even to the U.S.
　　　China maintains three fleets — the North Sea Fleet headquartered in Qingdao, the East Sea Fleet in Ningbo, Zhejiang province, and the South Sea Fleet at Zhanjiang in Guangdong Province. To advance to the Pacific Ocean, the North Sea Fleet and the East Sea Fleet must sail past the Shirakaba area and between the Main Island of Okinawa and Miyako-jima Island. Warned Prof. Hiramatsu:
　　　“What the Chinese are eyeing beyond their activities in the East China Sea is Japan’s Sakishima chain of islets which includes Senkaku and Miyako-jima, the sea area between Miyako-jima and the main island of Okinawa, and the main island of Okinawa itself. China is maneuvering to place these territories, land and sea, under its command. If the present situation, most serious as it is, remains neglected by Japan, not only will it allow the entire East China Sea to come under Chinese influence, but will readily let the Chinese navy sail down south through the “Miyako Sea Region,” so to speak, in its drive to advance to the western Pacific. This would not only put China in an advantageous position to invade Taiwan, but would make such a move virtually assured of success.”
　　　In case of a contingency in the South China Sea, it will become mandatory for China’s North Sea Fleet and East Sea Fleet to sail southward via the Strait of Taiwan. Meanwhile, if an emergency develops in the East China Sea or the Yellow Sea, the South Sea Fleet must also pass through the Strait of Taiwan as it sails northward. Controlling Taiwan is therefore seen by the Chinese as an overriding necessity. And it would seem logical to presume that China’s increased dominance over Taiwan will be pursued concurrently with a strategy to restrain Japan’s activities in the East China Sea, thereby increasing Chinese control over the entire land and sea of the East Asian region. Again, it is precisely for this reason that Japan should not readily give in to China in the East China Sea.

Diplomacy by Force of Words Alone
　　　Foreign Minister Maehara says he hopes to resolve the problems involving the East China Sea in the spirit of cooperation which made possible the 2008 bilateral agreement on joint gas field development between Japan and China. But can that really be attainable merely by resorting to the force of words as the means of diplomacy? This matter inevitably confronts Japan with the fundamental question of whether, as a sovereign state, it is determined — and able — to squarely tackle the problems affecting its inherent land and sea rights. Unless its leaders are ready to say “Yes” to this question from the bottom of their hearts and pledge to take appropriate action whenever needed — such as a prompt decision to start Japan’s own test-drilling at Shirakaba — all words will be meaningless no matter how flowery they may be.
　　　Following a brief dialogue with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in Brussels on October 6, Prime Minister Naoto Kan remarked that he is “hopeful that (Japan-China relations) will get back to where they were (before the Senkaku incident).” So the premier hopes to start from where he met Chinese President Hu Jintao shortly after taking office in July to confirm that both nations will benefit from a strategic and reciprocal relationship. But, what is the point of “getting back to where they were” if none of the existing problems are resolved, including the Senkaku incident and the unilateral drilling by China of the Shirakaba gas field?
　　　During deliberations at the lower house of the parliament on October 6, Kan made headlines by openly accusing an opposition questioner of using “foul language even I have never dared use while being a vocal opposition member before” — an accusation that was widely off the mark. In fact, the questions were worded properly, their content absolutely pertinent. Reminded by his aides later that his accusations were unsubstantiated, Kan ended up by offering an apology the following day.
　　　Unfortunately, this is not the first time we have seen the prime minister lose control of himself. Nicknamed “Fretful Kan,” he is widely known to have often poured out a torrent of abuse on bureaucrats during briefings on matters of vital importance to the state’s security and welfare. At a study group session held at the premier’s office prior to his diplomatic debut at the United Nations in New York in late September, for instance, an irritated Kan banged the table and bellowed at a group of bureaucrats who had come to offer their expert opinions. Obviously, the difficulties involving Japan-China relations centering around the Senkaku incident were putting him on edge at the time. However, when “Senkaku” cropped up, Kan had been spending almost all his time and energy on his election campaigns as a candidate for the next party leader and premier. Therefore, it actually must have been impossible for him to work out appropriate countermeasures and handle the situation effectively. Notwithstanding his own failures for which he should be personally responsible, however, Kan blustered at his men using “revolting words and phrases” one would not dare reintroduce here.
　　　Rather than taking it out on his men using strong language unbecoming a man of his position, Mr. Kan should make a conscious effort to devote more time and energy to pondering over the serious implications of the national and international issues centering around security — and speak his mind, which he rarely does, on how he as the man in charge of Japan intends to tackle the many critical problems confronting his nation, particularly the crucial matter of China’s hidden ambitions concerning the Senkaku Islands and the East China Sea.

(Translated from “Renaissance Japan” column No. 432 in the October 21 issue of “The Weekly Shincho.”)